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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1  Europe’s challenges 
As the European Union (EU) struggles to maintain its political momentum in the face of 
growing  popular  resentment  against  further  integration,  its  economic  model  is  also 
challenged. Its two most important economic projects are the new common currency, the 
euro, and the Lisbon agenda to stimulate the competitiveness of European economies. 
However, both projects face headwinds. The long-run sustainability of the euro is by no 
means guaranteed, which is exemplified by the resistance of France and Germany to the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the fiscal pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
In  addition,  European  competitiveness  has  slipped  to  such  an  extent  compared  to 
resurgent growth in the United States that the European Commission (2004) speaks of 
Europe’s ‘structural productivity problem.’ 
In this study, I analyze a number of aspects of these two major policy projects. 
These analyses show that the challenges to these programs are related in various ways. 
The  key  policy  prescription  is  that  the  flexibility  of  European  economies  should  be 
enhanced,  specifically  by  reducing  regulatory  burdens,  stimulating  (cross-border) 
movement  of  labour  and  freeing  up  trade  in  services.  These  measures  will  help  in 
responding  to  economic  shocks,  whether  these  shocks  are  cyclical  disturbances  or 
technological opportunities. The United States represents an example, where both adverse 
local cyclical developments are absorbed without too much economic pain as well as new 
technologies successfully exploited. 
The  competitiveness  of  European  economies,  and  specifically  the  rate  of 
productivity growth, is important to ensure a high standard of living. In the short run, a 
higher income per capita can also be realized through a higher employment rate, but 
while the employment rate cannot increase indefinitely, no such limits are apparent for 
productivity. This issue is set to become more important in the upcoming decades as 
‘baby boomers’ retire and working-age populations shrink in most European countries. Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Strong productivity growth can ensure that pension systems remain solvent without a 
decline in living standards for current workers. 
Much  commentary  currently  focuses  on  the  spectacular  growth  performance  of 
India  and  China,  with  cheap  manufactured  goods  from  China  and  outsourced  ICT 
services  from  India  threatening  parts  of  the  European  and  American  economies. 
However,  the  immediate  impact  should  not  be  exaggerated.  In  terms  of  income  and 
productivity levels these countries still lag Europe and the U.S. by decades, so the rise of 
China and India mostly stimulates a more efficient division of labour.
1 When confronted 
with  cheap  imports,  the  most  sustainable  strategy  is  to  compete  on  quality  and 
innovativeness because the closure of Europe’s borders against those imports provides 
only temporary relief at best, or worse, slows down structural improvement even further. 
A more immediate challenge for Europe is the resurgence of U.S. productivity growth. 
Whereas the average productivity level of the European Union was at the same level as 
the U.S. around the mid-1990s, a new productivity gap has opened up since. The strong 
performance of the American economy over the past decade stands in stark contrast to the 
lower GDP growth rates and higher levels of inactivity in many European economies. 
This suggests that Europe’s competitive and innovative capabilities are lacking.  
Despite these grudges against Europe’s economies, it should be stressed that the 
European integration process of the past half century has been a remarkable success. 
Although  still  incomplete  (particularly  in  the  area  of  services),  the  realization  of  an 
internal market has created one of the largest economic free trade areas in the world, 
providing an enormous potential for growth and productivity gains. The Lisbon agenda is 
essentially meant to realize this potential by focusing on economic reforms, more jobs 
and innovation.  
The other main economic project is the adoption of a common currency by twelve 
European  countries.  An  important  reason  for  adopting  the  euro  has  been  to  support 
further economic integration and growth within the euro area. In addition it was meant to 
provide a framework for a more robust fiscal and monetary regime in an area that is so 
                                                 
1 GDP per person engaged in China and India is between ten and twenty percent of levels seen in Europe 
and the U.S. Even at current growth rates, it will take until at least 2040 before productivity levels would be 
at similar levels. Chapter 1 Introduction 
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strongly integrated. As such, it represents an experiment of a unique scale in modern 
times. Still it is by no means certain that this project will ultimately turn out to be a 
success. For example, while Germany was one of the most vocal advocates of adopting 
strict fiscal rules to complement the common monetary policy, it has been among the first 
countries  to  break  those  rules.  Even  if  the  euro  delivers  benefits  by  way  of  greater 
competitiveness, there is a risk that these gains are outweighed by the costs of a common 
monetary policy.
2 Upon joining the euro area, the member countries surrendered their 
monetary policy and thereby an instrument to dampen the effects of recessions. Unless 
recessions occur at the same time in all member countries, monetary policy will not be 
suitable for all countries. 
This study analyzes the challenges Europe faces in these two economic projects and 
the implications for European competitiveness from a number of different perspectives.
3 
The next section discusses the prospects for the euro and the effects of the heterogeneity 
of the euro area, setting the stage for Chapters 2 and 3. Their main goal is to determine 
whether  the  costs  of  the  common  currency  may  become  unsustainable  in  the  future. 
Section 1.3 presents recent productivity developments and introduces Chapters 4 and 5. 
These  chapters  evaluate  the  importance  of  new  information  and  communication 
technologies (ICT) diffusion and of cyclical factors in explaining the productivity growth 
gap with the United States. Through the analysis of Europe’s productivity problem, these 
chapters  suggest  ways  in  which  the  goals  of  the  Lisbon  agenda  could  be  achieved. 
Finally, Section 1.4 sketches the agenda for reform based on the findings of this study as 
well as other research and brings the two topics together in an integral fashion. 
1.2  The costs of the euro and variations in business cycles 
The most important consequence of the adoption of a common currency in the euro area 
is that monetary policy is the same for all member countries. In setting this policy, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) should only respond to economic developments in the area 
as  a  whole,  but  this  may  not  be  suitable  for  all  countries  in  the  monetary  union.  If 
                                                 
2 Some would argue that the euro was introduced mainly for political reasons. Nevertheless, the costs of the 
euro may come to outweigh the combined economic and political benefits. 
3 This book deals exclusively with the 15 EU member states from before the accession of ten new member 
countries in May 2004. Europe and EU-15 will be used interchangeably. Chapter 1 Introduction 
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business cycles vary substantially across countries within the euro area, monetary policy 
will be too accommodating for some countries, and too strict for others.
4 This issue is not 
just of academic interest as research by Nitsch (2004) has shown that inflation differences 
have led to the dissolution of currency unions in the past, and these inflation differences 
are (to a certain extent) related to differences in business cycles. 
Figure 1.1 Euro area cycle and the range of cycles for euro area countries, 1987-
2003 
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Notes: Business cycle is estimated as the Baxter-King (1999) band pass filtered log of quarterly GDP of a synthetic euro area and each of 
the euro area countries, estimated over the period 1970-2003. Minimum is the smallest value for filtered GDP  in any of the euro area 
countries in a specific quarter Maximum is the largest value for any of the countries.
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, supplemented with Eurostat and national data, see Table 1.1
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates this problem by showing output relative to trend for the euro 
area for the period 1987-2003.
5 As the figure shows, periods where output was above 
trend  have  alternated  with  periods  of  below-trend  output.  Periods  where  output  is 
substantially  below  trend,  such  as  in  the  early  1990s,  are  commonly  referred  to  as 
recessions.
6  In  addition  to  the  euro  area  cycle,  the  highest  and  lowest  output  of  the 
individual countries relative to their own trend is also shown. This makes clear that at 
                                                 
4 Monetary policy can have a short-run effect on economic activity if there are frictions in the economy 
such as sticky prices (e.g. Calvo, 1983) or sticky information (e.g. Mankiw and Reis, 2002). 
5 The business cycle estimates are based on quarterly GDP series filtered using a band pass filter. The GDP 
series  are  mostly  drawn  from  the  OECD’s  Quarterly  National  Accounts  publication, supplemented  by 
national sources. The band pass filter used is described in Baxter and King (1999) and discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 3. 
6 See Chapter 2 for more details on defining recessions. Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
  19 
nearly any point in time, output in some countries is above trend, while in others it is 
below trend. In other words, a very heterogeneous set of countries has adopted a common 
currency  in  1999.  In  the  short  run,  this  may  not  be  a  problem  for  monetary  policy 
decisions since the ECB only needs to worry about economic developments in the euro 
area as a whole. In the long run though, it will be difficult for a country to be part of a 
monetary union if its business cycle is not (broadly) in line with that of other member 
countries. 
A  problem  that  does  surface  in  the  short  run  is  that  GDP  estimates  are  made 
quarterly and released with substantial delays whereas the ECB has to set its benchmark 
interest  rates  each  month.  It  is  therefore  useful  to  have  more  frequent  and  timely 
estimates of the state of the economy by way of business cycle indexes. These indexes 
are meant to reflect the current state of the economy and its likely development in the 
near future by using data that are more frequently available and timelier than GDP data. 
One  can  choose  from  a  wealth  of  series  that  are  generally  available  at  a  monthly 
frequency: industrial production, sales, consumer and business confidence, etc. For policy 
makers, it is relevant how these data can best be combined into an informative index of 
the state of the economy. This question is even more pressing for the euro area since less 
is known about the structure of this economic area as a whole. Particularly given the less 
than perfect correspondence between country cycles, it is important to know how much 
information is lost when focusing on a dataset of limited size for the largest euro area 
countries.  
Chapter 2 examines how many different series are needed to get a good description 
of the euro area business cycle. The main finding in this chapter is that an index based on 
a relatively limited amount of economic series (less than forty) for France, Germany and 
Spain  is  able  to  capture  the  main  cyclical  facts  for  the  euro  area.  However,  another 
finding  is  that  comparable  variables  in  different  countries  have  different  effects.  For 
example, German industrial production is much more important in explaining movements 
in euro area GDP than comparable series for France and Spain. This again brings the 
heterogeneity from Figure 1.1 to mind. 
Although this heterogeneity is not crucial for short run policy making, in the long 
run, the monetary union is at risk if the common monetary policy is not suitable for most Chapter 1 Introduction 
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countries, most of the time. Of course it is not always the same country that has either the 
maximum or minimum output gap in Figure 1.1, so it is useful to look at the correlation 
of (detrended) output of each country with euro area output.
7 As Table 1.1 shows, the 
correlation with the euro area aggregate is on average higher for euro area countries than 
for the other countries in the table. However, this still leaves some countries with either 
an unrelated business cycle (Greece) or relatively low correlations (Finland, Portugal, 
Spain). On the other hand, although countries like Switzerland or Norway are not part of 
the European Union, they both had a business cycle that closely resembled the euro area 
cycle. 
Table 1.1  Output correlation  of  European  and  non-European  countries  with  the 
euro area, 1999-2003 
Euro area countries (average: 0.65)
Austria 0.78* Ireland 0.81*
Belgium 0.83* Italy 0.95*
Finland 0.47* Netherlands 0.71*
France 0.98* Portugal 0.47*
Germany 0.97* Spain 0.47*
Greece -0.26
Other countries (average: 0.38)
Australia -0.57* Norway 0.63*
Canada 0.44 Sweden 0.57*
Denmark 0.64* Switzerland 0.91*
Japan 0.63* UK 0.65*
New Zealand -0.25 US 0.17
Notes: Correlations between band pass filtered quarterly GDP for each country and the 
euro area aggregate. The euro area aggregate excludes the country in question for euro 
area correlations. * denotes a correlation significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts, supplemented with Eurostat data for 
Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, for Japan with data from the Cabinet 
Office (SNA68 series), for Spain from INE (SNA68 series) and for Canada with data 
from Statistics Canada.
 
While  Table  1.1  shows  that  the  business  cycles  of  euro  area  countries  are  not 
perfectly correlated with the euro area aggregate, this may not be a big problem if the 
                                                 
7  Comparing  (detrended)  output  of  individual  countries  to  the  euro  area  aggregate  would  bias  the 
correlations, since the country is part of the euro area aggregate. Therefore, each country is compared to an 
aggregate of all euro area countries, excluding the country under analysis. Chapter 1 Introduction 
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economies  in  each  country  are  flexible  enough  to  adjust  through  a  high  mobility  of 
capital but especially of labour. To see why this is the case, imagine that one of the euro 
area countries is hit by an adverse demand shock to its main export products. As a result, 
workers in the export industry will become unemployed and the country as a whole may 
enter a recession. However, if unemployed workers can easily find employment in a euro 
area  country  with  excess  demand  for  its  products,  the  adverse  effects  will  be  much 
smaller for the first country. This underpins the idea that the costs of a common currency 
will be low when business cycles are very similar or when the economies are flexible 
enough  to  adjust  to  asymmetric  shocks.  In  a  recent  paper,  de  Grauwe  and  Mongelli 
(2005) show this relationship in the following way. 
Figure 1.2 The costs of a common currency for different levels of synchronization 
and flexibility 
 
The net benefits of adopting a common currency depend to a large extent on these 
two dimensions discussed above.
8 De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) argue that the euro 
area has the right combination of synchronization and flexibility, while the European 
Union as a whole falls short. While the exact net benefits are hard to establish, Chapter 3 
examines whether euro area countries will become more synchronized as economic and 
monetary integration increases. If synchronization is likely to rise under monetary union, 
                                                 
8  De  Grauwe  and  Mongelli  (2005)  also  look  at  the  degree  of  economic  integration,  a  topic  which  is 
discussed in more detail later. 
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the pressure for greater flexibility might decrease – at least from the perspective of the 
cost of the euro. 
The effect of monetary integration on synchronization may be evaluated directly by 
examining whether more stable exchange rate regimes in Europe over the past decades 
have led to more synchronized cycles. After the demise of the Bretton-Woods golden-
dollar standard in the early 1970s, exchange rates were allowed to be determined by 
market  forces.  However,  within  Europe,  arrangements  like  the  Exchange  Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) were set up to stabilize exchange rates from the late 1970s onwards, 
culminating  in  the  launch  of  the  euro  in  1999.  A  test  of  the  impact  of  monetary 
integration is to see whether business cycles have become more similar as exchange rates 
have become more stable over time. A second approach to this problem is to look at the 
long run experience of business cycles within an existing monetary union. Since the U.S. 
is similar in size to the euro area, the history of business cycle synchronization between 
its states provides useful information. Finally, to draw policy-relevant conclusions, it is 
necessary  to  know  the  determinants  of  synchronization.  Of  specific  interest  is  the 
importance of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy relative to trade links and other 
structural economic characteristics such as specialization in explaining synchronization. 
These factors are important because in addition to common monetary policy between 
EMU  countries,  differences  in  fiscal  policy  are  also  (to  some  extent)  kept  in  bound 
through  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  In  addition,  one  might  expect  trade  links  to 
become  stronger  due  to  fixed  exchange  rates  and  specialization.  Chapter  3  aims  to 
disentangle how each of these consequences of economic integration affects business 
cycle synchronization. 
The analyses in Chapter 3 show that there is no strong trend towards ever greater 
synchronization,  neither  in  Europe  nor  in  the  United  States.  However,  as  Table  1.1 
showed, the degree of synchronization within the euro area has been higher than between 
OECD  countries  in  general,  and  this  has  been  the  case  since  the  mid  1980s.  More 
coordinated  monetary policy and  more stable  exchange  rates have contributed to this 
development, as have  more similar trade  flows, fiscal policy and a  greater degree of 
financial integration. As the monetary union becomes more established, synchronization 
is likely to increase even further, to levels similar to those between U.S. states. These Chapter 1 Introduction 
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results  suggest  that  the  costs  of  the  euro  are  likely  to  be  sufficiently  low  to  sustain 
political support for the euro. There are important uncertainties though, mainly about 
whether fiscal policy will remain relatively similar and to what extent specialization will 
increase  or  decrease.  These  uncertainties  argue  for  greater  flexibility  of  European 
economies, as well as the fact that a greater degree of flexibility will increase the net 
benefits of monetary union (Figure 1.2). In addition, research for the U.S. by Kim (1995) 
has  shown  that  specialization  tends  to  decrease  as  production  factors  more  mobile. 
Furthermore,  measures  to  stimulate  (cross-border)  labour  mobility  will  also  improve 
European competitiveness by making it easier to exploit new technologies. 
1.3  Competitiveness in Europe 
In the long run, the only way to increase income per head of population is to increase 
productivity. In general, per capita income can increase because a) a greater share of the 
population is employed, b) employed persons work more hours or c) output per hour 
worked increases.  While there are natural limits to the employment rate and average 
hours worked, productivity growth is in principle unbounded. This makes it particularly 
worrisome that over the past decade, labour productivity growth in Europe has slowed 
down, while U.S. growth accelerated.
9 
                                                 
9 A low employment rate is also among the challenges facing Europe, but this is not dealt with in detail in 
this thesis. See e.g. Garibaldi and Mauro (2002) and McGuckin and van Ark (2005). Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Figure 1.3 Trend growth in GDP per hour worked in the EU-15 and U.S., 1979-2004 
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Figure 1.3 plots trend labour productivity growth for Europe and the U.S. for the 
period 1979-2004.
10 The figure shows that European growth outstripped U.S. growth for 
most of this period, but the roles have reversed since the mid-1990s. From 1995 onwards, 
there is a clear rise in U.S. trend growth, while the European trend has been decreasing. 
Table 1.2 shows that despite much faster GDP growth, U.S. productivity growth outpaced 
European growth by a small margin during the ‘boom’-period between 1995 and 2000 
because of the strong growth in U.S. hours. After 2000, GDP growth decreased in both 
Europe and the U.S., but the productivity growth gap widened substantially. The upside 
of this development is that European employment growth has been higher than in the 
U.S. since 2000. This could mean that Europe has ‘traded off’ productivity growth for 
employment growth. But one might as well turn this conclusion around and ask why 
GDP growth has not increased in line with higher employment growth.
11 
                                                 
10 The underlying data are from the GGDC (2005a) Total Economy Database. The trend is estimated using 
a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. Note that as with any filter, the estimates for the beginning and end of the 
sample are less reliable than the other years. This mostly affects the first and last two years. When one is 
only interested in long-run trends, the Hodrick-Prescott filter is somewhat more convenient than the band 
pass filter used for Figure 1.1. As Chapter 3 describes in detail, the differences are generally not large. 
11 For more on the relationship between productivity and employment growth, see McGuckin and Van Ark 
(2005). Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Table 1.2 Growth of output, employment and productivity in Europe and the U.S., 
1987-2004 
1987-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004 1987-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004
GDP growth 2.2 2.7 1.4 2.7 4.0 2.5
Growth in total hours worked 0.0 0.9 0.4 1.6 1.9 -0.4
Growth in GDP per hour worked 2.2 1.8 1.0 1.1 2.1 2.9
Source: GGDC (2005a)
EU-15 U.S.
 
By now, most researchers agree that ICT has played a key role in the post-1995 
productivity acceleration in the U.S., partly through strong productivity growth in the 
ICT production sector and partly through an ICT investment boom across the economy. 
Chapter 4  quantifies  and  analyzes  these  effects  for both the  American and  European 
economies and asks why European growth has not taken off in tandem with the U.S. In 
an accounting sense, U.S. productivity growth has outstripped European growth because 
ICT production is a larger sector in the U.S. and because ICT investment has been higher 
than in Europe. However, a considerable fraction of the growth gap cannot be traced to a 
rise in capital or labour input and is labelled as total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
TFP growth has been especially important in raising the contribution of market services 
to aggregate labour productivity growth. 
To shed light on the role of TFP  growth in understanding the productivity  gap 
between the U.S. and Europe, one of the assumptions underlying the neoclassical growth 
accounting framework is relaxed. Instead of assuming that the marginal productivity of 
ICT capital is equal to its marginal cost, econometric techniques are used to estimate the 
marginal product. It turns out that the marginal product of ICT has followed a U-shaped 
pattern over time. Up to the early 1980s, ICT capital returned its marginal cost, but since 
then it turned negative. It was not until the start of the 1990s that the productivity and 
costs  of  ICT  capital  came  back  into  balance  again.  Furthermore,  these  developments 
occurred  a  few  years  earlier  in  the  UK  and  U.S.  than  in  France,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands. 
One explanation for this pattern is that the relatively straightforward savings from 
ICT were realized early on in the diffusion process. However, additional productivity 
gains  first  required  complementary  innovations  in  organizational  change  and 
(unmeasured) investment in intangible capital. This appears of particular importance in Chapter 1 Introduction 
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services industries. An example can be found in retail trade. While it has been relatively 
straightforward to adopt barcode scanning in supermarkets to speed up check-out, it has 
been much harder and time-consuming to reorganize the supply chain and take advantage 
of the increased information on customer purchases. As a result, after the initial cost 
savings, it took a long time before a noticeable impact on productivity could again be 
found. It can be argued that restrictive product and labour market regulation are important 
reasons  for  lagging  ICT  diffusion  in  Europe.  Such  regulations  may  have  hampered 
complementary innovations, making ICT investment less profitable.
12 
While Chapter 4 focuses on structural explanations for differences in productivity 
growth, cyclical factors cannot be discounted out of hand. Figure 1.3 showed productivity 
growth trend estimates because year-to-year changes in productivity tend to fluctuate, 
obscuring  longer  run  patterns.
13  These  fluctuations  are  not  just  random  noise. 
Productivity growth tends to be procyclical, i.e. it is generally higher during economic 
expansions than during recessions. As a result, some have argued that business cycles are 
caused  by  technology  shocks,  the  so-called  Real  Business  Cycle  theory.  Another 
explanation for procyclicality is that firms may decide not to immediately fire workers 
during  downturns  in  demand,  but  instead  ‘hoard’  those  workers  until  economic 
conditions  improve.  Chapter  5  examines  a  number  of  explanations  for  cyclical 
productivity for three European countries and the United States. 
The  analysis  in  Chapter  5  relaxes  two  key  assumptions  commonly  used  in  the 
empirical productivity literature, namely constant returns to scale (if all inputs increase 
by  one  percent,  output  is  assumed  to  increase  by  that  same  one  percent)  and  exact 
measurement of labour and capital input. Instead, the analysis allows for variable returns 
to scale and unmeasured variation in capital utilization and labour effort. The results 
provide  only  limited  statistical  evidence  against  constant  returns  to  scale  and  well-
measured  inputs.  Furthermore,  even  when  taking  the  limited  evidence  at  face  value, 
productivity appears still procyclical in many industries. Most relevant for this study, the 
stylized facts about productivity growth do not change when allowing for variable returns 
                                                 
12 See McGuckin, Spiegelman and van Ark (2005) for more on productivity growth in retail trade. 
13 See also Inklaar and McGuckin (2003) on this topic. Chapter 1 Introduction 
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to  scale  or  unmeasured  input  utilization,  confirming  the  importance  of  supply-side 
factors. 
1.4  An agenda for reform 
Although there are still important gaps in our understanding, the research presented in 
this study points at a number of directions in which European economic performance can 
be  improved.  Foremost  among  these  are  reforms  to  foster  flexibility  of  product  and 
labour markets. European firms are exploiting new technologies at a much slower rate 
than  their  American  counterparts  and  as  a  result,  Europe  is  missing  out  on  potential 
productivity growth. Removing barriers to entry and growth of new firms can help spur 
ICT  investment  and  foster  the  necessary  complementary  innovations.  It  should  also 
become easier for existing firms to, for example, open up new branches or try out new 
business concepts without wading through endless reams of red tape. Further efforts at 
freeing  up  trade  in  services  will  also  make  it  easier  for  successful  firms  to  achieve 
sufficient scale. In a similar fashion, a more flexible workforce makes it less costly when 
experiments do not work out in practice. All these measures feature in the Lisbon reform 
agenda, and although implementation is still patchy, the research in this book shows that 
based on the experience of the U.S., the potential gains are large. 
As discussed earlier, flexibility also improves the cost-benefit analysis for using a 
common currency. So in addition to stimulating competitiveness, reforms aimed at more 
flexible product and labour markets also reduce the costs of a common currency. It seems 
likely that synchronization of business cycles will be high enough for the costs of the 
EMU to remain containable, but this is contingent on a stable or decreasing degree of 
specialization and coordinated fiscal policy. Strict deficit rules are not all that important 
in this respect, but the more qualitative rule to keep cyclically-adjusted deficits at or 
above zero should contribute positively to synchronization. Reforms that enhance the 
flexibility  of  European  labour  markets  will  increase  the  freedom  of  movement  for 
government policy. Chapter 2  The euro area business cycle
14 
2.1  Introduction 
The European Central Bank (ECB) is charged with maintaining price stability in the euro 
area and to set monetary policy, it needs information about the state of the euro area 
economy.  A  business  cycle  index  (BCI)  can  provide  this  information  at  a  glance. 
However,  BCIs  have  mainly  been  developed  for  the  U.S.,  with  much  less  research 
focusing on the euro area. In case of the euro area as a whole, an added complexity is that 
it only recently became an economic entity in its own right due to the ECB’s common 
monetary policy. The scarcity of research does not leave the ECB or other policy makers 
without tools to analyze the euro-economy: there is an area-wide structural model (see 
Fagan,  Henry  and  Mestre,  2005)  as  well  as  more  recent  work  on  Bayesian  dynamic 
general  equilibrium  models (Smets  and  Wouters,  2004).  However,  BCIs are  a  useful 
complement as they do not rely on a detailed description of the economic structure and 
do not make assumptions regarding the behaviour of consumers or firms. Rather, BCIs 
are constructed based on statistical analysis of the economy in question. 
This chapter compares different methods of constructing BCIs. The main question 
it addresses is how the selection of a set of variables affects the performance of different 
BCIs.  In  a  recent  paper  Boivin  and  Ng  (2003)  also  address  this  issue  and,  using 
simulation techniques, they come to the conclusion that indexes, which are based on a 
limited number of variables, perform at least as well or even better than those based on 
the full dataset they consider.
15 The analysis here is largely complementary: the setting is 
applied and uses economic logic rather than statistical algorithms to reduce the data set. 
The comparison of BCI construction methods focuses on ability of BCIs to capture 
relevant  historical  cyclical  facts,  not  on  their  performance  in  real-time  forecasting. 
                                                 
14 This chapter is largely based on Inklaar, Jacobs and Romp (2003). See acknowledgements for further 
details. 
15 Bai and Ng (2002) also find that the number of series need not be very large to get precise estimates for 
factor models, one of the methods used in constructing BCIs. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Furthermore,  the  turning  points  of  the  index  are  considered  to  be  the  most  relevant 
cyclical  fact,  although  others  would  focus  on,  for  example,  the  business  cycle  as  a 
periodic  cycle  or  a  serially  correlated  phenomenon.
16  To  evaluate  forecasting 
performance, an analysis would be needed along the lines of e.g. Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1991) or McGuckin, Ozyildirim and Zarnowitz (2003) and more attention would need to 
be paid to end-of-sample problems as in Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2003). 
The methodology for constructing BCIs was originally developed at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the U.S. in the 1930s and described in the 
seminal book of Burns and Mitchell (1946). It has since then been widely used (see e.g. 
Zarnowitz,  1992).  In  recent  years  these "NBER  method"  indexes are  maintained  and 
regularly published by The Conference Board (TCB), which has also developed similar 
indexes for other countries. A more recent development in the construction of BCIs is the 
use of dynamic factor models. Early applications of dynamic factor models are described 
in Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke (1977). Recent examples are Stock and Watson 
(1989, 2002), Camba-Mendez, Kapetanios, Smith and Weale (2001), and the Generalized 
Dynamic Factor Model of Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2000) and Forni and Lippi 
(2001). 
After a general introduction to business cycle measurement, Section 2.2 describes 
the two different methods used for constructing BCIs, namely the generalized dynamic 
factor model of Forni et al. (2000) and the NBER method. Section 2.3 presents three 
BCIs for the euro area. The first uses a relatively small dataset and is constructed using 
the NBER method (EuroTCB). The second is estimated using a dynamic factor model 
and a very large dataset (EuroCOIN from Altissimo et al., 2001). The final index is based 
on a small dataset and constructed using a dynamic factor model (EuroIJR). This final 
index can be used to gauge the relative importance of data selection to arrive at a small 
dataset on the one hand and the method of index construction on the other hand. Section 
2.4 compares the three business cycle indexes in terms of how they are correlated and 
track the euro area cycle. In Section 2.5 the EuroIJR index is used to shed some light on 
cyclical dynamics in the euro area. 
                                                 
16 See Harding and Pagan (2005) for an overview of these approaches. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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The main finding is that the business cycle indexes analyzed here are very similar 
in terms of correlations. The dates of peaks and troughs are also similar. The leads and 
lags around the turning points of euro area GDP are generally modest and none of the 
three indexes is consistently more accurate in pinpointing peaks and troughs than the 
other two. This suggests that a useful BCI can be constructed using only a limited number 
of variables. Furthermore, it is not necessary to include data from each euro area country 
to  adequately  capture  the  euro  area  cycle.  As  Chapter  1  already  showed,  cycles  of 
European countries tend to move together and the analysis in this chapter confirms that 
for some purposes, the differences across euro area countries are not crucial and the area 
can be treated like a single economic entity. 
However, the analysis of cyclical dynamics brings some of the heterogeneity of the 
different countries to the fore. So, for example, German industrial production is one of 
the most important variables in the EuroIJR index, whereas French and Spanish industrial 
production make only modest contributions to the index. This means that a shock to 
German industrial production tends to have a different effect on the euro area cycle than 
similar shocks in France and Spain. So even for short-run policy making, the euro area 
cannot be treated as fully homogeneous.  
2.2  Methodology 
Business cycles are more or less regular patterns in fluctuations in economic activity. In 
the well-known definition of Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 3): 
A cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic 
activities, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which 
merge  into  the  expansion  phase  of  the  next  cycle;  this  sequence  of  changes  is 
recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one year 
to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character 
with amplitudes approximating their own. 
In other words, expansions and contractions in economic activity are observed in 
time  series  of many variables across  different  sectors  of  most  (market)  economies  at 
roughly the same time. This suggests that an index capturing these movements would be 
very useful. This idea lies at the core of the NBER approach as originally proposed by Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Burns  and  Mitchell  (1946).  An  alternative  method  to  measure  business  cycles  is  to 
formulate a formal statistical model which identifies underlying “shocks” that drive the 
business cycle.
17 Dynamic factor models are part of this latter group and provide a more 
formal way to select and weight relevant cyclical variables. This chapter will compare 
business cycle indexes constructed according to both approaches. 
Burns and Mitchell (1946) define the business cycle in terms of fluctuations in 
economic  activity.  However,  the  choice  of  a  measure  of  "economic  activity"  is  not 
straightforward. The usual choice is GDP, but since GDP is only available on a quarterly 
frequency,  additional  variables  are  needed  to  establish  a  monthly  chronology. 
Furthermore, the usual publication lag of GDP makes it unsuitable for gaining a timely 
insight  into  the  state  of  the  economy.  Therefore,  the  NBER  Business  Cycle  Dating 
Committee has adopted a broader approach in the U.S. by also looking at other (monthly) 
economic variables such as industrial production or retail sales. 
Contractions  of  economic  activity  are  an  essential  ingredient  of  the  classical 
definition  of  a  business  cycle.  However,  some  economic  theories  predict  movements 
around  a  permanent  component  or  “trend”.  This  has  given  rise  to  the  analysis  of 
fluctuations around a trend, a category of cycles usually referred to as deviation cycles or 
growth  cycles.  While  policy  makers  are  primarily  interested  in  classical  cycles, 
academics tend to focus on deviation cycles (Harding and Pagan, 2000). A third type of 
cycles looks at turning points in the growth rate of economic activity. These growth rate 
cycles are related to deviation cycles, since growth rates can be interpreted as a trend 
filter (cf. Harding and Pagan, 2005). 
Given a reference series of economic activity, turning points of business cycles can 
be determined in levels, deviations from trend, or growth rates. This chapter focuses on 
the classical cycle and the growth rate cycle concepts, as discussed further below. The 
deviation cycle is central to the next chapter and the main methods are described there. 
The standard method to determine turning is to use the algorithm of Bry and Boschan 
(1971). This algorithm calculates moving averages of different lengths to narrow down 
                                                 
17 The term "shock" should not be taken to mean that business cycles are set in motion through economic 
events such as, for example, stock market crashes or technology shocks. In a purely statistical sense, a 
shock is a phenomenon that causes a variable to diverge from its long-run average. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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the region where the turning points are likely to be located and then pinpoints the exact 
month where the peak or trough occurred using the original series. The only restrictions 
are that a full business cycle (peak to peak or trough to trough) should last at least fifteen 
months, each business cycle phase (peak to trough, trough to peak) should last at least 
five months and peaks and troughs should alternate. These criteria have been developed 
to  pinpoint  turning  points  in  the  classical  business  cycle  using  monthly  data.  A 
generalization to quarterly or even annual data is relatively straightforward, as discussed 
in Harding and Pagan (2001). Application of the Bry-Boschan algorithm to the dating of 
growth  rate  cycles  is  less  well  established,  mostly  because  no  independent  reference 
chronology exists for a growth rate cycle, as is the case for the classical cycle in the 
United States. However, Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim (2001) have recently used the Bry-
Boschan algorithm to compare various filtering methods and the algorithm is also applied 
to the dating of EuroCOIN turning points (see Altissimo et al., 2001).
18 In this chapter, 
the same rules are used for dating growth rate cycles as for dating classical cycles, but 
further research on the appropriateness of this choice is called for. 
The NBER method 
In establishing a monthly business cycle chronology, the NBER relies on four monthly 
variables: employment, personal income, industrial production and manufacturing and 
trade sales. Together these make up the composite coincident index for the United States. 
The choice of these variables (in some form) can be traced back to the work of Burns and 
Mitchell (1946). Since then, the four components of the coincident index have stood up 
as a good representation of the reference business cycle. 
Potentially relevant economic variables are evaluated based on how closely they 
track  the  classical  cycle  of  the  reference  series.  This  can  be  done  by  looking  at  the 
correlations with the reference series at various leads and lags and whether variables 
exhibit peaks  and  troughs  around the  same  time  as  the reference series. Consistently 
leading  and  lagging  variables  are  then  combined  into  leading  and  lagging  composite 
indexes. The change in a composite index is calculated as the unweighted average of 
                                                 
18 In contrast, Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2002) identify periods with negative growth rates for a certain 
number of months as a recession. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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changes in the components, after normalisation; the level of the index is computed by 
cumulating the changes from a specified base year.
19 
The choice of variables depends for a large part on the judgment of the researcher. 
One  has  to  construct  a  "good"  reference  series  based  on  a  measure  of  "economic 
activity", find a way to determine its peaks and troughs and then evaluate whether other 
variables have a "close" relationship to the reference series. The degree of subjectivity of 
the NBER method has been a motivation to develop more statistically oriented methods.  
The Generalized Dynamic Factor Model 
Although statistical  methods also involve a number of  (subjective) choices,  generally 
speaking  they  do  impose  more  (theoretical)  structure  on  the  problem  of  measuring 
business cycles. The basic idea of factor models is that a dataset consisting of a number 
of  time  series  can  be  decomposed  into  a  common  component  and  an  idiosyncratic 
component, where the common component is driven by only  a few common shocks. 
Although many factor models fit this general description, the remainder of the analysis 
uses the Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (GDFM) of Forni et al. (2000). The model 
is "generalized" in the sense that, contrary to the earlier dynamic factor models such as 
those of Sargent and Sims (1977) or Geweke (1977), the idiosyncratic components can be 
correlated.
20  The  factor  model  is  basically  a  method  of  rank-reduction,  where  the 
information in the large matrix of observations is summarized in the matrix of common 
components of smaller rank.
21 The GDFM can be written as follows. 
(2.1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) it Qt iQ t i t i it it it u L b u L b u L b x ξ ξ χ + + + + ≡ + = ... 2 2 1 1 , 
where xit is the t-th observation on the i-th time series and L is the lag operator. The 
dynamic factor loading bij(L) describes the dynamic impact of the j-th common shock uj 
on the i-th series. The common shocks and the factor loadings together make up the 
common components  t i, χ . After the influence of common shocks has been removed, only 
                                                 
19 See The Conference Board (2001) for more details 
20 The theoretical criterion is that idiosyncratic shocks can be correlated as long as this correlation can still 
be distinguished from the common shocks. In practice, it is harder to draw a strict line. See the appendix to 
this chapter for more details. 
21A more extensive discussion can be found in Appendix 2.A. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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the idiosyncratic components  i ξ  remain. Equation (2.1) shows that the model is explicitly 
dynamic since a common shock can affect a variable with leads or lags. 
As Forni et al. (2000) show, the common component in this model is only uniquely 
identified in a dataset with an infinite number of observations and time series, but they 
present an estimator that is reasonably precise for datasets of more modest dimensions. 
The main identifying assumption is that there are only a limited number of common 
shocks that explain an increasing percentage of the variance of the dataset as the number 
of time series in the dataset  grows,  while the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks 
remains bounded. The common components of Equation (2.1) can then be estimated by 
employing principal component analysis in the frequency domain. 
The common component of a series is the part that is driven by shocks that are 
common to all series, while the remainder is idiosyncratic noise. The common component 
of  GDP  is  the  logical  candidate  for  a  business  cycle  index.  Abstracting  from 
mathematical complexities, the common component of a series is a linear combination of 
all the variables, where the weights on each of the variables are chosen to maximize the 
variance  explained  by the  common component.  Since  the  main  interest  is  in  cyclical 
fluctuations  we  also  want  to  filter  out  the  high-frequency  noise  of  GDP's  common 
component: 
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where  C
i K   is  the  matrix  of  weights  used  in  calculating  the  cyclical  common 
component C
it χ . Weights are available for each variable i and each lead and lag, denoted 
by m. A similar decomposition can also be made for the irregular, high-frequency noise 
in NC
it χ . 
Instead of the GDFM, other factor models could have been used as well, but there 
are  a  number  of  reasons  for  using  the  GDFM.  First,  an  important  characteristic  of 
business cycles is that not all variables move exactly in phase: leads and lags are quite 
common. This makes it essential to use a dynamic factor model, to take these leading and 
lagging relationships into account. Second, in the model of Forni et al. (2000) it is very 
straightforward  to  remove  high-frequency  noise  and  only  focus  on  longer  run Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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fluctuations.  Finally,  the  GDFM  allows  for  a  certain  amount  of  correlation  between 
idiosyncratic  components.  This  can  be  very  important  for  cyclical  indicators.  For 
example, if two industrial production series are included in the index, it is quite possible 
that measurement errors in the two series are partly correlated, although both of these 
measurement errors are unrelated to cyclical fluctuations. If idiosyncratic components 
were required to be strictly uncorrelated, part of this measurement error would show up 
in the common component. To avoid this, it is desirable to allow for some amount of 
correlation between idiosyncratic components. A more pragmatic reason for choosing the 
GDFM is that this way, a more parsimonious specification of the EuroCOIN index can be 
compared to EuroCOIN. 
The GDFM is basically a multivariate filter for euro area GDP. The information 
from other series allows the model to a) eliminate idiosyncratic measurement errors, b) 
filter out high-frequency noise, c) estimate economic activity within a quarter and d) use 
information  from  leading  variables  and  their  relation  to  GDP  to  forecast  economic 
activity for recent periods. Although the final point is quite important for the usefulness 
of a BCI, the model applied here is only  equipped to take the first three points into 
account.
22 
One  problem  in  applying  this  method  is  that  the  selection  of  the  number  of 
common shocks is not straightforward; see also Bai and Ng (2002). Here, one of the 
criteria suggested by Forni et al. (2000) is used, namely that each common shock should 
explain at least a pre-specified percentage of total variance.
23 
2.3  Euro Area Business Cycle Indexes 
This  section  describes  three  business  cycle  indexes  for  the  euro  area:  EuroTCB,  a 
coincident index constructed along the lines of the NBER methodology, EuroCOIN, in 
which the Generalized Dynamic Factor Model is applied to a large set of data, and the 
hybrid EuroIJR, in which the GDFM is used on the limited set of variables used in the 
construction  of  coincident  and  leading  indexes  for  European  countries  by  TCB. 
EuroCOIN is constructed by others  and published online  monthly, but EuroTCB and 
                                                 
22 See Forni et al. (2003) for details on end-of-sample estimation. 
23 See Appendix 2.A for further discussion. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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EuroIJR were specifically constructed for the analysis here. In all cases, quarterly GDP 
for the euro area is included in the construction of the index. The information from the 
other series is used to get the information that is necessary for a monthly business cycle 
chronology. 
EuroTCB 
The Conference Board (TCB) publishes business cycle indexes for a number of euro area 
countries on a monthly basis. At present, coincident and leading indexes are constructed 
for France, Germany and Spain. The components of the coincident indexes have been 
selected based on the components of the U.S. coincident index as well as their ability to 
match the business cycle turning points of GDP in the individual countries. The leading 
indexes have been constructed so that they generally lead the coincident index at business 
cycle turning points. 
The components of the leading and coincident indexes differ across countries, but 
they  generally  contain  the  same  type  of  time  series.  The  coincident  indexes  include 
measures  of  sales,  income,  production  and  employment.  The  leading  indexes  usually 
contain financial variables such as bond yields and share prices, natural leading series 
like  orders  for  new  goods  and  building  permits,  and  finally  surveys  of  consumer  or 
business  confidence.
24  All  series  have  been  selected  to  match  classical  cycle  turning 
points  in  each  of  the  individual  countries.  It  is  therefore  not  clear  whether  they  will 
provide a good representation of the euro area growth rate cycle, but given that these 
three  countries  account  for  about  60  percent  of euro area  GDP,  the  representation  is 
assumed to be reasonably good. 
In constructing the EuroTCB index the NBER and TCB procedures are followed as 
well as possible.
25 The procedure starts off with 12 coincident variables, four from each 
country,  and  euro  area  GDP  from  the  OECD  Quarterly  National  Accounts.  In  the 
construction of a monthly index, the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of GDP is applied to 
each month in the quarter. This procedure corresponds to linearly interpolating the level 
                                                 
24 Table 2.4 below provides a list of the components of the leading and the coincident indexes for the three 
countries 
25 For a more extensive discussion of the methods, see The Conference Board (2001). Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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of  GDP  for  each  month.
26  To  construct  a  BCI  for  a country, The  Conference  Board 
weights each series by a standardization factor. This standardization factor is calculated 
from the inverse standard deviations of each of the series, normalized to sum to one. An 
analogous procedure is followed here for the 12 variables plus euro area GDP.
27 It would 
be possible to weight by the relative size of the economies in addition to the relative 
volatility of each series. However, only using the relative volatility is more in line with 
the NBER tradition and it is also more in line with the procedures used in calculating the 
other two BCIs. According to Altissimo et al. (2001), EuroCOIN is calculated from a set 
of series after normalizing and in calculating the EuroIJR index we also do not perform 
further weighting. Euro area GDP in the index is included mostly to make the index more 
comparable to the other two. However, the index including and excluding euro area GDP 
are very similar (correlation of 0.99) and the turning points are never more than a few 
months apart. 
EuroCOIN 
The EuroCOIN index is published monthly by the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) (www.cepr.org). Altissimo et al. (2001) describe the index in detail, so only the 
highlights  are  covered  here.  The  authors  construct  their  index  from  a  database  with 
monthly  observations  for  951  series  for  France,  Germany,  Spain,  and  Italy,  the 
Netherlands, Belgium and a number of euro  area wide variables. Using a number of 
criteria, such as timeliness in publication and concordance to the common shocks, they 
reduce their dataset to 246 series. The series cover a wide range of variables such as 
industrial  production,  prices,  interest  spreads  and  surveys  of  business  and  consumer 
confidence. The generalized dynamic factor model is applied to this database, after first 
differencing to render the series stationary. The authors include all common shocks that 
capture 10 percent or more of total variance, which leads to the choice of four factors. 
The first four dynamic principal components together explain 55 percent of all variance 
                                                 
26 An alternative would be to interpolate the growth rates instead of the level. There is no strong case for 
either of these options, but at least for the chosen procedure, it is immediately clear that the month-to-
month developments in GDP are not known, since the same growth rate for each month is used. 
27 To be precise, the month-on-month changes in each of the variables are multiplied by the standardization 
factor and summed across variables. For comparability to the other two BCIs, the 3-month average of this 
summation is used as the index. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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in the data. Altissimo et al. (2001) then use the cyclical part of the common component of 
euro area GDP as their business cycle index, i.e. all fluctuations with a periodicity higher 
than 14 months. Due to the stationarity requirement of the GDFM, GDP is included in 
growth rates, so their BCI models the growth rate cycle of the euro area. 
EuroIJR 
For the third euro area business cycle index, the generalized dynamic factor model is 
applied to the components of the coincident and leading indexes for France, Germany and 
Spain of TCB. In the construction of this index, which is referred to as EuroIJR, features 
from  both  approaches  are  combined.
28  On  the  one  hand,  data  is  used  that  analysts 
consider as informative for the cyclical development in euro area countries. The turning 
points of these series generally lead or coincide with GDP of the country in question. The 
fact that only a limited number of series enters into the index makes it easier to relate 
changes  in  the  index  to  changes  in  the  components  and  therefore  to  interpret  these 
changes. On the other hand, the GDFM is used to weight the series. This way, we can 
examine whether selecting only a limited number of variables for the index leads to a 
serious  loss  of  information.  Note  that  TCB  has  selected  the  coincident  and  leading 
variables  to  match  classical  turning  points in  economic activity,  without  reference  to 
turning points in the growth rate cycle. It is therefore possible that some other variables 
would  be  selected  if  this  latter  cycle  concept  were  used.  This  possibility  is  not 
investigated  further,  but  left  for  further  research.  It  should  be  noted  though,  that  a 
selection based on the correspondence to the growth rate cycle may even improve the 
performance of the index. 
In  total,  37  indicators  enter  into  the  coincident  and  leading  indexes  of  France, 
Germany and Spain (see the overview in Table 2.4). For each country, there are four 
coincident  series.  For  France,  the  leading  index  contains  ten  indicators,  while  the 
corresponding  indexes  for  Germany  and  Spain  contain  eight  and  seven  series 
respectively. In addition to these variables, we include quarterly GDP growth for the euro 
                                                 
28 The IJR in EuroIJR refers to the initials of the authors of the original paper on which this chapter is 
based, Inklaar, Jacobs and Romp (2004). Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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area. All series are analyzed as normalized exponential growth rates (first differences in 
logs), since stationarity is a prerequisite to the GDFM. 
As mentioned  above,  the criterion  of  Forni  et  al.  (2000) is used with common 
shocks included as long as they explain at least five percent of total variance. This leads 
to the selection of six common factors that together capture fifty percent of total variance 
and sixty percent of cyclical variance in the data. Just as in Altissimo et al. (2001), all 
fluctuations with a frequency lower than 14 months are defined as cyclical.  
 
2.4  Comparison 
This  section  compares  the  three  BCIs  for  the  euro  area,  looking  at  the  period  from 
January 1988 to September 2002. The data from The Conference Board are available for 
a longer period of time but EuroCOIN only starts in 1988, which limits the time span for 
comparison. Some other differences between the indexes are also of interest. EuroCOIN 
covers  the  widest  range  of  countries,  namely  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain; the other two indexes only include data from France, Germany 
and  Spain.  As  a  result,  EuroIJR  and  EuroTCB  are  based  on  data  from  countries 
representing 60 percent of euro area GDP, while EuroCOIN's countries cover nearly 90 
percent. Although all three BCIs include euro area GDP as one of the components, the 
GDP series used to construct EuroCOIN seems slightly different from the series used for 
the other two indexes (compare Figure 2.1 and Figure 6 from Altissimo et al., 2001).
29 
Finally, the EuroIJR index is based on the first six common factors, while EuroCOIN is 
based on four factors. Given the differences in the two datasets, these factors are not 
comparable.  However,  the  resulting  index  is  qualitatively  similar  whether  four  or  six 
common factors are selected. 
In  the  remainder  of this section  the  three  BCIs  are compared  in terms of  their 
correlation with GDP growth and in terms of cyclical peaks and troughs, both in the 
classical cycle and the growth rate cycle. The euro area classical cycle is defined by the 
peaks and troughs of euro area GDP. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show monthly series of euro 
                                                 
29 The GDP series used by Altissimo et al. (2001) could not be acquired, but visual inspection of the two 
GDP series does not reveal any major discrepancies. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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area GDP and the BCIs.
30 Figure 2.1 shows euro area GDP and the three BCIs as indexes 
with January 1988=100. The euro area growth rate cycle is defined by the growth rate of 
euro area GDP and consequently all three BCIs are taken as growth rates, (Figure 2.2). In 
both sets of figures the area between cyclical peaks and troughs is shaded. In Figure 2.1, 
these correspond to classical business cycle recessions, in Figure 2.2 these correspond to 
periods of declining growth rates. To determine the turning points the algorithm of Bry 
and  Boschan  (1971)  is  used.
31  Although  the  figures  show  differences  in  short-term 
fluctuations,  overall  the  similarities  between  the  indexes  are  striking.  Especially  the 
recession of 1993 clearly stands out in all three indexes. 
Table 2.1 shows the correlations between the three indexes (in growth rates) as well 
as the change in euro area GDP. Correlations are based on the monthly series and the 
quarterly aggregates. The quarterly results are included because for GDP only quarterly 
data is available, whereas monthly GDP is interpolated. For the correlation coefficients 
this interpolation has little or no effect. The correlations confirm the conclusions from 
visual  inspection  by  showing  large  and  positive  coefficients  (all  significant  at  the  1 
percent  level).  In  other  words,  the  three  indexes  all  capture  a  large  amount  of  the 
variation in euro area GDP since 1987. 
                                                 
30 Appendix 2.B shows the same type of figures for quarterly aggregates of the indexes. The quarterly 
series are calculated as the average of each of the indexes within the quarter. For EuroTCB and EuroIJR the 
basic data could also be aggregated to a quarterly frequency and the indexes calculated from these new 
series, but this changes littles. 
31 The program implementing the Bry-Boschan algorithm is taken from Mark Watson, converted from 
Gauss to Matlab and adapted along the lines of Harding and Pagan (2001) to also determine turning points 
in quarterly series. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Table 2.1 Correlation between euro area GDP and business cycle indexes 
EuroGDP EuroIJR EuroTCB
Monthly index
EuroIJR 0.84
EuroTCB 0.80 0.88
EuroCOIN 0.80 0.92 0.84
Quarterly index
EuroIJR 0.84
EuroTCB 0.83 0.91
EuroCOIN 0.80 0.93 0.86
Note: the quarterly index is calculated as the average over 
the quarter of the values of the monthly index.  
 
Figure 2.1 Euro area GDP and monthly business cycle indexes (levels), 1988-2002, 
January 1988=100 
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Note: shaded areas mark business cycle recessions with absolute declines in economic activity. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Figure 2.2 Euro area GDP and monthly business cycle indexes (growth rates), 1988-
2002 
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Note: shaded areas mark growth rate cycle recessions with decreasing growth rates of economic activity. 
In  Figures  2.1  and  2.2  recessionary  periods  are  shaded  to  facilitate  visual 
inspection, but it is informative to look at the differences in turning points in some more 
detail. Table 2.2 shows the turning points of the indexes in levels (cf. Figure 2.1). These 
turning points correspond to the turning points of the classical cycle and signal absolute 
expansions and contractions in economic activity. Table 2.3 shows the turning points for 
the growth rates of the indexes (cf. Figure 2.2). These turning points signal slowdowns 
and accelerations in economic growth and correspond to the growth rate cycle. A turning 
point of the growth rate cycle will generally lead a turning point of the classical cycle 
since a slowdown in growth usually occurs before growth turns negative. Furthermore, a 
series generally has more growth rate cycle turning points than classical cycle turning 
points since absolute declines in economic activity are rarer than slowdowns in growth. 
This is confirmed by comparing the turning points of GDP in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. In 
the period 1988-2002, GDP showed only one classical cycle, but five growth rate cycles. 
As discussed before, turning points are shown for both monthly and quarterly series, first 
of all to ensure the chronology is robust to the interpolation method for GDP, but also to 
check whether it is robust for the different BCIs. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Table 2.2 Business cycle turning points of euro area GDP and business cycle indexes 
EuroGDP EuroIJR EuroTCB EuroCOIN EuroIJR EuroTCB EuroCOIN
Monthly indexes
Peak Mar-92 May-92 May-92 Apr-92 2 2 1
Trough Mar-93 May-93 Jul-93 Oct-93 2 4 7
Quarterly indexes
Peak 1992Q1 1992Q2 1992Q2 1992Q1 1 1 0
Trough 1993Q1 1993Q2 1993Q2 1993Q3 1 1 2
Note: positive figures denote a lag of x months
Peak and trough dates Leads/lags versus EuroGDP
 
Table 2.3 Growth rate cycle turning points of euro area GDP and business cycle 
indexes 
EuroGDP EuroIJR EuroTCB EuroCOIN EuroIJR EuroTCB EuroCOIN
Monthly indexes
Peaks Mar-90 Dec-88 Oct-88 Feb-89 -15 -17 -13
Mar-92 Jan-92 M -2 M
Dec-94 Jul-94 Oct-94 Oct-94 -5 -2 -2
Dec-97 Jul-97 Jun-97 Nov-97 -5 -6 -1
Sep-99 Oct-99 Sep-99 Nov-99 1 0 2
Trough Sep-89 M M M
Sep-91 Sep-91 M 0 M
Mar-93 Nov-92 Jan-93 Nov-92 -4 -2 -4
Dec-95 Dec-95 Dec-95 Nov-95 0 0 -1
Dec-98 Aug-98 Nov-98 Oct-98 -4 -1 -2
Dec-01 Aug-01 Nov-01 Nov-01 -4 -1 -1
Average lead/lag -4.5 -3.1 -2.8
Average absolute lead/lag 4.8 3.1 3.3
Quarterly indexes
Peaks 1989Q1 1988Q4 1988Q4 1989Q1 -1 -1 0
1994Q1 1994Q3 1994Q4 1994Q4 2 3 3
1997Q2 1997Q3 1997Q2 1997Q4 1 0 2
1999Q3 1999Q4 1999Q3 1999Q4 1 0 1
Trough 1993Q1 1992Q4 1993Q1 1992Q4 -1 0 -1
1995Q4 1995Q4 1995Q4 1995Q4 0 0 0
1998Q4 1998Q3 1998Q4 1998Q4 -1 0 0
Average lead/lag 0.1 0.3 0.7
Average absolute lead/lag 1.0 0.6 1.0
Note: positive figures denote a lag of x months, negative figure a lead of x months, M denotes
missed turning points.
Peak and trough dates Leads/lags versus EuroGDP
 Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Tables 2.2 and Table 2.3 show that none of the three indexes perfectly matches the 
peaks and troughs of the cycles of GDP. However, the similarity between the turning 
points of the indexes and those of GDP is considerable. Table 2.2 shows that the euro 
area had one classical cycle between March 1992 and March 1993. The EuroIJR index 
had both its peak and trough two months later than GDP. The EuroCOIN index lagged 
one month at the peak and lagged seven months at the trough. EuroTCB lagged one 
month at the peak and four months at the trough. The other indexes as well as GDP also 
showed negative growth in 2001, but the period was too short to signal a turning point. 
The  Bry-Boschan  algorithm  smoothed  these  dips  and  thus  did  not  produce  recession 
signals.  The  quarterly  chronology  matches  the  monthly  turning  points  with  generally 
modest lags. 
Table  2.3  shows  the  turning  points  of  the  euro  area  growth  rate  cycle  and  the 
turning points for (the growth rates of) each of the BCIs. As could already be seen from 
Figure 2.2, it is much harder for the BCIs to match turning points of the GDP growth rate 
cycle than those of the classical business cycle. This is partly due to the fact that there are 
simply  more  growth  rate  cycles,  but  also  because  the  Bry-Boschan  algorithm  was 
originally designed to pinpoint classical turning points. As discussed in Section 2.2, the 
algorithm includes a number of decision rules, such as the minimum period between a 
peak and a trough and between two peaks or two troughs. These criteria are based on the 
U.S. classical business cycle chronology as maintained by the NBER Dating Committee 
and unfortunately, it is not known how appropriate these rules are for dating growth rate 
cycle turning points. 
Some of the difficulties in dating peaks and troughs in growth rate cycles show up 
when comparing the monthly chronology in the top panel of Table 2.3 with the quarterly 
chronology in the bottom panel. Based on the monthly series, GDP showed a trough in 
September 1991 and a peak in March 1992. In the quarterly chronology this upswing was 
too short to show up as a turning point. Focusing on the monthly chronology in the top 
panel  of  Table 2.3,  the  early  1990s  is  a  period  for  which  turning  points are  hard  to 
determine. Compared to the other BCIs, EuroTCB performs best with only one missed 
trough, compared to one missed peak and two missed troughs by the other two BCIs. In 
the second half of the 1990s, the BCI turning points are in better accordance with the Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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GDP turning points, although leads of up to six months can be seen. The average absolute 
lead/lag is slightly larger than one quarter for both EuroTCB and EuroCOIN and nearly 
five months for EuroIJR. 
The bottom panel of Table 2.3 shows that the BCIs perform relatively better in 
identifying  growth  rate  cycle  turning  points  at  a  quarterly  frequency.  As  mentioned 
before, the  number  of  peaks  and  troughs  that  were  picked  out  are  the  same  and the 
average absolute lead or lag is no bigger than one quarter. EuroTCB once again has a 
very  low  lead/lag,  with  EuroIJR  and  EuroCOIN  having  an  average  lead/lag  of  one 
quarter. 
In summary, the three BCIs pick up the two classical turning points in euro area 
GDP, but have more difficulties in signalling the growth rate cycle turning points. The 
performance  of  the  three  BCIs  is  roughly  comparable,  with  a  slight  advantage  for 
EuroIJR in determining classical turning points and a modest advantage for EuroTCB in 
identifying growth rate cycle turning points. However, differences in growth rate cycle 
peaks and troughs between monthly and quarterly series are an indication that further 
research is warranted. 
2.5  Driving Forces of the Euro Area Growth Rate Cycle 
One  of  the  main  advantages  of  using  only  a  relatively  small  dataset  to  construct  a 
business cycle index is that it makes it easier to analyze the impact of individual series. 
Although the EuroIJR index includes only variables for a limited number of countries, 
such an analysis should help to understand some of the dynamics of the euro area growth 
rate  cycle.  A  first  piece  of information  in this  analysis  is  the  weighting  matrix, (see 
equation 2.2). Another useful perspective is given by the average contribution of each 
variable to the index. The contribution of a variable to the index is given by the weight 
times the value of the variable in a particular month. Table 2.4 shows these weights and 
contributions for all variables. The weight and contribution of each variable is calculated 
by summing across leads and lags. Two columns with average contributions are included, 
one averaged over all months and another averaged over those months where the value of 
the index in absolute sense was larger than 0.1 (this was the case in more than 85 percent Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
 
  47 
of the months). The reason for the latter adjustment is that in months with small values of 
the index, the relative contributions can be quite large. 
Table 2.4 shows that euro area GDP is the most important variable in the index, 
although by no means the only important one. There are also a number of variables with 
negative weights, meaning that these variables were negatively correlated with euro area 
GDP over this period. In other words, these variables are countercyclical. As the final 
two columns show, these variables do make, on average, a positive contribution to the 
index.  Some  variables  make  negative  contributions,  but  this  is  mostly  due  to  large 
contribution shares in months where the index is close to zero, because excluding these 
months nearly eliminates negative contributions.  
It is also interesting to see that the contribution of GDP is considerably larger than 
its weight (around two times as large). Since all variables have been normalised, this 
finding cannot reflect differences in the relative size of changes in variables. Instead, the 
reason might be that some variables move more in line with the index as a whole than 
others,  but  no  useful measure was  found  to show  this.  Other  important  variables  are 
German  industrial  production  (with  an  average  contribution  of  11.5  percent),  French 
imports  (6.3  percent)  and  Spanish  household  consumption  (15.3  percent).  Quite 
significant is also the presence of variables with small contributions, such as for example 
the Spanish order book survey. It would be very useful if statistical criteria could be used 
to remove such variables from the index since they are likely to mostly add noise to the 
system.
32 
                                                 
32 See Boivin and Ng (2003) for criteria to include variables or weight them according to the correlation of the error 
with other series' errors. This seems a potentially fruitful approach, although the statistical foundations are less clear. 
For the state of the art on inference for large factor models see Bai (2003). Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Table 2.4 Weights and contributions of the EuroIJR index 
Country Type Variable Weights
All months Excl. outliers
France LEAD Bond Yield 10 year 4.3 3.7 3.4
France LEAD Yield Spread - 10 year minus Day-Day Loan -3.1 3.2 0.2
France LEAD Stock Price SBF 250 Index -0.1 1.2 0.2
France LEAD Personal Consumption of Manuf. Goods 2.9 -3.5 1.1
France LEAD Building Permits - Residential 0.4 0.1 0.2
France LEAD New Unemployment Claims -0.3 0.3 0.7
France LEAD Industrial New Orders 0.1 -1.2 0.0
France LEAD Consumer Confidence Index 1.6 0.4 0.3
France LEAD Change in Stocks 4.2 3.8 1.8
France LEAD Ratio Deflator of Manuf. Value Added to Unit Labor Cost 2.3 0.6 0.5
France COIN Retail sales 2.0 0.1 0.7
France COIN Industrial Production 1.8 0.6 0.7
France COIN Real Imports 6.3 7.2 6.3
France COIN Paid Employment 5.1 -2.9 7.1
Germany LEAD New Orders - Investment Goods 0.4 0.7 0.1
Germany LEAD Yield Spread - 10 year minus 3 month 2.4 1.2 1.0
Germany LEAD New Orders - Consumer Confidence Index -0.7 0.5 -0.2
Germany LEAD Change in Inventories -2.4 3.0 1.0
Germany LEAD New Orders - Residential Construction 5.5 -3.4 1.0
Germany LEAD Stock Prices 0.9 1.6 0.3
Germany LEAD Gross Enterprise and Property Income 5.7 -1.5 1.6
Germany LEAD Growth Rate for Consumer Price Index for Services -2.1 1.3 0.2
Germany COIN Industrial Production 10.3 17.0 11.5
Germany COIN Employment - Number of People Employed 0.7 2.0 0.4
Germany COIN Manufacturing Sales 4.7 3.6 2.8
Germany COIN Retail sales 7.1 10.9 4.1
Spain LEAD Construction Component of Industrial Production (3-m ma) 1.1 -0.1 0.4
Spain LEAD Capital Equipment Component of Industrial Production (3-m ma, s.a.) 1.6 -0.7 0.2
Spain LEAD Spanish Contribution to Euro M2 (s.a.) 2.5 1.8 1.2
Spain LEAD Spanish Equity Price Index -0.7 0.3 -0.1
Spain LEAD Long-term Government Bond Yield (Inverted) -3.0 2.0 1.9
Spain LEAD Order Books Survey (3-m ma, s.a.) 0.9 0.0 0.0
Spain LEAD Job Placings (3-m mov. av., s.a.) 2.2 0.5 0.3
Spain COIN Final Household Consumption (Q) 9.3 9.5 15.3
Spain COIN Industrial Production Excluding Construction (3-m ma) 4.1 1.6 2.0
Spain COIN Real Imports (3-m ma) 5.3 1.9 2.9
Spain COIN Retail Sales Survey (s.a.) 1.4 -0.2 0.1
EuroArea GDP Gross Domestic Product (Q) 15.4 32.9 28.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Indicators: The Conference Board (www.globalindicators.org). Weights and contributions: own calculations. 
Contribution share
Notes: COIN: Coincident indicators; LEAD: Leading indicators; Weights: share, summed across leads and lags, calculated from 
projection matrix. 3-m ma: 3 month moving average. sa: seasonally adjusted. Contribution share: calculated as the share of the changes 
in each indicator times its weight in the total change of the index. Outliers are defined as month where the EuroIJR index value was less 
than 0.1 in absolute sense. This cut-off point was chosen because nearly all large contributions (of more than 100% of the index in that 
month) occured in such months.
 
To further illuminate the contributions of variables to the index, Figure 2.3 shows a 
number of plots, where the shaded areas give the contribution by (a set of) variables. 
Panel A shows how the variables for the different countries, as well as euro area GDP Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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affect the EuroIJR index.
33 This reveals part of the pattern of economic growth in the 
1990s. In the early 1990s, most of European growth was driven by Germany with little 
contribution from France and Spain. The main recession starting around the end of 1991 
shows large negative contributions from all three countries, as well as from the overall 
euro  area  GDP.  Toward  the  end  of  the  1990s,  France  and  Spain  were  making  large 
contributions  to positive  values  of the  index,  but German  variables  hardly  made  any 
contribution. The relative size of the countries in terms of GDP does not seem to be the 
most important predictor of their share of the contributions, although this set of countries 
may simply be too close in relative size to easily distinguish. A more thorough test of this 
matter would include data for countries such as Finland or Ireland. Finally, the recession 
starting around 2001 once again features sizable contributions from each of the countries. 
From  this  limited  set  of  countries  and  time  span,  there  seems  to  be  no  evidence  of 
idiosyncratic shocks that led to recessions in only one of the countries. This issue is 
analyzed in more detail in the next chapter. 
                                                 
33 Each of the countries also influences the index indirectly by their contribution to Euro area GDP, but we 
have not separately distinguished this impact.  Figure 2.3 Contribution to EuroIJR by its components 
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Panel B shows the contributions from the group of coincident variables and from 
the set of leading variables. This figure reveals that especially in the recession of 1992-
1994  coincident  variables  played  a  dominant  role.  Visual  inspection  does  not  reveal 
important signals from the leading variables, but as noted before, a formal evaluation of 
the forecasting performance of the index would proceed along different lines. Finally, 
Panels C and D show the contribution from individual variables to the index. Panel C 
shows the contribution from the most important variable from each country in terms of its 
contribution  to  the  total  index.  These  three  variables  are  certainly  not  driving  all 
movement in the index, as especially the recession in 2001 reveals: after the index had 
turned negative, it took a number of months before these variables also made a negative 
contribution.  In  the  recession  of  the  early-1990s,  the  three  variables  are  more 
synchronized with the rest of the variables. 
It is striking to look at the relative importance of similar variables for different 
countries. Panel D shows the contribution of industrial production of each country to the 
EuroIJR index. German industrial production is clearly the most important, even though 
German manufacturing is only about 30 percent of euro area manufacturing (French and 
Spanish  manufacturing  are  about  20  and  10  percent  of  euro  area  manufacturing, 
respectively). This difference is confirmed when looking at the weight of each series in 
Table  2.4.  While  German  industrial  production  receives  a  weight  of  more  than  10 
percent, French and Spanish industrial production get a weight of 1.8 and 4.1 percent, 
respectively.  This  seems  to  indicate  that  German  manufacturing  plays  a  much  more 
important cyclical role than is indicated by its size. This may be partly due to the greater 
importance  of  more  cyclical  capital  equipment  manufacturing  in  Germany,  but 
international linkages may also be important. Once again, however, firm conclusions are 
hard to come by due to the limited set of countries that is studied. 
2.6  Concluding remarks 
A timely and up-to-date picture of economic circumstances is invaluable for decision 
makers in both government and business. Since GDP is only released once a quarter and 
with  a  considerable  lag,  earlier  and  more  frequent  indexes  of  the  state  of  economic 
activity are useful, especially in turbulent economic times. Such indexes, constructed by Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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statistical analysis, can be a useful complement to models that have to make assumptions 
about structure of the economy or behaviour by consumers and firms. 
This chapter compared the performance of two different methods for constructing 
business cycle indexes, namely the NBER method and the generalized dynamic factor 
model. In the NBER method, variables are selected for inclusion in the index based on a 
researcher's judgment of how closely the cyclical behaviour of a variable matches that of 
an index of economic activity such as GDP. The generalized dynamic factor model of 
Forni et al. (2000) uses statistical criteria to give a variable a larger or smaller weight. 
An advantage of the generalized dynamic factor model compared to the NBER 
method  is  that  business  cycle  indexes  can  be  constructed  with  a  smaller  number  of 
(judgmental) choices about the components and their weight in the index, since many of 
those choices are determined by the statistical model. One advantage of the NBER-type 
indexes is that the business cycle index is constructed from only a limited number of 
variables.  As  a  result,  changes  in  the  index  can  be  more  easily  traced  back  to  the 
component  or  components  that  drive  this  change.  This  allows  analysts  and  users  to 
evaluate which variables have contributed to a recession, say a slowdown in the industrial 
production or a drop in employment. If the number of components of the index grows too 
large, this insight is much harder to get. 
Using both the NBER method and the generalized dynamic factor model, three 
business cycle indexes were compared. The first index is based on euro area GDP and the 
components  of  the  coincident  indexes  for  France,  Germany  and  Spain  from  The 
Conference Board, selected according to the NBER method. The second is the euro area 
index of Altissimo et al. (2001), constructed by applying the generalized dynamic factor 
model to a dataset with nearly 1000 economic variables. The third index is a hybrid index 
that uses the 37 components of the Conference Board's coincident and leading indexes for 
France,  Germany  and  Spain  as  well  as  euro  area  GDP  and  applies  the  generalized 
dynamic factor model to weigh and combine these variables into a business cycle index. 
One of the most important uses of a business cycle index is to signal peaks and 
troughs  of  business  cycles.  Therefore,  the  three  indexes  are  compared  based  on  that 
criterion. Although none of the three indexes perfectly matches the turning points of euro 
area GDP, all three are reasonably close. The indexes identify the two classical turning Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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points of GDP in the 1990s, but have more difficulties with growth rate cycle turning 
points. This is at least partly because the Bry-Boschan algorithm that is used for dating 
cyclical turning points was designed for dating classical cycles, not growth rate cycles. 
Differences between the monthly and quarterly chronology of growth rate cycle turning 
points suggests more research into this issue would be useful. 
Overall  only  a  limited  number  of  variables  is  necessary  to  capture  the  salient 
features  of  the  euro  area  business  cycle.  Including  more  variables  adds  little  extra 
information, but the added noise may make the index harder to identify (Boivin and Ng, 
2003). A business cycle index based on a limited number of variables also makes it easier 
to identify some of the driving forces of the euro area cycle. The analysis of the hybrid 
EuroIJR index reveals some important differences between the contributions of France, 
Germany and Spain to the euro area growth rate cycle. Most notably, the same variable 
from different countries seems to play very different roles. For example, while German 
industrial production is one of the variables with the largest impact on the euro area 
cycle,  industrial  production  in  France  and  Spain  make  only  small  contributions.  This 
suggests that German industrial production moves more ‘in tune’ with the overall euro 
area economy. This brings up the issue to what extent a common monetary policy for the 
euro area is suitable for each of the individual countries. As this question has important 
implications for the (political) sustainability of the common currency, it is the topic of the 
next chapter.  Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Appendix 2.A   The Generalized Dynamic Factor Model 
In  recent  years  increasingly  large  datasets  on  economic  time  series  have  become 
available. However, many of the existing statistical tools were not well suited to analyze 
such datasets. One of the tools that is frequently used to extract relevant information from 
large datasets is factor analysis. The basic idea behind factor analysis is that movements 
in a large number of series are driven by only  a limited number of (latent) common 
shocks.  
In factor models, the N series in a dataset with T observations each are decomposed 
into a common component (χ ) that is driven by only Q<N common shocks (u) and an 
idiosyncratic  component  (ξ ):  it it it x χ ξ = + .  In  the  standard  static  factor  model  the 
implicit assumption is made that all series are only contemporaneously affected by the 
common shocks. The Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (GDFM) of Forni et al. (2000) 
is  both  dynamic  and  it  allows  for  limited  cross-correlation  between  the  idiosyncratic 
components.  For  most  time  series  analysis  the  dynamic  character  of  the  model  is 
especially  important  as  common  shocks  may  not  have  an  impact  on  a  series 
contemporaneously but with a lead or lag. The GDFM allows for a decomposition of the 
common component in a cyclical  C χ  and non-cyclical  NC χ  component so the complete 
decomposition becomes: 
(A2.1)  C NC
it it it it it it x χ ξ χ χ ξ = + = + + . 
The  generalized  dynamic  factor  model  proposed  by  Forni  et  al.  (2000)  can  be 
written as: 
(A2.2)  ( ) ( ) C NC L L = + + X UB UB Ξ , 
which is the matrix notation of Equation (2.1). Uppercase characters denote the matrix of 
corresponding lowercase variables. The series  it x  are normalized to have a mean of zero 
and a variance of one. 
The factor loadings b and common shocks u are not uniquely identifiable, but Forni 
et al. (2000) prove that under four assumptions the common component of each series 
can be uniquely identified and consistently estimated as both N and T go to infinity. First 
of  all,  the  common  shocks  are  white  noise  and  the  idiosyncratic  components  are Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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stationary processes, uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the common 
shocks. Second, the spectral density matrix of the observation matrix  X  exists. Third, the 
first Q eigenvalues go to infinity as the number of series N goes to infinity and finally, all 
remaining eigenvalues remain bounded.  
The  proposed  estimation  scheme  consists  of  four  steps.  In  the  first  step,  the 
information  in  the  time  domain  is  transformed  to  the  frequency  domain,  to  easily 
incorporate  information  of  leading  and  lagging  relationships.  Second,  a  filter  is 
constructed  that  maximizes  the  variance  explained  by  the  common  component  using 
principal component analysis. Third, the filter is transformed back to the time domain and 
fourth, applied to the time series to obtain the common component of each series.  
More precisely, the estimation scheme is as follows. The first step is to calculate a 
series of auto-covariance matrices of the data matrix m Γ ,  m M M = − ,..., . The integer M 
represents the number of leading and lagging observations that contain information on the 
current common component. To obtain a consistent estimator, M must go to infinity and 
the quotient  M T  must go to zero as T tends to infinity. Forni et al. (2000) propose to 
use 1 3 (2 3) M round T / = . The second step is to use a Fourier transformation on the auto-
covariance matrices to estimate the spectral density using the Bartlett kernel estimator: 
(A2.3)  ( ) t
M
im
t m m
m M
e θ θ ω −
=−
= ∑ Σ Γ ,  0 1 t F = , ,..., , 
with  1 [ (2 1)] m m M ω = − | | +   the  Bartlett  kernel.  This  means  the  spectrum,  ( ) t θ Σ ,  is 
evaluated at some predetermined number of frequencies, F, given by  2 ( 1) t t F θ π = + . 
In  the  third  step  the  Q  largest  (real)  eigenvalues  are  calculated  as  well  as  the 
corresponding (complex) eigenvectors  ( ) q t p θ  of the spectral density matrix at frequency 
t θ . If we stack the eigenvectors in a matrix  1 ( ) [ ( ) ... ( )] Q p p θ θ θ = , , V , the weights of the 
filter in the frequency domain are given by: 
(A2.4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) m m m V V θ θ θ ′ = K , m M M = − ,..., , 
with V’ the transposed complex conjugate of V.  Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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To select only the cyclical part of the common component, the inverse  Fourier 
transform  is  applied  in  the  third  step  using  only  the  frequencies  associated  with  the 
cyclical frequencies and obtain the two-sided filter: 
(A2.5)  ( ) m ik C
k m
m
e θ θ = ∑ K K , k M M = − ,..., , 
with m in the summation such that  (2 14) m θ π | |< , so  m θ  is part of the cyclical interval. 
The final step involves applying the filter to the dataset  ( ) it Nt x x = ,..., X  for all  1 t T = ,... , 
to get an estimator of the cyclical common component: 
(A2.6) 
1 ˆ ( )
2 1
M C k C
k
k M
L
M =−
= ∑
+
X K Φ . 
That is, each common component is a moving average (M lags and leads) of the 
series  in  question.  The  weights  of  this  moving  average  are  determined  by  the 
eigenvectors of the spectral densities. For M =0 this model reduces to the standard static 
principal component model.  
Choice of Q 
Until now the number of common shocks Q was assumed to be known. In practice of 
course, Q must be chosen or ideally be estimated based on the dataset at hand. As Forni 
et al. (2000) point out, there is no formal statistical test to help identify the number of 
factors in their GDFM. However, Forni et al. (2000) propose to relate the choice of Q to 
the variance explained by the i
th eigenvalue (averaged over all frequencies). If the model 
assumptions are fulfilled, there is a substantial gap between the variance explained by the 
Q
th and the (Q+1)
th eigenvalue. Forni et al. (2000) propose to include factors as long as 
they explain 5 percent of total variance and this rule of thumb is followed here. 
Appendix  Figure  2.1  shows  the  percentage  of  total  variance  explained  by  the 
different eigenvalues. As the figure shows, only the first 6 eigenvalues explain more than 
5 percent, so Q=6 is chosen. The figure also shows that the choice of Q=6 is somewhat 
arbitrary, as the difference in explained variance with eigenvalues 7 and 8 is quite small. 
Some robustness analysis, however, suggests that the resulting business cycle index is not 
very sensitive to the exact choice of Q. Chapter 2 The euro area business cycle 
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Appendix Figure 2.1 Percentage of variance explained by each eigenvalue (38 series, 
189 observations) 
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Appendix 2.B  Plots of Quarterly GDP and Business Cycle Indexes 
Appendix Figure 2.2 Euro GDP and  quarterly business cycle index levels, 1988-
2002, January 1988=100 
EuroGDP
Q1−88 Q1−92 Q1−96 Q1−00
100
110
120
130
140
EuroIJR
Q1−88 Q1−92 Q1−96 Q1−00
100
110
120
130
140
EuroTCB
Q1−88 Q1−92 Q1−96 Q1−00
100
110
120
130
140
EuroCOIN
Q1−88 Q1−92 Q1−96 Q1−00
100
110
120
130
140
 
Note: shaded areas mark business cycle recessions with absolute declines in economic activity. 
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Appendix Figure 2.3 Euro GDP and quarterly business cycle index growth rates, 
1988-2002 
EuroGDP
Q2−88 Q2−92 Q2−96 Q2−00
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
EuroIJR
Q2−88 Q2−92 Q2−96 Q2−00
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
EuroTCB
Q2−88 Q2−92 Q2−96 Q2−00
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
EuroCOIN
Q2−88 Q2−92 Q2−96 Q2−00
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
 
Note: shaded areas mark growth rate cycle recessions with decreasing growth rates of economic activity. Chapter 3  Business cycle synchronization
34 
3.1  Introduction 
One of the main determinants of the success of the European monetary union will be 
whether  the  common  monetary  policy  set  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  is 
suitable for all member countries. This suitability in turn depends on the degree to which 
business cycles are synchronized across countries. In setting monetary policy, the ECB 
can only respond to the average level of economic activity, which can lead to economic 
and political difficulties for countries that are performing better than the average, but 
especially,  for  those  that  perform  worse  than  the  average.  The  original  literature  on 
optimal currency areas (OCAs) argued that if countries are prone to asymmetric shocks, 
their economies should be flexible enough to absorb these shocks. Mundell (1961) argued 
that labour migration could be such an absorption mechanism but labour mobility is still 
less than perfect in Europe.  
As a result, research in recent years has examined whether economic and monetary 
integration will make asymmetric shocks more or less likely. Krugman (1991) argued 
that  with  increasing  economic  integration,  specialization  would  lead  to  a  regional 
concentration of industries due to agglomeration benefits. In that case, industry-specific 
shocks will affect some countries more strongly than others. In contrast, the European 
Commission has argued that more economic and monetary integration will lead to more 
synchronous business cycles (Emerson et al., 1992), due to, for example, more similar 
monetary and fiscal policies.  
With the increased interest in the determinants of business cycles synchronization, 
there has also been a growing literature on the measurement of synchronization. Before 
presenting new empirical results, this chapter starts off by giving an overview of this 
                                                 
34 This chapter builds on Inklaar and de Haan (2001), de Haan, Inklaar and Sleijpen (2002), de Haan, 
Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2005) and Inklaar, Jong-A-Pin and de Haan (2005). See the acknowledgements for 
further details. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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literature. Part of the overview deals with what types of data have been used, but most 
attention is devoted to discussing measures of business cycles and synchronization. 
To gauge the prospects of Europe’s common currency, an obvious starting point is 
to  see  whether  monetary  integration  in  itself  contributes  to  more  similar  cycles. 
Specifically, since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
in the early 1970s, there has been a trend towards greater monetary integration within 
Europe, starting with the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979 and culminating in 
the introduction of the euro in 1999. If monetary integration is a dominant determinant of 
synchronization one would expect the cycles of European countries to have become more 
similar with no similar development amongst other countries. This issue is taken up in 
Section 3.2. 
To  examine  the  impact  of  increased  economic  integration,  the  United  States 
provides  a  useful  test  case.  The  U.S.  has  been  a  monetary  union  for  a  long  time. 
Therefore, trends in business cycle synchronization among U.S. states can be revealing 
about how similar cycles are within a monetary union over time and as a result, it can 
give some indication of Europe’s prospects (Section 3.3).
35 
Up to this point, the discussion about economic and monetary integration has been 
relatively abstract, while in practice it is a multi-faceted concept reflecting similarities in 
economic policies, structural features and closeness of trade links. To draw conclusions 
that are relevant for policy, these different dimensions should be disentangled and their 
relative importance for business cycle synchronization evaluated. In their seminal paper, 
Frankel and Rose (1998) show that countries with more intensive trade links have more 
similar business cycles. Since then, this topic has received increasing attention and a 
large number of potential determinants has been considered and tested. Section 4 of this 
chapter analyzes a large set of such variables. The goal is to come up with a robust set of 
explanatory variables and estimate how monetary union will affect synchronization in 
Europe. 
                                                 
35 This is no strict comparison since the period before the U.S. became a monetary union is not analyzed. 
As a result, differences in the U.S. economic structure relative to the euro area can lead to differences in the 
eventual synchronization patterns. For example, the greater degree of labour mobility between U.S. states 
could be an important determinant of synchronization. Despite this, the U.S. experience should still be 
informative. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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The  main  findings  of  these  analyses  are  that  there  is  no  clear  trend  in 
synchronization over time, neither in Europe nor in the United States. This stands in 
contrast to some earlier studies for Europe, notably Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999), who 
conclude that a European business cycle is emerging over time. More recently though, 
research by, e.g. Massman and Mitchell (2004) has shown that periods of greater and 
lesser synchronization alternate. The U.S. experience is also revealing as it has been a 
monetary  union  throughout  the  period.  Indeed,  Clark  and  van  Wincoop  (2001) 
established that there is a greater degree of synchronization within the U.S. than within 
Europe, and this finding is confirmed. Again however, synchronization tends to fluctuate 
over time. Some economic episodes are shared by nearly all states, such as the Great 
Depression of the 1930s or the effects of the oil crises of the 1970s but there are also 
periods of wide divergence in the economic experience of U.S. states. A recent study by 
Partridge and Rickman (2005) shows that a decline in synchronization among U.S. states 
in recent decades can be traced to a decline in the volatility of the aggregate U.S. cycle. 
However,  other  U.S.  research  by  Kim  (1995)  shows  that  specialization  across  U.S. 
regions has decreased in recent periods due to more mobile production factors, which 
presumably has had a positive impact on business cycle co-movement. 
The analysis of the determinants of synchronization has more encouraging news for 
euro  enthusiasts.  Not  only  trade  intensity,  but  the  similarity  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies, the degree of financial integration and the similarity of trade also has a robust 
positive effect on synchronization and the impact of each of these factors is at least as 
large as that of trade intensity. Scenarios show that under monetary union these factors 
will contribute to a greater degree of synchronization. Caution is in order though, as even 
the  most  optimistic  projections  show  less  than  perfect  synchronization  and  there  are 
important  uncertainties  regarding  the  similarity  of  fiscal  policy  and  changes  in 
specialization  patterns  in  the  future.  This  suggests  that  a  reform  agenda  focusing  on 
flexibility and mobility of production factors is still important and might even stimulate 
further synchronization due to decreasing specialization. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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3.2  Measuring business cycle synchronization 
Various studies have looked at the issue of synchronization of business cycles in the euro 
area, often reaching very different conclusions. Part of these differences can be related to 
differences in variables used, diverging business cycle measures and methods to assess 
synchronization. This section therefore deals in turn with the different economic variables 
that have been considered in previous studies,  the differences in the measurement of 
relevant cyclical information, and different measures of cyclical synchronization. 
Data 
One obvious reason for differences between studies on business cycle synchronicity is 
different data sources. The two most important sources are quarterly data on GDP and 
monthly data on industrial production. In addition, GDP is sometimes decomposed into 
expenditure  categories  such  as  consumption  and  investment.
36 Annual  data  is  usually 
avoided to capture more of the high-frequency fluctuations. 
Studies of business cycle synchronization should focus on the broadest possible 
output variable, GDP. In addition, expenditure components can provide further useful 
information. If, for example, consumption is highly synchronized across countries but 
government  expenditure  is  not,  then  one  can  hypothesize  that  a  large  degree  of  risk 
sharing  between  consumers  is  already  taking  place,  but  that  fiscal  policies  are  very 
different.  Similarly,  correlations  between  consumption  in  country  A  and  exports  in 
country B can elucidate the importance of trade links between country A and B. 
The conceptual reasoning behind using industrial production is less convincing. 
First of all, manufacturing activity represents less than 20 percent of aggregate output in 
the euro zone so a priori it would not seem to be representative of total output. Second, 
manufacturing output is much more volatile than aggregate output, so the claim to being 
representative  seems  even  less  credible.
37  One  could  argue  that  movements  in  the 
manufacturing sector are likely to have a more than proportionate impact on GDP since 
                                                 
36 Some studies, like Angeloni and Dedola (1999), not only look at common output cycles, but also study 
cyclical movements in consumer prices or stock prices. As the main topic is the level of economic activity, 
price cycles are not treated here. 
37 Using annual data on value added growth from the GGDC 60-industry database, it can be shown that the 
standard deviation of annual output growth in the manufacturing sector is more than twice as large as the 
standard deviation of GDP growth for the euro zone over the period 1979-2003. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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sectors such as  transport  and  trade  earn  their  revenues  from  transporting  and  trading 
manufactured goods.
38 Furthermore, the higher frequency at which industrial production 
data is available, as well as the longer time series is appealing. Still, analysis based on 
more comprehensive output measures seems preferable to using industrial production. 
Measuring business cycles 
As discussed in Section 2.2, an important distinction that has to be made is between 
classical business cycles and growth (or deviation) cycles. In the work by Burns and 
Mitchell (1946), (classical) business cycles are defined in terms of absolute expansions 
and contractions of economic activity. Many of the more recent studies, however, look at 
deviation cycles, or the deviation of economic activity from a ‘trend’.  
Harding  and Pagan (2002, 2005) discuss some of the arguments for both cycle 
concepts,  concluding  that  the  classical  cycle  should  be  the  relevant  measure  to  be 
explained by researchers. First, classical cycles are less subjective since no trend has to 
be  identified  and  second,  policymakers  are  more  interested  in  recessions  instead  of 
slowdowns relative to a trend. There is a relationship between classical and deviation 
cycles since slowdowns generally precede a recession but not every slowdown leads to a 
recession. However, a practical reason why most researchers focus on deviation cycles is 
that most (parametric) measures used to describe the cycle need stationary series as input. 
Most studies in this literature focus on growth cycles in European countries and a 
variety of filtering techniques is used to separate trend and cycle. This makes it useful to 
describe  the  salient  features  of  these  techniques.
39  The  most  straightforward  filtering 
technique is calculating first differences.
40 Usually, this is sufficient to render the series 
of interest stationary.
41 However, as, for example, Baxter and King (1999) point out, first 
differencing does remove a trend from a series, but at the cost of a shift in the peaks and 
                                                 
38 Indeed, the correlation between manufacturing output growth and GDP growth from the GGDC 60-
industry database is 0.9 for the euro zone over the period 1979-2003. 
39 See also, for example, Canova (1998), Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim (2002), and Massmann and Mitchell 
(2004) for an overview of various filtering methods. 
40 If the original series is expressed in natural logs, first differencing yields growth rates. Various studies 
employ growth rates (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1998, Otto et al., 2001 and Kose et al., 2003). 
41 In other words, the moments (mean, variance, etc.) of the series do not depend on time. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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troughs of the differenced series and a larger volatility.
42 The phase shift may not be too 
important when comparing cycles across countries since this phase shift is the same for 
both countries. However, the larger weight on higher frequencies in the series emphasizes 
the irregular ‘noise’ over the cyclical movements. 
Canova (1998) and Massmann and Mitchell (2004) discuss a number of parametric 
methods such as the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, unobserved component models 
and simple linear time trends. Since such methods are hardly used in the literature on 
business cycle synchronization, these will not be discussed in depth. Most studies apply 
non-parametric filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP, 1997) filter; the Baxter-King 
(BK, 1999) and Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF, 2003) band pass filters and the phase average 
trend (PAT, Boschan and Ebanks, 1978). 
In general, filters can be viewed as weighted moving averages. For example, first 
differencing can be interpreted as applying a filter with a weight of one on the current 
observation and a weight of minus one on the previous observation. Usually, the filters 
are two-sided, which means that the current value of the trend depends on both past and 
future values of the series under observation. The use of a two-sided, symmetric filter 
ensures  that  there  is  no  phase  shift  between  the  original  and  the  filtered  series.
43 
However, as a result, the trend value near the beginning and end of the sample will be 
less  reliable  since  part  of  the  moving  average  cannot  be  calculated.  Quite  often  this 
problem  is  ignored,  although  the  standard  programs  to  calculate  the  BK  filter 
automatically remove a certain number of observations at the start and end of the series. 
Another alternative is to forecast and backcast the original series using, for example, an 
AR process. 
Probably  the  most  widely  used  filter  is  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter.  This  filter 
estimates  the  trend  component  by  minimizing  deviations  from  trend,  subject  to  a 
predetermined smoothness of the resulting trend: 
                                                 
42 In other words, first differencing induces a phase shift and puts a larger weight on higher frequencies of 
the time series. 
43 See, for instance, Baxter and King (1999).  Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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In this equation  t y  is the original series, 
tr
t y  the estimated trend and  λ  is the 
smoothness parameter. Note that this is a two-sided filter in that the current deviation 
from trend is minimized, subject to the change in the trend from the current period to the 
next and the change from the previous period to the current. Note also that if λ  is set to 
zero, the ‘trend’ will simply follow the original series, while if  λ  is set to infinity, a 
linear time trend will be estimated.  
For quarterly data, Hodrick and Prescott (1997) argue that a standard deviation of 
the cyclical component of 5 percent is moderately large, just as an 1/8
th of a percent 
standard deviation of the quarterly trend growth rate. Based on these priors, they set λ  to 
1600 for quarterly frequencies on the assumption that trend and cycle are identically and 
independently distributed.
44 The problem of choosing appropriate smoothness parameters 
for data at frequencies other than quarterly has in the past mostly been solved by keeping 
the 5 percent variability in the cyclical component fixed and scaling the variability of the 
trend component up or down. So the appropriate λ  for annual data becomes 100 and for 
monthly data 14,400.
45 However, using frequency-domain techniques, Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002)  have  shown  that  the  same  amount  of  smoothing  is  achieved  by  scaling  the 
quarterly lambda by one over the frequency change to the fourth power. So for annual 
data, λ  becomes (1/4
4)*1600=6.25. 
As  noted  before,  the  HP  filter  can  be  viewed  as  a  moving  average  filter. 
Specifically, as pointed out by Prescott (1986), the HP filter can be interpreted as a high-
pass filter that removes fluctuations with a frequency of more than 32 quarters or 8 years 
and  puts  those  fluctuations  in  the  trend.  Baxter  and  King  (1999)  argue  that  the 
combination  of  such  a  high-pass  filter  on  the  one hand  and  a  low-pass  filter (which 
removes high frequencies) on the other is another improvement since the HP filter still 
leaves much of the high-frequency noise as part of the cycle.
46 The resulting cyclical 
                                                 
44 The calculation is  ( )
2 125 . 0 5 = λ . 
45 Calculated as (5/0.5)
2 and (5/0.0417)
2, respectively. 
46 Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim (2002) argue that such high-frequency fluctuations are important to determine 
the exact date of a business cycle peak or trough. This consideration does not seem to be too important for 
measuring cycle synchronization, though. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
  68 
component  does  not  contain  any  fluctuations  with  high  or  low  frequencies  beyond 
predetermined cut-off points, and this defines a band pass filter. Baxter and King (1999) 
and  Christiano  and  Fitzgerald  (2003)  derive  approximate  band  pass  filters,  using 
somewhat different assumptions.
47 Although different in details, in both cases the weights 
for the filter are estimated using frequency domain arguments, but the standard Baxter 
and King (1999) filter is two-sided, while Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) advocate a 
one-sided filter. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) also point out though that both filters 
are quantitatively similar when looking at cyclical statistics. 
Baxter  and  King  (1999)  suggest  using  a  band  pass  filter  isolating  frequencies 
between 6 and 32 quarters, based on the observation in Burns and Mitchell (1946) that 
business cycles are generally confined to these frequencies. The analogy is somewhat 
problematic, however, as the 6 to 32 quarter interval refers to classical cycles, not to 
growth cycles. Economic variables generally trend upwards, so classical cycles between 
6 and 32 quarters will conform to a smaller frequency band for growth cycles (Zarnowitz 
and Ozyildirim, 2002). 
Finally, the Phase Average Trend (PAT) is closely related to the method used to 
calculate business cycle turning points. The PAT filter, originally proposed by Boschan 
and Ebanks (1978) and more recently described in Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim (2002), 
starts off by estimating a 25-quarter moving average. The turning points of the deviations 
from this trend are dated using the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm, which generates 
classical  cycle  turning  points  that  closely  approximate  those  selected  by  the  NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee. Finally, the trend is estimated by connecting the mean 
values between each cyclical peak. Although the OECD uses this filter for their business 
cycle indicators, not many studies apply this filter. However, Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim 
(2002) show that the PAT filter gives similar turning points as other filters such as the HP 
and the BK band pass filter. Artis and Zhang (1997) and Calderon et al. (2002) also 
conclude  that  the  choice  of  filtering  method  is  not  crucial  for  their  conclusions. 
Massmann and  Mitchell (2004, p. 303), who  consider the largest number of filtering 
methods,  conclude that  “our  examination  of convergence  between  euro  area  business 
                                                 
47 An ideal band pass filter would need a time series of infinite length, so an approximation is always 
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cycles indicates that there are substantive similarities across alternative measures of the 
business cycle.” This finding is remarkable since Canova (1998) concluded that different 
cycle filtering methods lead to different conclusions regarding business cycle facts in the 
U.S. These findings are not mutually exclusive, since Canova compares different filters 
within a country, while Massmann and Mitchell and others compare the results from 
different  filters  across  countries.  So  although  the  various  filters  may  indeed  “extract 
different types of information”  (Canova 1998,  p. 475), the  findings  are similar when 
comparing this information across countries. 
In summary, studies that use standard filters such as the HP, BK and CF filters are 
likely to yield similar results as long as the same data are used. These three filters also 
perform reasonably well in isolating fluctuations in the data of certain frequencies, which 
after all is the most important goal of filtering. Using first differences is likely to lead to 
larger problems, as it puts too much weight on high-frequency fluctuations. 
A  quite  different  approach  to  extracting  cyclical  information  is  by  estimating 
Markov switching models. These models, first used in this setting by Hamilton (1989) 
allow the economy to ‘switch’ between expansions and recessions. The probability of 
being in recession can then be compared across countries to gauge the commonality of 
business  cycles  across  countries.  This  methodology  is  relatively  less  established  for 
comparing  business  cycles  across  countries,  but  Artis,  Krolzig  and  Torro  (2004) 
implement this method in a recent study. 
Another comparatively new method is the one proposed by den Haan (2000). His 
approach to analyzing the co-movement between series is to study the forecast errors 
from a VAR that includes (at least) the two series of interest. This way, the dynamics and 
possible  cointegration  of  the  series  can  be  taken  into  account.  Up  until  now,  only 
Camacho et al. (2005) have used this method. 
Synchronization measures 
Given a certain measure of the cycle, the important question arises to what extent these 
cycles move together across countries. Most studies use simple (Pearsson) correlation 
coefficients of the cyclical part of GDP to answer this question, but other measures have 
been suggested in the literature as well, like the dynamic correlation measure of Croux, Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Forni  and  Reichlin  (2001),  the  phase-adjusted  correlation  of  Koopman  and  Azevedo 
(2003) and the concordance index of Harding and Pagan (2002).
48 
The measures suggested by Croux et al. (2001), Koopman and Azevedo (2003) and 
Harding  and  Pagan  (2002)  require  some  more  discussion.  The  dynamic  correlation 
measure of Croux et al. (2001) is defined as the co-spectrum between two series over the 
product of the spectra of each series. The authors then go on to define this measure over a 
certain frequency band, i.e. fluctuations in the series with a certain period. They show 
that  for  time  series  with  an  infinite  number  of  observations,  the  dynamic  correlation 
between two series over a frequency band is equal to the regular correlation between two 
band pass filtered series. For finite time series this equality does not hold in general as 
both the band pass filter and the dynamic correlation are estimated imperfectly. Despite 
this, it is likely that the two measures will be quite close in practice. Croux et al.  (2001) 
suggest that for more than two series, one should look at the cohesion of these series. The 
authors  define  cohesion  as  the  (weighted)  average  of  the  binary  dynamic  correlation 
coefficients.  This  measure  provides  a  useful  summary  statistic  on  the  degree  of  co-
movement  within  a  group  of  countries  by  avoiding  the  problem  of  choosing  a  base 
country. Still, the full distribution of correlation coefficients as for example plotted in 
Massmann and Mitchell (2004) provides even more useful information.
49 
Koopman  and  Azevedo  (2003)  estimate  an  unobserved  components  model  that 
accounts for time-varying phase differences as well as a time-varying relation between 
cycles. Although unobserved components models can also be used to distinguish trend 
and cycle, Koopman and Azevedo (2003) take band pass filtered series as input. Their 
method refines standard contemporaneous correlations between cyclical components in 
two  ways,  first  by  separating  the  contemporaneous  correlation  into  a  part  due  to 
differences in the position on the cycle of two countries (phase shift) and a ‘phase-shift’ 
                                                 
48 Belo (2001) also applies Spearman rank correlations. Camacho et al. (2005) use the simple average of   
various measures (including those of Forni et al. (2001), Harding and Pagan (2002) and den Haan (2000)), 
yielding what they call a comprehensive measure of distance.  
49 More recently, Hughes Hallett and Richter (2004) discuss a measure of business cycle coherence that is 
similar in spirit to the dynamic correlation of Croux et al. (2001). The main innovation is that Hughes 
Hallett and Richter (2004) allow for time variation in their estimated spectra. This not only allows them to 
judge how strongly two countries co-move at a certain frequency, but also how this degree of co-movement 
changes over time. The drawback is that it is as yet hard to gauge how statistically important some of these 
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adjusted correlation. Second, they allow for time variation in both the phase shift and the 
phase-shift adjusted correlation. Although this last innovation seems valuable, they can 
only practically implement their method by imposing a monotone time function. In other 
words, the correlation can either go up over the sample period, or it can go down. While 
this  provides  useful  information,  visual  inspection  of  their  cyclical  component  series 
suggests  that  periods  of  stronger  and  weaker  correlation  alternate.  Furthermore,  the 
finding that the correlation between the cyclical components of each country versus the 
euro area is around 0.90 near the year 2000 seems puzzling when compared to the results 
using  other  methods  in  studies  like  Massman  and  Mitchell  (2004),  or  the  estimates 
presented in the next section. 
The concordance index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) is a non-parametric 
co-movement measure that uses a binary indicator variable of recessions and expansions. 
Referring to this indicator variable for country x at time t as  xt S , the concordance index is 
defined as: 
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Put differently, this index measure the percentage of the time where the two series 
are  in  the  same  state.  The  index  is  in  some  ways  more  flexible  than  the  correlation 
coefficient since any method for distinguishing between recessions and expansions can 
be chosen. While the correlation between series of GDP levels will in general be spurious 
due to the strong trend in those series, classical recessions can be dated from these level 
series  and  the  concordance  index  can  be  calculated.  A  drawback  is  that  analyzing  a 
binary variable throws away potentially useful information. Still, the concordance index 
can be a useful complement to correlation measures between detrended series as well as 
providing a  useful measure to  analyze  classical cycles.  Artis,  Marcellino  and  Proietti 
(2002) provide a related perspective by looking at diffusion indexes. Such a diffusion 
index for say the euro area, measures the share of countries that are in a recession if the 
euro area as a whole is in recession. Such indexes can also be modified to measure the 
share of above-trend countries or countries with positive growth. While the concordance 
index seems useful to summarize bilateral co-movement between two series, diffusion Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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indexes can provide insight in the co-movement within an aggregate at each point in 
time.
50 
Most co-movement measures are judged by their characteristics and not so much 
by  economic  reasoning.  An  exception  is  the  work  by  Kalemli-Ozcan,  Sørensen  and 
Yosha (2001), who compare utility under autarky, where the consumption possibilities 
are  constrained  by  the  country’s  own  GDP,  and  utility  under  full  cross-country  risk 
sharing. In the latter case, consumption possibilities are equal to a fraction of total GDP 
in the area in which risk sharing takes place.
51 Moving from autarky to full risk-sharing 
will generally bring utility gains and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) derive the following 
measure for these gains when assuming log-utility:
52 
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where  δ  is the intertemporal discount rate, 
2 σ  is the variance of output growth in the 
entire economic area, excluding country i, 
2
i σ  is the variance of output growth in country 
i and 
i cov  is the covariance between output growth in country i and the rest of the 
economic area. This measure states that the gains from risk-sharing for country i will be 
larger  when  the  standard  deviation  of  GDP  growth  in  country  i  is  higher,  when  the 
standard deviation of GDP growth in the rest of the risk-sharing area is larger and when 
the covariance between country i and the rest of the area is smaller. The interpretation of 
this negative sign on the covariance is straightforward as joining an area with largely 
unrelated  fluctuations  will  provide  more  insurance  by  stabilizing  aggregate  output. 
Furthermore, the higher the standard deviations of growth, the more is gained by sharing 
risk.  
  This measure also focuses attention on an issue that is often ignored when looking 
at  business  cycle  synchronization.  Asynchronous  business  cycles  are  assumed  to  be 
costly for a monetary union since the common monetary policy will not fit all countries. 
However, as the analysis by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) makes explicit, transfers of 
                                                 
50  Note  that  diffusion  indexes  are  also  used  widely  in  the  study  of  business  cycles  within  a  country, 
amongst others by The Conference Board for the U.S. Leading Index. 
51 In the first case consumption possibilities are equal to GDPi, and in the second case they are equal to a 
(long-run) share of total GDP in the currency area. 
52 The authors also consider a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functional form for utility. The 
resulting expression for risk-sharing gains is more complicated, but the intuition is similar. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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income across countries could increase aggregate utility and more so with asynchronous 
business cycles.
53 Interestingly, equation (3.3) bears close resemblance to the correlation 
coefficients that are often used in the study of business cycle synchronicity since the 
standard deviations of the two series and the covariance between the series are the main 
components of both equation (3.3) and of the standard correlation coefficient.  
A related problem is how to judge the change in co-movement between cycles over 
time. The simplest solution is to compare correlations in two periods, for example, before 
and after the establishment of the ERM (Artis and Zhang, 1997, 1999), or for multiple 
periods as in Inklaar and de Haan (2001). A more general and less arbitrary approach is 
to use rolling windows as in Massmann and Mitchell (2004). 
Summing up, depending on the purpose, many different methods can be used to 
measure the amount of co-movement between two countries. In the introduction it has 
already been spelled out that the main issue is to see whether business cycles in the euro 
area are similar enough to justify a common monetary policy, whether the similarity has 
increased over time and which factors can help predict the similarity in the future. Indeed, 
the  simplicity  of  the  correlation  coefficient  is  one  its  strongest  advantages:  the  main 
question of interest is whether monetary policy will be suited to a currency area at a point 
in time. Decomposing co-movement into in-phase and out-of-phase components as in 
Koopman and Azevedo (2003) may provide interesting information, but it is not very 
useful from the point of view of the suitability of a common monetary policy. 
3.3  Synchronization trends in OECD countries 
Although the previous section demonstrated that there are many ways to analyze the co-
movement  of  economic  activity  across  countries,  for  the  empirical  analysis  it  makes 
sense  to  consider  a  more  manageable  set  of  indicators.  The  most  commonly  used 
indicator is the correlation coefficient between detrended measures of economic activity. 
The  choice  of  detrending  method is  generally  not  crucial  for  the results,  so  here  the 
Baxter-King band pass filter is used.
54 Following the discussion in the previous section 
                                                 
53 This obviously abstracts from political considerations that could hamper the adoption and operation of 
such a risk-sharing scheme. 
54 Following Baxter and King (1999), cyclical frequencies are defined as fluctuations between 6 and 32 
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about selecting a measure of economic activity, there is a clear trade-off between GDP 
and the index of industrial production (IIP) in terms of the scope of coverage and the 
frequency and length of the time series. Therefore, results based on both measures will be 
presented. 
As the ECB takes the business cycle of the euro area into account when making 
monetary policy decisions, the most obvious first question is how similar the business 
cycles  of  euro  area  countries  are  to  the  aggregate  euro  area  cycle.  The  analysis  is 
performed using data on quarterly GDP and monthly industrial production for 21 OECD 
countries  between  1970  and  2003,  including  all  euro  area  countries  except 
Luxembourg.
55 Most of the GDP series are directly from the OECD Quarterly National 
Accounts. These data were supplemented with series from Eurostat and national statistical 
offices  to  get  the  maximum  number  of  observations.
56  The  source  of  the  industrial 
production data is the OECD Main Economic Indicators publication. Chapter 1 already 
showed those results for the period 1999-2003, but the next step is to see whether the 
degree of synchronization has changed over time, especially compared to countries that 
are not part of the euro area. One complication for comparisons of EMU members to the 
euro area aggregate is that these countries are part of the aggregate. To avoid this bias, 
correlations are calculated relative to the aggregate excluding the country in question.
57 
While the degree of monetary integration has generally increased since 1970, a 
number of periods can be distinguished with relatively distinct exchange rate behaviour. 
In the early 1970s, the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down and 
until 1979, only relatively informal exchange rate arrangements were in place. From 1979 
onwards, the Exchange  Rate Mechanism (ERM) started to function, but especially in 
early years there were still frequent changes in parities. From about 1987 onwards, these 
                                                 
55  In  addition  to  these  eleven  euro  area  countries,  Australia,  Canada,  Denmark,  Japan,  New  Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States are included. In the case of 
Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland, only quarterly industrial production data is available. Therefore, 
all correlations for these countries are calculated using quarterly data. 
56 Specifically, Eurostat data was used for Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. For Japan 
data was used from the Cabinet Office (SNA68 series), for Spain from INE (SNA68 series) and for Canada 
from Statistics Canada. 
57 To facilitate this, changes in the euro area aggregate are defined as changes in the GDP-weighted average 
of the individual countries for both quarterly GDP and industrial production. In case of GDP, there are 
missing  observations  for  a  considerable  number  of  countries  in  the  early  1970s.  For  estimating  the 
aggregate, the OECD estimate of quarterly euro area GDP is substituted for these countries. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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occurred much less often, with the exception of the currency upheavals of 1992. The 
obvious starting point for the final period is 1999, at the introduction of the euro. 
Table  3.1  Business  cycle  synchronization  of  21  OECD  countries  with  euro  area 
aggregate, 1970-2003 
1970:Q1-
1979:Q2
1979:Q3-
1987:Q3
1987:Q4-
1998:Q4
1999:Q1-
2003:Q4
1970:Q1-
1979:Q2
1979:Q3-
1987:Q3
1987:Q4-
1998:Q4
1999:Q1-
2003:Q4
A: Summary statistics
GDP
Average 0.68 0.58 0.45 0.52 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.65
Standard deviation 0.13 0.27 0.36 0.43 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.36
Minimum 0.43 -0.28 -0.20 -0.57 0.43 0.38 0.34 -0.26
Maximum 0.83 0.90 0.88 0.98 0.83 0.90 0.88 0.98
Industrial production
Average 0.74 0.55 0.52 0.65 0.73 0.53 0.62 0.76
Standard deviation 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.24 0.33 0.24 0.29
Minimum 0.36 -0.08 -0.26 -0.11 0.36 -0.08 0.25 0.02
Maximum 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.99 0.95 0.87 0.92 0.99
B: Number of significant changes over previous period
GDP
Increases 1 4 3 1 3 3
Decreases 0 2 2 0 0 2
Industrial production
Increases 0 3 9 0 2 5
Decreases 9 5 1 6 2 0
All countries Euro area countries
Notes: Based on correlations between detrended output in 21 OECD countries, including all euro area countries except 
Luxembourg, and the euro area aggregate. The non-EMU countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. In case of euro area countries, the correlation is 
computed excluding the country itself. In panel B, a correlation changes significantly when the 95% confidence intervals in 
two periods do not overlap.  
Table 3.1 shows the resulting development of synchronization with the euro area 
over time. Panel A presents some summary statistics, both for all countries and for the 
subset of euro area countries. To get an indication about the importance of some the 
changes,  Panel  B  shows  how  many  countries  had  significantly  higher  or  lower 
correlations compared with the previous period.
58 As the table makes clear, there is no 
clear  trend  in  synchronization  over  time  for  either  measure  of  output  and  while  the 
correlations are generally positive, some are quite small. The correlations for the euro 
                                                 
58 To be precise, a correlation coefficient changes significantly from one period to the next if the 95% 
confidence intervals do not overlap. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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area countries are somewhat higher than the overall average, but the differences are not 
very large and there has only been a modest increase in the difference over time. In this 
respect it is remarkable that the GDP-based correlation has gone down after the start of 
EMU,  while  the  correlation  based  on  industrial  production  has  gone  up.  As  further 
evidence, the number of significant increases is not clearly larger than the number of 
decreases.  For  example,  after  1999,  the  correlations  based  on  industrial  production 
increased significantly in five euro area countries, but also in four non-EMU countries. 
These results are akin to the conclusions by Artis (2003), who finds that there is no clear, 
overwhelmingly European business cycle. 
Figure 3.1 Density estimates of bilateral output correlations, GDP 1970-2003 
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There are two obvious objections to the analysis underlying Table 3.1. First of all, 
although the correlations with the euro area as a whole may not show a clear pattern, a 
core group of euro area countries may have similar business cycles (see e.g. Forni and 
Reichlin, 2001). The other potential problem is that the results in Table 3.1 may not be 
robust to changes in the periodisation. To address the first issue, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show 
kernel density estimates of bilateral correlations for the same periods as Table 3.1, while 
Figures  3.3  and  3.4  plot the  average bilateral correlation  for a  moving  window.  The Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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estimated densities are basically refined histograms, showing the frequency of different 
values of correlation coefficients. 
Figure 3.2 Density estimates of bilateral output correlations, industrial production 
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If there is a core group of countries with high bilateral correlations, or if this group 
developed over time, a bimodal distribution for the correlations between EMU countries 
would show up in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. These figures show the distribution of bilateral 
correlations for country couples that are both EMU members, and the distribution for all 
other country couples (i.e. couples where at least one country is not an EMU member). 
However, the evidence for bimodality is by no means obvious. What does stand out in 
both figures is that in the period from 1970 to 1979, correlations amongst EMU countries 
were generally lower than all other correlations. This picture changed during the late 
1980s. In the 1987-1999 period for GDP (Figure 3.1), the EMU countries were clearly 
more  correlated  amongst  each  other,  than  country  couples  that  were  not  both  EMU 
members, but for industrial production (Figure 3.2) the picture is not so clear. The pattern 
for GDP also did not hold clearly after 1999. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure  3.3  Average  bilateral  correlation  between  EMU  countries  and  all  other 
correlations for an 8-year moving window, GDP 1970-2003 
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Figures  3.3  and  3.4  provide  somewhat  clearer  evidence.  Both  figures  chart  the 
average bilateral correlation for 8-year moving windows, Figure 3.3 for GDP and 3.4 for 
industrial  production.  Again,  a  distinction  is  made  between  correlations  of  EMU 
countries  and  all  other  correlations.  The  average  correlation  fluctuates,  sometimes 
substantially, but since the mid-1980s, EMU correlations have on average been higher 
than non-EMU correlations for both output measures.
59 Still, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 showed 
that the distribution of correlations is quite wide and even an average correlation of 0.60 
means that there has been quite some heterogeneity in the cyclical experience of euro 
area countries. 
                                                 
59 The average correlation for EMU countries in Figure 3.3 dropped substantially around 1990. This can be 
traced to Portugal, which did not have a long enough time series of quarterly GDP data for earlier periods. 
These sample imbalances are less an issue for industrial production, as only data for Denmark and Ireland 
do not stretch back to 1970, but 1974 and 1975, respectively. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure  3.4  Average  bilateral  correlation  between  EMU  countries  and  all  other 
correlations for an 8-year moving window, industrial production 1970-2003 
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3.4  Synchronization trends in U.S. states 
The past experience of euro area countries may not be representative for the future. For 
much of the period since 1970, monetary policy has not been coordinated and exchange 
rates fluctuated wildly at times. Also, the period since 1999 may simply be to short as no 
full business cycle has occurred since then. Indeed, the full effects of a monetary union 
will take even longer to materialize, as, for example, production may take a long time to 
concentrate geographically. To evaluate the effects of monetary union, we need to turn to 
an area that has already been a monetary union for many decades. 
The United States is a good candidate as it is similar in size to the euro area and it 
is also a developed country. Ever since 1935, all monetary policy decisions have been in 
the hands of the Federal Reserve and before that, a common currency was in use and 
individual states could not hamper inter-state commerce. Technological progress over the Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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past century has reduced the cost of transport  and communications, which may have 
made regional specialization more attractive over time.
60 
To  analyze  long-run  trends  in  business  cycle  synchronization,  state  personal 
income is the only available measure. Gross state product (the state analogue of GDP) is 
only available from 1977 onwards on a consistent basis, while employment data go back 
to  1969.  In  contrast,  the  personal  income  data  from  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis (BEA) are available from 1929 onwards.
61 No price data is available at the state 
level, so instead the implicit GDP deflator is used. 
Table 3.2 Business cycle synchronization of personal income in U.S. states with U.S. 
aggregate personal income, 1929-2004 
1929-1947 1948-1966 1967-1985 1986-2004 1929-1966 1967-2004
Summary statistics
Average 0.88 0.67 0.76 0.68 0.85 0.72
Standard deviation 0.08 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.18
Minimum 0.61 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.54 0.25
Maximum 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.92
Number of significant changes over previous period
Increases 0 3 0 0
Decreases 5 0 0 7
Notes: Based on correlations of annual state personal income for U.S. states excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii, including the District of Columbia. Personal income is deflated using the U.S. GDP deflator and 
detrended with the Baxter-King band pass filter (fluctuations between 1 and 8 years). Each state's cycle 
is correlated to the U.S. aggregate, excluding the state in question. A correlation changes significantly 
when the 95% confidence interval of the coefficients in one period does not overlap the interval in the 
next period.  
Table 3.2 shows the results for a number of different periods. As there have been 
no major shifts in the degree of monetary integration, the period is first divided into four 
periods of equal length and next divided into two periods. As the table makes clear, the 
average correlation was highest in the first period, 1929-1947, which included both the 
Great Depression and the wartime economic boom. The minimum correlation of 0.61 in 
this  period  is  another  indication  that  this  was  a  period  of  relatively  homogenous 
                                                 
60 See also Sleijpen (2001) for more on the United States as a monetary and fiscal union. 
61 The personal income measure in the U.S. national accounts includes household income from all sources, 
including government transfers as well as income of non-profit institutions. As such, it covers around 80 
percent of GDP. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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economic  performance  across  states.  The  post-war  periods  shows  much  greater 
divergence with a lower average correlation and a greater spread. The bottom panel of the 
table shows that there have been relatively few significant changes in correlation: of the 
49 states covered,
62 only seven or eight showed a significant change. Compared to the 
results in Table 3.1, the cycles of U.S. states after 1948 are not much more similar than 
the business cycles of countries in the euro area. 
Again, similar criticisms can be raised about the possible cluster formation (for 
example  in  certain  regions)  and  the  arbitrary  periodisation.  Figure  3.5  shows  density 
estimates of the correlations for each couple of states. The chart on the left-hand side 
compares the period up to 1966 to the period afterwards, and the right-hand side divides 
the 1967-2004 period in two. These charts show a comparable pattern to that seen in 
Table  3.2  with  a  very  high  degree  of  synchronization  in  early  periods  and  lower 
synchronization from around 1970 onwards. Compared to Figures 3.1 and 3.2 though, the 
spread of bilateral correlations is smaller in case of the U.S. states. 
Figure 3.5 Density estimates of the bilateral personal income correlations, 1929-2004 
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62 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because they have not been part of the Union since 1929. The District of 
Columbia is included. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure  3.6  addresses  the  issue  of  periodisation.  All  bilateral  correlations  are 
calculated for each 8-year period between 1929 and 2004 and the average is plotted. The 
figure shows considerable variation with average correlations fluctuating between 0.2 and 
0.8.  The  pattern  is  also  broadly  comparable  to  that  shown  in  Table  3.2.  The  figure 
suggests economy-wide developments, such as the Great Depression and the following 
wartime boom, or the oil crises and economic stagflation in the 1970s and early 1980s 
have similar effects across most states. However, there are also periods where divergence 
is much greater. 
Figure 3.6 Average bilateral correlation between U.S. states for an 8-year moving 
window, personal income 1929-2004 
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In summary, the U.S. experience suggests that a monetary union is no guarantee for 
perfectly synchronized business cycles and economic integration does not inexorably lead 
to  more  similar  business  cycles.  Even  though  the  average  correlation  seems  to  be 
somewhat higher amongst U.S. states than between euro area countries, the differences 
are not large. The development over time suggests that there are periods where U.S.-wide 
developments dominate, such as the Great Depression, but also that there are periods of 
greater divergence across states. This is in line with the results of Partridge and Rickman Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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(2005), who find that co-movement between states has decreased since the late 1960s due 
to a less volatile aggregate economy.
63 
3.5  The determinants of synchronization 
Since  the  seminal  paper  of  Frankel  and  Rose  (1998),  the  search  for  determinants  of 
business cycle synchronization has taken a great flight. However, these studies cannot 
agree on more than the original finding by Frankel and Rose (1998) that more intensive 
trade  links  between  two  countries  stimulates  synchronization.
64  The  analysis  in  this 
section builds on this literature and first focuses on finding a set of robust explanatory 
variables. This analysis is comparable to the Extreme Bounds Analysis of Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004), but covers 21 OECD countries and considers a more extensive list of 
potential explanatory variables. Furthermore, instead of the very restrictive criterion for 
robustness of Leamer (1983), the criterion of Sala-i-Martin (1997) is followed.
65 
Once a set of robust explanatory variables is identified, the remainder of the section 
focuses on estimating a model for synchronization that incorporates these variables and 
analyzing the implications for EMU. This analysis makes a number of contributions to 
the literature. First of all, as the density estimates of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 already showed, 
correlation  coefficients  are  skewed  and  hence,  not  normally  distributed.  For  valid 
inference in the regressions, the correlation coefficients are transformed, so that they are 
no longer bounded between -1 and 1. 
Second, the issue of endogeneity of trade is dealt with in a more substantive way 
than  in  previous  studies.  The  basic  problem  here  is  that  countries  with  intense  trade 
relations  are  more  likely  to  link  their  currencies,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly.  This 
implies  that  these  countries  will  have  similar  monetary  policies  –  and  possibly  other 
policies – that may synchronize their business cycles. So it is not only trade that causes 
the  business  cycles  to  be  correlated  but  also  the  similarity  of  economic  policies. 
Neglecting  these  other  variables  in  the  regression  specification  renders  the  trade 
                                                 
63 The correlation of output between two states will ceteris paribus be lower if shocks that are common to 
both states, such as U.S.-wide shocks are less common. See e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) or 
Stock and Watson (2003) for more on the decreased volatility of the U.S. economy. 
64 For a survey of research into the determinants of synchronization, see de Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin 
(2005). 
65 See Appendix 3.A for more details. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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coefficient biased and inconsistent. Frankel and Rose (1998) and most subsequent studies 
therefore  employ  instrumental  variables  estimation,  using  gravity  variables  as 
instruments. However, this is not an adequate solution, since the gravity variables are 
likely to affect other variables that influence business cycle synchronization as well, like 
participation in a currency union. This problem is avoided by estimating a multivariate 
model, including policy variables as well as structural characteristics. 
The third topic is the effect of specialization on business cycle synchronization. If 
the  degree  of  specialization  between  two  countries  is  high,  most  trade  will  be  inter-
industry, and industry-specific shocks will lead to diverging business cycles. However, a 
dominant role for intra-industry trade can explain the positive association between trade 
and  synchronization  that  has  been  found  in  the  literature.  Despite  these  theoretical 
arguments, this issue has received only scant empirical attention. Gruben et al. (2002) 
include  inter-industry  and  intra-industry  trade  in  their  business  cycle  synchronization 
model and claim that the effects of both variables are different. However, this conclusion 
is based on unreliable estimates as the correlation between inter- and intra-industry trade 
is very high. Imbs (2004) accounts for the effect of inter-industry trade by including a 
measure of industrial specialization. The approach taken here is similar, but in addition to 
industrial  structure,  the  structure  of  overall  exports  and  the  share  of  (bilateral)  intra-
industry trade are used to test the theoretical foundations of the trade relationship more 
directly. 
The  final  issue  is  to  what  extent  the  relationship  between  trade  intensity  and 
business cycle synchronization is robust across different country pairs. Is the effect of 
trade on business cycle synchronization the same for country pairs that are already highly 
synchronized, like Germany and the Netherlands, and countries which are not, like for 
example Germany and Japan? Or is the effect of trade on business cycle correlations 
driven  by  (outlying)  country  pairs  such  as  the  US  and  Canada?  To  examine  the 
importance of sample heterogeneity and outliers, the methods of quantile regressions and 
least-trimmed squares are employed, respectively. 
The main findings are the following. Trade intensity is found to affect business 
cycle synchronization, but the effect is much smaller than reported by Frankel and Rose 
(1998) and Hausman (1978) tests show that in the multivariate models, estimation using Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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ordinary  least  squares  is  no  longer  inconsistent.  Furthermore,  apart from  the  level  of 
trade, specialization has a strong impact on business cycle synchronization. In addition, 
similar monetary and similar fiscal policies have a positive impact on business cycle 
synchronization. The impact of these factors on business cycle synchronization is about 
as large as the impact of trade intensity. Finally, the results suggest that the effect of trade 
on  business  cycle  synchronization  does  not  suffer  from  sample  heterogeneity  and  is 
robust for outlying observations.
66 
The remainder of the section is organized as follows. First, the methodology and 
the  data  sources  and  methods  are  described.  Thereafter,  the  estimation  results  are 
presented and the economic relevance of the findings is discussed. The final part shows 
the results of the quantile and least trimmed squares regressions. 
Methodology 
Theoretically, trade intensity has an ambiguous effect on the co-movement of output. 
Standard trade theory predicts that openness to trade will lead to increased specialization 
in  production  and  inter-industry  patterns  of  international  trade.  If business  cycles are 
dominated by industry-specific shocks, trade-induced specialization leads to decreasing 
business  cycle  correlations.
67  However,  if  trade  is  dominated  by  intra-industry  trade 
industry-specific shocks may lead to more symmetric business cycles. Furthermore, in 
case of intensive trade relations economy-wide shocks in one country will generally have 
an effect on demand for goods from the other country. 
The question how to disentangle the effect of intra-industry and inter-industry trade 
has been dealt with in different ways in the literature. Imbs (2004) includes an industrial 
specialization measure to capture the impact of inter-industry trade. Gruben et al. (2002) 
                                                 
66 The paper that comes closest to the analysis here is Imbs (2004), who also finds that the effect of trade on 
business cycle synchronization is less than that reported by Frankel and Rose (1998). There are, however, a 
number of important differences between both studies. The methodology is quite different as the primary 
interest is in the effect of trade intensity on output correlation. Furthermore, a much longer list of potential 
determinants of business cycle synchronization is analyzed here. Imbs (2004), for instance, does not take 
the role of monetary and fiscal policy into account, which is found to be important. Imbs also does not 
examine how sensitive his findings are for sample heterogeneity and outliers. 
67 However, as pointed out by Frankel (2004), a positive shock at one point in the chain of value added in a 
country will tend to have positive spillover effects at the other points along the chain in other countries.
 
Thus trade in intermediate products gives rise to positive correlations but may be recorded as inter-industry 
trade. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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take a more direct approach and split up trade in inter- and intra-industry trade. In a 
regression in which both intra-industry and inter-industry trade are included, they find 
that  intra-industry  trade  has  a  positive  effect  and  that  the  effect  of  inter-industry  is 
insignificant.  An  important  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  intra-industry  trade  is 
highly correlated with inter-industry trade; in the dataset used here, this correlation is 
0.82.  This  means  that  including  both  variables  simultaneously  leads  to  serious 
multicollinearity problems. Therefore the approach of Imbs (2004) is followed and his 
solution  is taken one  step  further.  Instead  of relying  only  on  specialization  measures 
based on industrial structure, measures based on the structure of exports, and the share of 
intra-industry trade are also used. These measures will be discussed in more detail below. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) acknowledge the possible contrasting effects of inter- and 
intra-industry trade on business cycle synchronization, but focus on the net effect of total 
trade on output co-movement. However, even identifying the net effect of trade is not 
straightforward since trade intensity is endogenous, which makes an OLS regression of 
business cycle synchronization on trade intensity inappropriate. Frankel and Rose (1998) 
deal with this problem by  using  gravity  variables  (distance,  border dummy, common 
language  dummy)  as  instruments  to  identify  the  effect  of  trade  on  business  cycle 
correlation. However, as pointed out by Gruben et al. (2002), this is not appropriate if the 
gravity variables (Z) not only affect bilateral trade intensity (T) but are also possibly 
related  to some  other  variables  (F) that  affect  business  cycle  synchronization  (C),  as 
illustrated  in  Figure  3.7.  For  instance,  neighbouring  countries  are  more  likely  to 
coordinate their monetary policies, or even to have a common currency, than countries 
that are further away from each other. In turn, the introduction of a single currency will 
contribute  to  reducing  trading  costs  both  directly  and  indirectly,  e.g.,  by  removing 
exchange  rate  risks  (and the  cost of  hedging)  and  diminishing information  costs  (De 
Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005).  
 Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure  3.7  The  Relationship  between  business  cycle  correlation  (C),  trade  (T), 
gravity variables (Z) and other variables (F) 
 
The regression model that corresponds to the figure above is: 
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The model shows that the business cycle correlation depends on bilateral trade as 
well as other policy-related and structural variables. Some of these variables may be 
influenced by the exogenous gravity variables, while in turn affecting trade intensity. 
Broadly  speaking,  these  variables  can  be  grouped  into  the  following  categories:  (1) 
specialization (see, e.g., Imbs, 2004); (2) monetary integration (see, e.g., Rose and Engel, 
2002); (3) financial integration (see, e.g., Imbs, 2004); and (4) similarity of fiscal policies 
(see, e.g., Clark and van Wincoop, 2001). Apart from these variables many others have 
been suggested that may be related to business cycle synchronization (see chapter 6 in De 
Haan, Eijffinger and Waller (2005) for an extensive discussion).  
To identify the other variables to be included in the model, an Extreme Bounds 
Analysis  is  used  to  examine  which  variables  are  robustly  related  to  business  cycle 
synchronization in the OECD area, following Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004). Using a 
much  longer  list  of  potential  explanatory  variables  than  examined  by  Baxter  and 
Kouparitsas  a  number  of  robust  variables  are  identified,  including  the  similarity  of 
monetary policy (proxied by the correlation of short-term interest rates) and the similarity 
of  fiscal  policy  (proxied  by  the  correlation  of  cyclically-adjusted  budget  deficits).  In 
contrast to Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) the robustness criteria of Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
are used since Leamer’s (1983) EBA is extremely restrictive. Appendix Table 3.1 shows 
the variables that have been used in the analysis and whether they are robust explanatory 
variables of the business cycle correlation between two OECD countries. When testing 
C 
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for the robustness of these variables, care was taken not to include other proxies for the 
same  “driving  force”  in  the  set  of  control  variables.  This  is  especially  relevant  for 
financial integration and specialization, since three measures of financial integration and 
specialization are under consideration (see below for more details on these measures). 
Once a suitable set of explanatory variables has been identified, the appropriate 
method to estimate the model above depends on the correlation between the error terms 
of the three equations. Given the exogeneity of gravity variables, it is crucial whether ν  
and  ε   are  correlated.  If  so,  using  OLS  for  the  first  equation  results  in  inconsistent 
estimates  and  instrumental  variables  estimation  should  be  preferred.  If  not,  OLS 
estimates are consistent and at least as efficient. A Hausman (1978) test is used to test 
whether  IV  estimates  are  significantly  different  from  OLS  estimates.  If  there  is  no 
significant  difference  between  these  estimates,  we  can  conclude  that  OLS  gives 
consistent results. 
Data sources and methods 
As  in  Section  3.3  on  synchronization  trends  in  the  OECD,  both  GDP  and  industrial 
production are used as measures of economic activity and both variables are detrended 
using the Baxter-King band pass filter. As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 showed, synchronization 
tends to fluctuate over time and there is no obvious way to split the sample period in 
relatively homogenous sub-periods. For the regression analysis, the sample is therefore 
split into three periods of equal length (i.e. 11 years: 1970-1981, 1981-1992 and 1992-
2003), resulting in a maximum of 630 observations (0.5*(3*21*20)).
68 For the quantile 
regression results shown below, the sample is split in eight periods of equal length in 
order to increase the number of observations.
69 
As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 showed, the set of correlations is generally not normally 
distributed. Up to here, this was not problematic, but the residuals in the regression need 
to be normally distributed for valid inference. To resolve this, Fisher’s z-transformation 
of  the  correlation  coefficients  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  transformed 
correlation coefficients are calculated as  ( ) ( ) ( ) C C C
t − + = 1 1 ln 2 1 , where C is the pair-
                                                 
68 Frankel and Rose (1998) followed a similar approach, using four periods of about 9 years. 
69 The results are generally robust to distinguishing from two up to eight different periods. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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wise correlation coefficient for each country couple. After transformation, the correlation 
coefficient is no longer bounded at -1 and 1, but unbounded instead. As a result the 
transformed correlations will be normally distributed (see David, 1949). This issue has 
not been addressed in most previous papers using these types of model, presumably under 
the assumption that the deviation from normality is sufficiently small. Figure 3.8 shows 
density estimates of all untransformed correlations (left-hand side) and the transformed 
correlations.  While  the  untransformed  correlations  are  clearly  skewed,  the  z-
transformation mostly removes this. 
Figure 3.8 Estimated density plots of untransformed and transformed business cycle 
correlations 
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In previous studies on the determinants of business cycle synchronization various 
indicators of trade intensity have been used.
70 For instance,  Frankel and Rose (1998) 
employ total trade (i.e. exports X and imports M) between two countries (i,j) scaled by 
total GDP (Y) or total trade.
71 Instead of using the sum of trade or GDP of the two 
                                                 
70 The source for all the trade data in this study is the new database by Feenstra et al. (2005). 
71 As pointed out by Otto et al. (2001), the first measure suffers from obscuring one-way interdependence, 
the second suffers from not measuring the relative importance of trade in the total economy. Note that 
when using GDP as a scaling factor, GDP at current national prices is converted to U.S. dollars using Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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countries as scaling factor, some authors prefer scaling by the product of GDP or trade of 
the two countries concerned (see, for instance, Clark and van Wincoop, 2001) as this 
indicator  is  not  size-dependent.  An  alternative  indicator  is  suggested  by  Otto  et  al. 
(2001), who take the maximum of: 
(3.5) 
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  . 
They argue that what matters is whether or not at least one country is exposed to 
the other. In this measure, total trade can also be used for normalization. As a result, six 
different trade intensity measures have been calculated. Table 1 shows the correlation 
matrix of these indicators. As these measures are (imperfect) proxies for trade intensity 
and  it  is  not  obvious  which  one  is  to  be  preferred,  they  are  combined  into  a  single 
measure using principal component analysis. The preferred trade intensity  measure is 
therefore based on the common variation in the six individual trade intensity measures. 
This combined measure is based on the largest eigenvalue, which accounts for 64 percent 
of the total variance.
72  
Table 3.3 Correlation coefficients between trade intensity measures 
TINT2 TINT3 TINT4 TINT5 TINT6
TINT1 0.52* 0.84* 0.73* 0.27* 0.58*
TINT2 0.58* 0.52* 0.60* 0.48*
TINT3 0.57* 0.29* 0.78*
TINT4 0.64* 0.57*
TINT5 0.51*
Notes: * denotes correlation significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
TINT1: bilateral trade, normalised by total trade of the two countries. 
TINT2: normalised by minimum of total trade of the two countries, 
TINT3: normalised by the product of total trade of the two countries. 
TINT4-6: same, but with GDP.
 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  three  indicators  of  specialization  are 
distinguished, namely measures based on industrial specialization, export similarity and 
the  share  of  intra-industry  trade.  Imbs  (2004)  suggests  the  following  measure  for 
industrial specialization: 
                                                                                                                                                 
purchasing power parities from the OECD (2002a) to take price differences between countries into account. 
All trade data are already converted using current exchange rates. 
72 The first eigenvalue is four times larger than the second. Furthermore, a measure based on the largest two 
eigenvalues has a correlation of 0.99 with the measure based on only the largest eigenvalue. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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where stni denotes the GDP share of industry n at time t in country i. Apart from the index 
suggested by Imbs, the squared difference instead of the absolute difference of output 
shares  can  be  used.  Following  Baxter  and  Kouparitsas  (2004),  these  specialization 
measures are recast as similarity measures by subtracting the specialization measure from 
one. In addition, the correlation of output shares is used. These three industrial similarity 
indicators are constructed using the 60-industry database of the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (GGDC, 2005b), which has data on 56 industries covering the entire 
economy at the 2-digit and sometimes 3-digit level of industry detail (according to the 
ISIC  revision  3 classification).
73  As  might be  expected, the  three measures  of  output 
similarity are highly correlated (between 0.87 and 0.96), so following similar reasoning 
and criteria as for the trade intensity measures, the first principal component is used in the 
regressions as the first indicator of specialization.
74 
Furthermore, following Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), the similarity of exports is 
used as the second main indicator of specialization. As these authors point out, countries 
with similar baskets of traded goods will be affected similarly in the event of sector-
specific  shocks  hitting  their  export  and/or  import  sectors.  Using  the  trade  data  by 
commodity (at the 4-digit SITC level of detail) of Feenstra et al. (2005), export shares are 
calculated for each country. The same three similarity measures as for output shares are 
calculated for export shares. The correlation between these export similarity measures 
varies between 0.54 and 0.84, and the first principal component accounts for 78% of the 
variance. Therefore, this measure is used as the second specialization indicator. 
The  final  indicator  of  specialization  is  the  share  of  bilateral  trade  that  can  be 
attributed to intra-industry trade, IIT. This index is defined as: 
                                                 
73 See www.ggdc.net for a more thorough documentation of this database, as well as the most recent 
version. 
74 The first principal component accounts for 94 % of the variance. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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The share of intra-industry trade is calculated as one minus the absolute difference 
between exports of industry k from country i to country j and exports from country j to 
country i, divided by total bilateral trade (see Grubel and Loyd, 1971). The trade data by 
commodity  of  Feenstra  et  al.  (2005)  are  allocated  to  industries  using  a  detailed 
concordance.
75 
Financial linkages could result in a higher degree of business cycle synchronization 
by  generating large demand side effects.  For instance, a decline in a  particular stock 
market could induce a simultaneous decline in demand in other countries if investors in 
these  countries  have  invested  in  this  particular  stock  market.  Furthermore,  contagion 
effects  that  are  transmitted  through  financial  linkages  could  also  result  in  heightened 
cross-country  spillover  effects  of  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  However,  international 
financial  linkages  could  also  stimulate  specialization  of  production  through  the 
reallocation of capital in a manner consistent with countries’ comparative advantages. 
Three indicators of financial integration are considered: the correlation of changes in 
stock  market  indexes,  a  dummy  for  capital  account  restrictions,  and  the  (absolute) 
difference between the net foreign asset (NFA) positions of a country couple.
76  
The stock market data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the 
measure  that  is  used  is  the  correlation  of  annual  growth  rates.  The  capital  account 
variable is based on information provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and updated 
using  the  IMF  publication  Exchange  arrangements  and  exchange  restrictions,  which 
gives  an  overview  of  capital  and  current  account  restrictions  for  each  country.  The 
indicator equals one if at least one of the two countries had capital account restrictions 
during the period considered. The source of the NFA data is again Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001). They present two estimates, one based on cumulated current account data 
and one based on cumulated capital accounts. As the capital account-based measure is 
                                                 
75 Industries are defined at the 4-digit level of the international standard classification (ISIC rev. 2). See 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeConcordances.
html.  
76 The latter two measures are also employed by Imbs (2004). Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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available for fewer years in most countries and (in theory) they should measure the same 
phenomenon, the cumulated current accounts are used. 
Estimation results 
The first two rows of Panel A of Table 3.4 shows a replication of the main results of 
Frankel and Rose (1998), i.e. the OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the 
effect of trade on business cycle correlations using the same trade measures as in their 
study. In addition to the instruments used by Frankel and Rose (1998), i.e. distance, an 
adjacency  dummy,  and  a  dummy  for  common  language,  a  variable  measuring 
geographical remoteness and a dummy for common legal origin are also included.
77  
The  OLS  and  IV  estimates  of  the  trade  coefficient  are  positive  and  highly 
significant and comparable for the two measures of economic activity. Like Frankel and 
Rose, the coefficients are smaller and less significant when bilateral trade intensity is 
normalized by output. The IV estimates are similar in magnitude as those reported by 
Frankel  and  Rose  (1998)  and  considerably  higher  than  the  OLS  estimates.  Indeed, 
Hausman (1978) tests show that the IV estimates are significantly different from the OLS 
estimates, suggesting that the OLS estimates are biased. 
                                                 
77 All these instruments are highly significant in explaining trade intensity and the F-statistic from the test 
of the joint significance of all variables in the first-stage regression with gravity variables explaining trade 
is 157. Legal origin has also been used to directly explain output co-movement (e.g. Otto et al., 2001) but it 
can be argued that the main effect of a common legal origin is via trade: the correlation between legal 
origin and trade intensity is 0.40, while the correlation with the GDP and IP correlations are 0.23 and 0.11, 
respectively. As the 95% lower bound of the legal origin-trade intensity correlation is 0.27, the link with 
trade is significantly stronger than the link with output correlations. From a conceptual point of view, it also 
seems  reasonable  that  a  common  legal  system  will  facilitate  trade  links,  while  the  direct  link  with 
synchronization is more elusive. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Table 3.4 The effect of trade on business cycle synchronization, replication of the 
Frankel-Rose model with the current dataset 
IIP GDP IIP GDP
Panel A, Estimation results
(1) Bilateral trade, normalised by total trade 0.031* 0.025* 0.060* 0.061*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
(2) Bilateral trade, normalised by total GDP 0.009* 0.010* 0.016* 0.016*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
(3) Bilateral trade, factor score 0.074* 0.086* 0.125* 0.140*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
(4) Bilateral trade, factor score, transformed correlation 0.127* 0.125* 0.204* 0.203*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.030)
Hausman test (H0: OLS is consistent)
Bilateral trade, normalised by total trade 21.0* 18.3*
Bilateral trade, normalised by total GDP 24.6* 11.4*
Bilateral trade, factor score 22.2* 13.3*
Bilateral trade, factor score, transformed correlation 24.5* 14.5*
Panel B, Standardized coefficients
Bilateral trade, normalised by total trade 0.081 0.072 0.070 0.077
Bilateral trade, normalised by total GDP 0.080 0.089 0.079 0.081
Bilateral trade, factor score 0.074 0.084 0.100 0.106
Bilateral trade, factor score, transformed correlation 0.126 0.123 0.160 0.151
95% confidence interval of standardized coefficient [Lower bound – Upper bound]
Bilateral trade, normalised by total trade [0.06 - 0.11] [0.04 - 0.10] [0.05 - 0.09] [0.05 - 0.11]
Bilateral trade, normalised by total GDP [0.06 - 0.10] [0.06 - 0.12] [0.06 - 0.10] [0.06 - 0.11]
Bilateral trade, factor score [0.05 - 0.09] [0.06 - 0.11] [0.08 - 0.12] [0.08 - 0.14]
Bilateral trade, factor score, transformed correlation [0.09 - 0.16] [0.08 - 0.16] [0.12 - 0.20] [0.11 - 0.19]
OLS IV
Note: * denotes significantly different from zero at 5% level (coefficients) or null hypothesis rejected at 5% level. Dependent 
variable are the bilateral output correlations. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The standardized 
coefficients are calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard deviation of the underlying data series. The number of 
observations is 630 for the IIP regressions and 472 for the GDP regressions.  
Row (3) of panel A of Table 3.4 shows the results using the preferred indicator of 
trade intensity (the first principal component of six different measures of trade), while 
row (4) presents the results after transforming the output correlations. The coefficients of 
the preferred trade indicator are highly significant, which suggests that the qualitative 
conclusion that trade intensity is positively related to business cycle correlation is not 
sensitive  to  the  measurement  of  trade  intensity.  Transforming  the  dependent  variable 
yields  higher  coefficients,  but  due  to  the  transformation  it  is  not  straightforward  to 
compare  the  coefficients  with  the  estimates  of  rows  (1)-(3).  In  order  to  make  a 
meaningful  comparison,  Panel  B  of  the  table  presents  the  standardized  coefficients, 
calculated  by  dividing  the  coefficients  in  Panel  A  by  the  standard  deviations  of  the Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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respective trade series. This gives the effect on the business cycle correlation from a 
change in trade intensity of one standard deviation, evaluated at the mean. The effect for 
the model with transformed correlation coefficients is calculated by running the reverse z-
transformation on the estimated effect. Below the point estimates, the 95% upper and 
lower bound are shown. These results suggest that the use of the transformed dependent 
variable leads to a somewhat stronger impact of trade on business cycle synchronization. 
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results for the model outlined in Figure 3.7. For the 
variables  to  be  included  in  F,  the  results of the  Extreme Bounds  Analysis (EBA)  as 
described in Appendix 3.A are used. A separate analysis is run for each combination of 
financial integration and specialization measures. For the financial integration measures 
only the correlation of stock returns turns out to be a robust explanatory variable for 
synchronization while the capital account restrictions and NFA measures fail to pass the 
test. Therefore only regressions with the stock market indicator are shown. In contrast, all 
three specialization measures appear robustly related to business cycle synchronization 
and are therefore each included in a separate regression model.
78 
It follows from Appendix Table 3.1 that apart from the correlation of stock market 
returns and the specialization measures, other variables are also considered robust in the 
sense that in regressions with different control variables, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients  remains  stable.
79  The  correlation  of  short-term  interest  rates  and  the 
correlation of cyclically-adjusted budget deficits are robustly related to business cycle 
synchronization for both GDP and industrial production correlations. For the GDP-based 
measure of synchronization, exchange rate variability is also robust.
80 It follows from 
Table 3.5 that almost all explanatory variables are significant with the expected sign. So a 
higher correlation between monetary policy or fiscal policy, more similar industrial and 
export structures, a higher share of intra-industry trade, and less exchange rate variability 
are related to more similar business cycles. 
                                                 
78 The measure of industrial similarity is not robust with GDP as the dependent variable, but it is included 
to facilitate the comparability of results across specifications. 
79 See the Appendix for a more precise definition. 
80 For the industrial production correlations, measures reflecting differences in capital stocks and arable 
land are also robust for some combinations of financial integration and specialization measures. Since they 
frequently fail this test and are also not robustly related to the GDP-based measure of synchronization, they 
are not included here. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Table 3.5 Effect of trade on business cycle synchronization in a multivariate model 
Specialisation measure:
GDP OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Trade 0.043* 0.054* 0.053* 0.121* 0.044 0.115*
(0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.036) (0.023) (0.040)
Specialisation measure 0.032 0.031 0.064* 0.050* 0.346* 0.177
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.159) (0.175)
Correlation of short-term interest rates 0.239* 0.236* 0.124* 0.112 0.129* 0.130*
(0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.058)
Correlation of cyclically-adjusted budget deficits 0.172* 0.171* 0.143* 0.137* 0.136* 0.133*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Correlation of stock markets 0.308* 0.303* 0.214* 0.202* 0.225* 0.216*
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Exchange rate variability -1.600* -1.513* -1.552* -1.089* -1.548* -1.165*
(0.483) (0.497) (0.46) (0.487) (0.458) (0.478)
Number of observations 335 335 459 459 459 459
Industrial production
Trade 0.080* 0.088* 0.069* 0.113* 0.043* 0.080*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026)
Specialisation measure 0.070* 0.069* 0.118* 0.105* 0.761* 0.657*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.111) (0.117)
Correlation of short-term interest rates 0.374* 0.372* 0.221* 0.217* 0.211* 0.214*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041)
Correlation of cyclically-adjusted budget deficits 0.125* 0.126* 0.157* 0.155* 0.143* 0.143*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Correlation of stock markets 0.161* 0.156* 0.064 0.057 0.082 0.077
(0.060) (0.059) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050)
Number of observations 378 378 556 556 556 556
Hausman test (H0: OLS is consistent, critical 5% value: 12.6)
GDP 0.32 6.83 5.00
Industrial production 0.28 8.51 3.90
Industrial similarity Export similarity Share of intra-
industry trade
Notes: The dependent variable is the transformed output correlation. * denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% 
level. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. IV includes gravity instruments (distance, geographical 
remoteness and dummies for a common border, language and legal origin) and all explanatory variables except trade.
 
The main finding in Table 3.5 is that the trade coefficients are much smaller than 
those  previously  found:  the  coefficient  of  trade  intensity  with  GDP  correlation  as 
dependent  variable  is  only  half  as  large  as  in  Table  3.4  for  both  the  OLS  and  IV 
specification. In addition to the gravity variables that were used as instruments in Table 
3.4, the other explanatory variables are included as instruments too (except trade); this 
specification corresponds to the second line of equation (3.4). The Hausman tests show 
that OLS and IV estimates are not significantly different so the consistency of OLS can 
no longer be rejected. Because Frankel and Rose (1998) did not specify a full model, they 
overestimated the impact of trade on output correlation.  Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure 3.9 Standardized coefficients of explanatory variables with 95% confidence 
intervals 
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Note: The standardized coefficients are based on the OLS regressions, using intra-industry trade as the 
measure of specialization. 
Figure 3.9 shows the standardized coefficients of all the variables included in the 
model with intra-industry trade as the specialization measure. The point estimate, as well 
as the 95% upper and lower bounds are shown. It follows that the point estimates of 
almost all standardized coefficients – like the correlation of short-term interest rates or of 
cyclically-corrected budget deficits – is larger than the impact of trade intensity. The 
upper and lower bounds show that these differences are mostly not significant. Still, the 
evidence  suggests  that  variables  that  reflect  common  economic  policies  and 
specialization are at least as important as strong trade ties for synchronization.  
  Finally,  Figure  3.10  compares  the  standardized  coefficients  of  the  three 
specialization measures that are used. Again, the point estimate as well as the 95% upper 
and lower bounds are shown. In this figure, industrial similarity has the lowest impact. In 
view of the upper and lower bounds of the coefficients one has to be careful in drawing 
too  strong  conclusions,  but  the  evidence  suggests  that  trade-based  specialization 
measures have a larger impact on business cycle synchronization than industry-structure-Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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based specialization measures. This is most visible for the coefficients of the models 
based on industrial production. 
Figure  3.10  Standardized  coefficients  of  specialization  measures  with  95% 
confidence intervals 
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Figure  3.9  showed  the  economic  significance  of  the  determinants  of 
synchronization,  but  this  does  not  yet  give  an  indication  of  the  prospects  for 
synchronization  in  the  euro  area.  Table  3.6  examines  this  issue  by  looking  at  three 
scenarios. The first column shows the actual average correlation between EMU countries, 
the second shows the correlation predicted by the regression.
81 The last three columns 
show projected correlations according to three scenarios. The first scenario is cautious 
and assumes that the monetary union, with perfectly correlated monetary policy and no 
exchange rate variability, is the only difference compared to the 1970-2003 period. The 
other variables are set equal to the average for EMU countries over the period 1970-2003. 
The second scenario sets all other variables equal to the average for the period 1992-
2003. The third scenario is the most speculative and assumes that (cyclically-adjusted) 
                                                 
81 The intra-industry OLS regressions from Table 3.5 are used for the predication and projections. The 
predicted value is lower than the actual average since EMU countries have a correlation that is higher than 
the average in the full sample. Regression to the mean leads to the lower prediction. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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fiscal  policy  will  be  perfectly  correlated.  As  the  table  shows,  each  of  the  scenarios 
implies an economically significant, but not implausible, rise in the predicted correlation. 
The rise in the projected correlation from Scenario II relative to Scenario I shows that in 
the  period  between  1992  and  2003,  the  explanatory  variables  favoured  higher 
synchronization. Part of this effect can be traced to more correlated monetary policy, 
fiscal policy and stock market returns. In addition, a rise in the average intra-industry 
share, from 40 percent between 1970 and 1981 to 52 percent after 1992, made a notable 
contribution. In comparison, export similarity also increased, but by less than the intra-
industry share and industrial similarity decreased modestly. This confirms the importance 
of looking at trade-based measures of specialization and that based on those measures, 
specialization  has  actually  decreased  in  recent  decades.  Note  also  that  the  range  of 
projections, from 0.64 to 0.75, corresponds to the range of post-war average correlations 
of states within the U.S. from Table 3.2. 
Table  3.6  Actual,  predicted  and  projected  output  correlations  between  EMU 
countries based on the intra-industry regressions 
Actual average Predicted value
(1970-2003) (1970-2003) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
GDP 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.71 0.74
Industrial production 0.63 0.59 0.64 0.70 0.75
Predictions and projections are based on the intra-industry regressions from Table 3.5.
Projections
Scenario I: correlation of monetary policy is 1, exchange rate variability is 0. All other variables are 
equal to the 1970-2003 average for EMU countries.
Scenario II: correlation of monetary policy is 1, exchange rate variability is 0. All other variables are 
equal to the 1992-2003 average for EMU countries.
Scenario III: correlation of monetary policy is 1, exchange rate variability is 0 and correlation of fiscal 
policy is 1. All other variables are equal to the 1992-2003 average for EMU countries.
 
Sample heterogeneity and outliers 
There are two potential problems with the OLS results. First of all, outlying observations 
may influence the results and second, the identified relationships may not be the same for 
different groups of observations. Figure 3.11 shows the residuals of the regression of 
business cycle correlation for industrial production on the control variables against the 
residuals of the regression of bilateral trade on these same control variables. This figure 
suggests that there are various observations that are quite far away from the bulk of the Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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observations and these may drive the results. This section reports the estimation results 
using the Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) estimator of Rousseeuw (1984, 1985) to identify 
outlying  observations.  Furthermore,  quantile  regressions  are  used  to  examine  sample 
heterogeneity.
82 
Figure 3.11 Scatter diagram of industrial production correlations and trade (after 
conditioning on other explanatory variables) 
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The basic principle of LTS is to fit the majority of the data, after which outliers 
may be identified as those points that lie far away from the robust fit. LTS typically 
minimizes the sum of squares over half the observations, the chosen half being the set 
that  gives  the  smallest  residual  sum  of  squares.  Although  this  method  is  particularly 
suited  for  identifying  leverage  points,  it  is  not  suited  for  inference.  As  proposed  by 
Rousseeuw (1984), this can be resolved by using re-weighted least squares (RWLS). A 
simple, but effective, way is to give a weight of zero to all observations identified as 
outliers and a weight of one to all other observations (Sturm and De Haan, 2005).  
Table 3.7 shows the results of the LTS/RWLS estimates. For comparison purposes, 
the  OLS  results  of  Table  3.5  are  also  shown.  Overall, there  are no large  differences 
                                                 
82 See Koenker and Basset (1978) for the seminal contribution or Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a non-
technical overview. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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between the OLS estimates and the robust estimates. However, there are exceptions. In 
the  models  for  the  GDP-based  correlations,  the  bilateral  trade  coefficient  loses 
significance in some specifications. This is quite remarkable, as almost all other variables 
remain  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Still,  in  the  models  for  the  industrial  production 
correlations, the significance of the trade variable increases. This suggests that in general, 
the effect of trade on business cycle synchronisation is not driven by outliers.    
Table  3.7  The  effect  of  trade  on  business  cycle  synchronization,  OLS  versus 
LTS/RWLS estimation 
Specialisation measure:
GDP OLS LTS/RWLS OLS LTS/RWLS OLS LTS/RWLS
Trade 0.043* 0.044* 0.053* 0.033 0.044 0.022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020)
Specialisation measure 0.032 0.041* 0.064* 0.059* 0.346* 0.354*
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.159) (0.122)
Correlation of short-term interest rates 0.239* 0.274* 0.124* 0.207* 0.129* 0.177*
(0.055) (0.050) (0.057) (0.045) (0.057) (0.045)
Correlation of cyclically-adjusted budget deficits 0.172* 0.191* 0.143* 0.161* 0.136* 0.16*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034)
Correlation of stock markets 0.308* 0.266* 0.214* 0.138* 0.225* 0.158*
(0.080) (0.068) (0.065) (0.051) (0.064) (0.051)
Exchange rate variability -1.600* -1.373* -1.552* -1.920* -1.548* -1.768*
(0.483) (0.416) (0.460) (0.392) (0.458) (0.393)
Industrial production
Trade 0.080* 0.092* 0.069* 0.074* 0.043* 0.048*
(0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016)
Specialisation measure 0.070* 0.056* 0.118* 0.136* 0.761* 0.838*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.111) (0.100)
Correlation of short-term interest rates 0.374* 0.392* 0.221* 0.267* 0.211* 0.268*
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039)
Correlation of cyclically-adjusted budget deficits 0.125* 0.117* 0.157* 0.186* 0.143* 0.141*
(0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Correlation of stock markets 0.161* 0.223* 0.064 0.047 0.082 0.101*
(0.060) (0.057) (0.052) (0.044) (0.050) (0.043)
Notes: The dependent variable is the transformed output correlation. * denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. LTS/RWLS shows regressions robust for outliers.
Industrial similarity Export similarity Share of intra-
industry trade
 
Quantile regression is an appropriate tool to address sample heterogeneity as shown 
by Koenker and Basset (1978). OLS focuses on the mean of the dependent variable given 
the explanatory variables. Quantile regressions  are used to  analyze other parts of the 
conditional  distribution,  such  as  the  (conditional)  median  or  specific  deciles.  The 
difference between the OLS and the median regression can help clarify this. In OLS, the 
sum  of  squared  residuals  is  minimized,  while  for  the  median  regression,  the  sum  of 
absolute residuals is minimized. Regressions for other deciles can be run by giving a Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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greater  weight  to  positive  or  negative  residuals.  In  order  to  increase  the  degrees  of 
freedom, the sample period 1970-2003 is divided into eight periods of uniform lengths 
after which the same regressions as for Table 3.5 are run. 
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show the estimated coefficients of the trade intensity variable 
for each decile, using the model in which intra-industry trade is used as specialization 
measure.
83 It follows that the relationship between the correlation of business cycles and 
bilateral trade is fairly robust across deciles. The estimates for each conditional decile are 
almost  always  significant  at  the  5% significance  level.  More  importantly,  the figures 
show that the quantile regression estimates are very similar to the OLS estimates and 
almost always lie within the 95% confidence band of the OLS estimates. This indicates 
that  the  relationship  between  business  cycle  correlations  and  bilateral  trade  does  not 
differ across the sample. 
Figure 3.12 Quantile regression estimates of the effect of trade on synchronization, 
GDP correlations 
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83 For brevity, only the estimates across deciles for bilateral trade are shown. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Figure 3.13 Quantile regression estimates of the effect of trade on synchronization, 
industrial production correlations 
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3.6  Concluding remarks 
One of the main long-run challenges to the euro is the possible lack of similarity of 
business cycles in the member countries. If the degree of synchronization is low, the 
ECB’s common monetary policy will not be suitable for all countries. In other words 
there is a risk is that ‘one size does not fit all’. Monetary policy will be too restrictive for 
countries  that  face  a  recession  while  the  rest  of  the  euro  area  flourishes  or  too 
accommodating for economies that perform better than the average.   
Since the late 1970s, monetary integration within Europe has increased steadily 
with the introduction of the euro as the high mark. However, synchronization is not solely 
determined by monetary integration as synchronization within Europe has fluctuated over 
time. Furthermore, the dispersion around the mean is quite sizeable, suggesting a great 
degree  of  heterogeneity.  Still,  since  the  mid-1980s,  synchronization  between  EMU 
countries has been higher on average than between other countries. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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The experience of the U.S. suggests that even decades of monetary union is no 
guarantee of perfect synchronization. The average correlation between state cycles and 
the aggregate cycle is somewhat higher than among EMU countries, but not much. The 
dispersion  of  cyclical  correlations  is  notably  smaller  though,  with  fewer  negative 
correlations between states. Synchronization between states also varies over time, and 
this variation is larger than between EMU countries. An important factor in this variation 
seems to be the aggregate U.S. business cycle. In periods of great volatility, such as the 
Great Depression, the national cycle plays a dominant role and synchronization is high. 
In contrast, the volatility of the U.S. economy has been relatively low in the past two 
decades, resulting in lower levels of synchronization. 
Comparing patterns of synchronization over time is useful to capture broad trends, 
but for specific policy recommendations, the determinants of synchronization need to be 
examined.  A  set  of  robust  explanatory  variables  was  identified  from  a  large  set  of 
variables  using  Extreme  Bounds  Analysis  (EBA).  The  robust  variables  include  trade 
intensity, measures of specialization, financial integration as given by the correlation of 
stock  market  returns,  the  similarity  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  and  exchange  rate 
variability. The resulting multivariate model is able to account for the endogeneity of 
trade. The main problem in estimating the effect of trade on synchronization is that other 
policy-related and structural variables affect both trade and synchronization. It turns out 
that once the variables identified using EBA are added to the regression, the hypothesis 
of OLS consistency is no longer rejected. This suggests that the endogeneity of trade is 
no longer a major problem. 
In the multivariate model, trade is still an important explanatory variable, but in 
terms of economic significance, the other explanatory variables are equally important. 
Projections  of  future  output  correlations  between  EMU  countries  suggest  that 
synchronization is likely to increase to similar levels as between U.S. states. The main 
uncertainties in these projections are the degree of coordination of fiscal policy and the 
development of specialization. Resistance against the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact suggests that the appetite for fiscal policy coordination is limited. It should be noted 
though that strict adherence to deficit limits is not crucial for synchronization. Instead, 
the main factor is the similarity of policy. So a unilateral spending spree is likely to Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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reduce synchronization, but a large deficit in response to adverse cyclical developments 
is unlikely to have such an effect. 
The future direction of specialization is harder to gauge. In part, this is because 
different specialization measures show different patterns in Europe. On the one hand, 
there has been a modest decrease in industrial similarity in recent decades, but on the 
other  hand,  both  the  similarity  of  export  bundles  and  the  intra-industry  share  have 
increased.  The  U.S.  experience  suggests  that  the  trade-based  measures  may  be  most 
relevant. Kim (1995) showed that the industrial structure of U.S. regions has become 
more homogenous in the past decades due to more mobile production factors. As Europe 
has been working towards a single market for capital and labour, specialization could 
decrease  further,  increasing  synchronization.  This  issue  might  also  become  more 
important as other evidence for the U.S. suggests that the national cycle has become less 
volatile,  leading  to  a  larger  effect  of  region-specific  and  industry-specific  shocks  on 
synchronization.
84 If similar  developments  occur  in Europe,  changes  in  specialization 
patterns will become even more important in determining future synchronization. 
These uncertainties strengthen the case for more flexibility, following De Grauwe 
and Mongelli (2005). Specifically, it should be easier for Europeans to take jobs in other 
countries. Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that economic shocks in U.S. states induce 
notable migration out of that state in addition to higher unemployment and lower wages. 
In  contrast,  Puhani  (2001)  argues  that  even  within  a  number  of  European  countries, 
labour mobility is not a very effective adjustment mechanism. Currently, there are not 
just language and cultural barriers, but, for example, pension and insurance systems are 
also not compatible. Reforms aimed at reducing these barriers are likely to decrease the 
degree  specialization  as  well  as  making  it  easier  for  countries  to  absorb  asymmetric 
shocks. Both developments would reduce the costs of having a common currency. In 
addition, as the next chapter will argue, more flexible labour markets will also stimulate 
productivity growth. 
                                                 
84 See Partridge and Rickman (2005). See also Clark and Shin (2000) for more on identifying different 
types of shocks. Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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Appendix 3.A  Extreme bounds analysis 
Appendix  Table  3.1  Robustness  of  potential  explanatory  variables  for 
synchronization 
Variable: Source: Suggested by:
GDP correlation IIP correlation
Correlation of short-term 
interest rates
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)
Otto et al. (2001)
Yes Yes
Correlation of cyclically-
adjusted budget deficits 
OECD Economic Outlook 
(vol. 76)
Camacho et al. 
(2005) Yes Yes
Correlation of stock market 
returns
IFS Otto et al. (2001)
Yes Yes
Absolute difference in net 
foreign asset positions
Milesi-Feretti and IMF Imbs (2004)
No No
Capital account restrictions Milesi-Feretti and IMF  Imbs (2004) No No
Industrial similarity GGDC 60-industry database Imbs (2004) No Yes
Export similarity Feenstra et al. (2005) Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) Yes Yes
Share of intra-industry trade 
(IIT)
Feenstra et al. (2005)
Yes Yes
Exchange rate variability IFS Otto et al. (2001) Yes No
Arable land difference WDI Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Human capital difference, 
secondary education
OECD Labour Force Statistics Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Human capital difference, 
tertiary education
OECD Labour Force Statistics Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Physical capital difference GGDC Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database
Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004)
No No
Import similarity Feenstra et al. (2005) Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Average openness IFS & GGDC Total Economy 
Database
Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Relative financial structure 
credit/stock
Beck et al. (1999) Artis (2003)
No No
Relative labour productivity 
level
GGDC Total Economy 
Database
Baxter and 
Kouparitsas (2004) No No
Correlation of inflation rates IFS Camacho et al. 
(2005) No No
Average oil import share World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI)
Artis (2003)
No No
Difference in national savings 
ratio
OECD National Accounts Camacho et al. 
(2005) No No
Note: A more detailed description of the variables and sources, as well as the data is available at www.rug.nl/economics/inklaarrc
Robust in model for:
 
 
The Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine 
and Renelt (1992) is used to determine the list of variables to be included in the structural 
model outlined in the main text. EBA has been widely used in the economic growth Chapter 3, Business cycle synchronization 
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literature.
85 Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) also use this methodology (using a different 
set of countries and a more limited set of potential explanatory variables than in the 
present  analysis)  to  examine  which  variables  are  robustly  related  to  business  cycle 
synchronization. The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following 
general form are estimated: 
(3.A1)  u Z F M C + + + = γ β α , 
where  C  is  the  dependent  variable  (output  correlation);  M  is  a  vector  of  ‘standard’ 
explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992) possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature 
may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. In this analysis only 
trade intensity is included in the M vector. As explained in the main text, the various 
proxies for financial integration and specialization are not considered simultaneously. 
Following  Sala-i-Martin  (1997),  the  criterion  for  the  robustness  of  the  sign  of  the 
coefficient is the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero 
(CDF(0)). In addition, the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the 
variable of interest differs significantly from zero is used to distinguish robust variables. 
Following Sturm and De Haan (2005), a variable is considered to be robust if the CDF(0) 
test statistic is larger than 0.95 and if the variable has a significant coefficient (at the 5% 
significance level) in 90% of all regressions. 
                                                 
85 See Sturm and De Haan (2005) for a further discussion Chapter 4  Productivity growth and ICT use
86 
4.1  Introduction 
Oer the past decade, labour productivity growth in Europe has fallen behind growth 
rates in the United States, reversing the pattern of growth since the Second World 
War.  Much has been written about why U.S. productivity  growth accelerated and 
whether the pace of growth is sustainable.
87 However, by now the U.S. has outpaced 
European productivity growth for nearly a decade since 1995 and U.S. growth shows 
little sign of letting up. 
Among the potential explanations for this growth gap, a prominent candidate is 
the  slower  uptake  and  less  productive  use  of  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies  (ICT)  in  Europe.  Over  the  past  few  decades,  ICT  has  become 
increasingly pervasive in modern societies. Two main developments have spurred this 
uptake of new technology. First of all, rapid technological progress has driven down 
the cost of ICT goods and second, the number of applications of ICT has multiplied 
over the years, enabled by this technological progress. These twin developments have 
reinforced  each  other,  making  ICT  a  general  purpose  technology  like  steam  and 
electricity.
88 
As a result of these characteristics, one would expect ICT to have an impact on 
labour productivity growth. Indeed, there are three channels through which an ICT 
impact may occur, namely from the production of ICT goods and services, investment 
in ICT and spillovers from the use of ICT. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in 
ICT producing industries will quite naturally contribute to aggregate TFP growth and 
hence labour productivity growth. In a neo-classical framework, the contribution from 
ICT investment is also well defined: firms will invest in ICT up to the point where 
further output gains are equal to the marginal cost of the investment. This way the 
                                                 
86 This chapter builds on van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2003a, b) and Inklaar, O’Mahony and 
Timmer (2005). See the acknowledgements for further details. 
87 See, for example, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000) for relatively optimistic 
early  assessments,  Gordon  (2000)  for  a  more  sceptical  argument,  and  Gordon  (2003)  and  The 
Economist (2003) for a retrospective on some of these arguments. 
88 For an economic growth model along these lines, see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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contribution  from  growth  in  ICT  capital  per  hour  worked  to  labour  productivity 
growth can be quantified. The final channel is the hardest to measure and also raises 
conceptual issues. The underlying idea is that ICT enables the introduction of new 
organizational models and other innovations. So although new ICT investment goods 
are  standard  products,  they  enable  firms  to  innovate  and  accumulate firm-specific 
capital  (see  e.g.  Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt,  2000  and  OECD,  2004).  For  example,  a 
network of off-the-shelf computers, scanners and databases can be combined into a 
system  that  tracks  and  replenishes  inventories  and  gives  insight  into  patterns  of 
customer purchases. Insofar as these innovations yield additional output gains, they 
will show up as additional total factor productivity growth in ICT using industries and 
may be labelled as spillovers. To be precise, if the organizational and other intangible 
investments were properly accounted for, these ‘spillovers’ should disappear. 
The main question this chapter poses is to what extent Europe has failed to 
exploit the growth potential of ICT. Specifically, slower ICT investment could be a 
reflection of a time lag relative to the U.S. or indicate a more structural failure to 
exploit new technologies. A time lag may be due to the more fragmented nature of the 
European market. The greater scale of the U.S. market can make certain investments 
more profitable early on, while ICT prices have to fall further before it is profitable in 
Europe too. On the other hand, ICT investment in Europe might permanently lag the 
U.S., because regulations hold back the diffusion of complementary innovations. For 
example,  young,  innovative  firms  may  face  obstacles  to  fast  growth,  such  as 
restrictive  land-use  regulations.  This  in  turn  reduces  the  incentives  for  incumbent 
firms to innovate too. 
With the availability of industry data on ICT and productivity growth for the 
U.S. and several European countries, the link between productivity and ICT can be 
investigated  in  detail.  This  chapter  argues  that  the  declining  rate  of  productivity 
growth in Europe may be a reflection of a slow transition process towards so-called 
“soft savings” from  ICT usage, in particular in market services. These follow the 
earlier “hard savings” which could be immediately obtained from ICT investment. For 
example, the earliest application of barcode scanning in supermarkets was to speed up 
check-out.  Along  the  lines  of  the  literature  on  general  purpose  technologies,  the 
results  suggest  that  “soft  savings”  require  investments  in  intangible  capital  and 
organizational innovations, which are most likely to be important in market services. 
The market services sector is the biggest investor in ICT and is also most dependent Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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on  additional  innovations  to  produce  new  ICT-related  services.  For  example,  in 
addition to speedier check-out, barcodes can be used reorganize the supply chain to 
take advantage of the increased information on customer purchases, but this is much 
less straightforward. The European institutional environment, reflected in its labour 
and product market institutions, tends to hold up the structural adjustment process in 
Europe and inhibits the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses. The 
European economic environment creates too little room for good firms to excel and 
for failing firms to exit the market. 
This chapter begins with a presentation of the macroeconomic evidence on the 
contribution  of  ICT  to  productivity  growth,  using  a  growth  accounting  approach. 
Next, the labour productivity growth gap between the EU-15 and the U.S. is examined 
at the industry level. This analysis shows that the key to understanding the difference 
in  growth  between  both  economies  can  be  found  in  the  differential  growth 
performance of market services (Section 4.3). Section 4.4 shows that market services 
is  also  the  most  intensive  ICT  using  sector  in  both  the  American  and  European 
economies. Due to the scarcity of data on ICT investment for individual industries, a 
more  detailed  analysis  of  ICT  intensity  and  TFP  growth  at  the  industry  level  is 
restricted to four major European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the UK) and the U.S. (Section 4.5). This section delves more deeply into the evidence 
and implications of the relationship between ICT and TFP growth. The concluding 
section focuses on the concepts of “hard” and “soft” savings from ICT, on the one 
hand, and the relation to the competitive market environment in Europe and the U.S. 
on the other hand. 
4.2  ICT and aggregate growth 
Economists  have  been  looking  for  an  impact  of  ICT  on  growth  for  almost  two 
decades, but until recently, these researchers spent most of their time explaining why 
this impact was lacking.
89 It was only with the work of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) 
and Oliner and Sichel (2000) that the impact of ICT on growth in the United States 
showed up strongly in the data, although at that time Gordon (2000) argued that part 
of the effect reflected cyclical instead of structural factors. In earlier years, part of the 
                                                 
89 This is exemplified by Solow’s (1987) quote that computers can be seen everywhere except in the 
productivity statistics. See also Oliner and Sichel (1994) and Triplett (1999). Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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reason why ICT contributed little to labour productivity growth was that ICT capital 
was  only  a  small  percentage  of  the  total  capital  stock  (Oliner  and  Sichel,  1994). 
Improvements in the measurement of computer and semiconductor prices have also 
been  important  in  revealing  the  effects  of  ICT  on  labour  productivity  growth 
(Jorgenson, 2001). Since the work of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and 
Sichel  (2000)  it  has  become  an  established  fact  that  a  significant  part  of  the 
acceleration  in  labour  productivity  growth  after  1995  in  the  United  States  can  be 
attributed to the production and use of ICT.
90 
The United States is not the only country where ICT is thought to have played 
an  important  role  in  stimulating  productivity  growth.  Indeed,  from  the  mid-1990s 
onwards,  labour  productivity  growth  in  Australia  also  accelerated  strongly,  with 
important contributions from faster  ICT investment and TFP  growth (see Parham, 
Roberts and Sun, 2001). Australia is an interesting case since it does not have an 
important ICT producing sector, so productivity gains from ICT can mostly be traced 
to either the investment or the spillover channel. 
In Europe, evidence on the impact of ICT on productivity has been much harder 
to come by, see for example the review of van Ark (2000). Early work by Schreyer 
(2000) and Daveri (2000, 2002) relied heavily on private data sources to estimate ICT 
investment. The consistency of these sources with investment data from the National 
Accounts was quite questionable though. Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) were the first 
to collect genuine ICT investment data for a limited number of countries, but it was 
not until the work of van Ark et al. (2002) that ICT investment data was collected for 
nearly all EU member countries.
91 
Data sources and methods 
To analyze the contribution of ICT to growth, a theoretical framework is needed. 
Assume that gross domestic product (Y) is produced from factor inputs X, consisting 
of ICT capital services (KICT), non-ICT capital services (KN) and labour services (L). 
                                                 
90 In extensions of their earlier work, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) and Oliner and Sichel (2002) 
broadly confirm their findings. Gordon, one of the most vocal academic critics a few years ago in his 
2000 article, has also come round to this position in more recent work (Gordon, 2003). It should be 
noted though that recent revisions by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) have reduced U.S. 
GDP growth before 2000, making the 1995-2000 less exceptional in retrospect. 
91 In addition, a number of studies have looked at the impact of ICT investment in individual countries. 
See van Ark (2002) for an overview. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Total factor productivity (A) is represented as a Hicks-neutral augmentation of the 
aggregate inputs. The aggregate production function has the following general form: 
(4.1)  ( ) ICT N K K L X A Y , , = .  
In this framework, total factor productivity measures technical change and is 
equal  to  output  growth  after  accounting  for  the  contributions  of  all  inputs.  These 
contributions  can  be  estimated  econometrically,  but  a  common  (non-parametric) 
method to analyze the sources of growth is the growth accounting framework (Solow 
1957,  Jorgenson  and  Griliches,  1967).  Under  the  assumption  of  cost-minimizing 
producers, competitive factor markets, well-measured inputs and output, and constant 
returns to scale, total factor productivity (TFP) growth also measures technical change 
and can be calculated non-parametrically.  
However,  it  is  unlikely  that  all  assumptions  are  fully  satisfied  and  growth 
accounting has often been criticized because of this. In general, as for example Hulten 
(2001) argues, TFP is a residual that measures shifts in the production function. These 
shifts can occur for a variety of reasons, such as technical change, but it can also 
capture, for example, returns to scale. The main advantage of growth accounting is 
that it provides a simple and consistent method to account for the contributions from 
factors  that  can  easily  be  identified,  namely  capital  and  labour.
92  This  greatly 
simplifies  the  task  of  testing  for  deviations  from  the  standard  assumptions  and 
dissecting the TFP residual into harder to measure components such as measurement 
errors, scale economies or spillovers from research and development (R&D). Later in 
this chapter and in Chapter 5, some of the key growth accounting assumptions will be 
tested and based on those results, no clear alternative assumptions seem warranted. 
The  growth  accounts  are  implemented  by  assuming  a  translog  production 
function, which only mildly restricts the production function of equation (4.1).
93 As 
Diewert  (1976)  showed,  the  (non-parametric)  Törnqvist  index  can  be  used  to 
represent such a translog function.
94 A Törnqvist index for the growth of aggregate 
factor inputs from t to t+1 is equal to the weighted average of the growth in each of 
the individual inputs, where the weight is equal to the share of each input in total 
                                                 
92 At the industry level, intermediate inputs also become important; see Chapter 5. 
93 Specifically, the translog function is a second order approximation to an arbitrary, twice continuously 
differentiable linearly homogenous function; see Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). 
94 Or to be precise, the Törnqvist index is exact for the translog function. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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income, averaged over periods t and t+1. TFP growth can then be derived as the 
growth of output minus the growth of aggregate inputs: 
(4.2)  ICT ICT N N L K v K v L v Y A ln ln ln ln ln ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = ∆ , 
where ∆ refers to first differences and  v ’s denote the two-period average shares in 
total factor income. Because of constant returns to scale:  1 = + + ICT N L v v v , when 
calculating  these  shares  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  By  rearranging  equation  (4.2), 
average labour productivity growth, defined as y = Y/L, can be decomposed into the 
ratio of capital services to hours worked, k = K/L, and TFP growth. Another useful 
distinction  can  be  made  between  TFP  originating  in  manufacturing  industries 
producing ICT goods (Aprod) and other industries (Aother) 
(4.3)  other prod ICT ICT N N A A k v k v y ln ln ln ln ln ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ . 
The estimates on the comparative growth performance of the EU-15 and the 
U.S. presented here are an update from earlier work by Timmer et al. (2003) and 
Timmer and van Ark (2005). The estimates on investment, capital services, labour 
input and GDP are updated from 2001 to 2004.
95 Data on investment, GDP and labour 
compensation are typically derived from the national accounts. However, substantial 
additional work was required to construct separate investment time series for three 
ICT  assets  (office  and  computing  equipment,  communication  equipment,  and 
software) as well as three non-ICT assets (non-ICT equipment, transport equipment 
and non-residential structures).
96 
To  obtain  separate  TFP  estimates  at  the  macro  level  for  ICT-production 
industries, the assumption is made that TFP growth rates for ICT-production (office, 
accounting  and  computing  equipment,  communication  equipment  and  electronic 
components  manufacturing)  in  the  U.S.  also  apply  to  the  European  countries.  To 
measure the ICT industry contributions to total factor productivity growth, Domar 
weights for the individual countries were used.
97 
                                                 
95 Many thanks go to Gerard Ypma, who constructed much of the data used in this section. 
96 See http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.html for further details on sources and methods 
and underlying data. The methodology to obtain the ICT investment series, the deflators for ICT series 
(which are essentially derived from U.S. hedonic price deflators for ICT) and the capital services 
method can be obtained from Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2004) and Timmer and van Ark (2005). 
Section 4.4 also discusses capital services measurement in more detail. 
97 See Appendix 4.A for further details. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Sources of aggregate labour productivity growth 
Figure 4.1 summarizes the main findings for the EU-15 and the U.S. for the periods 
1987-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2004. The chart shows a decomposition of labour 
productivity growth into the effects of ICT capital deepening, TFP growth from ICT-
producing industries, non-ICT capital deepening and TFP growth other than that from 
ICT production. The main findings are that the EU-15 as a whole has been lagging 
behind the U.S. in terms of ICT capital deepening in each period. Both the EU-15 and 
the U.S. show a strong acceleration in ICT capital deepening during the late 1990s. 
However, this investment boom was mostly transitory, with ICT capital deepening 
returning to pre-1995 levels after 2000 in both the EU-15 and the U.S. Since 2000 
though,  U.S.  labour  productivity  accelerated  further,  while  the  EU-15  suffered 
additional slowdown. This divergence between the Europe and America can mostly 
be traced to higher TFP growth outside the ICT producing sector. In Europe, TFP 
growth outside  ICT production was effectively  zero  after 2000, while in the U.S. 
“non-ICT  production”  TFP  growth  added  almost  1.5  percentage  points  to  labour 
productivity growth. This might be because Europe is not generating ICT spillovers, 
while the U.S. is, but other causes may be important too.
98 
Figure 4.1 Sources of labour productivity growth, EU-15 and U.S., 1987-2004 
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98 Estimates for individual countries can be obtained from Timmer, et al. (2003). Although there is 
much variation in TFP not related to ICT, growth is generally slower after 1995, with the exception of 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. See also http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.html. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
  116 
“Non-ICT production” TFP growth may include an element of ICT spillovers. 
An impressionistic way of getting at possible spillover effects at the macro-level is to 
relate  the  contribution  from  ICT  capital  deepening  to  “non-ICT  production”  TFP 
growth  for  the  period  2000-2004  (Figure  4.2).  This  scatter  plot  shows  a  very 
suggestive positive relationship between these two variables, with countries like the 
U.S., the UK, Finland and Sweden combining high ICT investment and high non-ICT 
TFP growth, and countries like France, Italy and Spain show the opposite. 
Figure 4.2 ICT contribution and non-ICT TFP growth, 2000-2004 
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Of course,  Figure 4.2 is only  a simple, though suggestive, scatter plot. It is 
therefore useful to test the scope of this finding. The first concern is whether this 
relationship is stable for different periods and the second is whether the relationship 
can still be seen when controlling for initial TFP levels.
99 Figure 4.3 already shows 
that for the period between 1995 and 2000, no relationship can be found. Further 
answers are provided in Table 4.1, which shows the parameters for the period 1995-
2000 in addition to 2000-2004. Furthermore, regressions both with and without the 
                                                 
99 See Appendix 4.B to this chapter for a description of the construction of these TFP levels. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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initial TFP level are shown and with total TFP growth and non-ICT production TFP 
growth as dependent variables.
100 
Figure 4.3 ICT contribution and non-ICT TFP growth, 1995-2000 
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As the table shows, a significant positive relationship can only be discerned for 
the 2000-2004 period and only when the initial TFP level is included as a control 
variable. The initial TFP level is only significant when non-ICT TFP growth is used 
as the dependent variable. Most important to note is that for the 1995-2000 period, the 
ICT coefficient is close to zero, even though U.S. growth had started to accelerate by 
then. Similar regressions were run for each available starting year, averaging over 
different numbers of years, but a significant ICT effect appears only for periods that 
include years after 1998. 
                                                 
100 The initial level is defined here as the TFP level at the start of the relevant period. So for the 1995-
2000 period, the 1995 TFP level is included. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Table  4.1  The  cross-country  relationship  between  ICT  capital  deepening  and 
TFP growth for the EU-15 and the U.S. 
Dependent variable: TFP growth
ICT contribution 0.19 0.26 4.79 4.77*
(1.26) (1.26) (2.31) (2.16)
TFP level -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
Dependent variable: Non-ICT TFP growth
ICT contribution -0.14 -0.10 3.91 3.88*
(0.90) (0.90) (2.05) (1.79)
TFP level -0.01 -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Cross-country regressions with TFP growth as the dependent variable and the 
contribution from ICT capital deepening and the initial TFP level as explanatory variables. 
The initial TFP level is defined as the level at the start of the period, so the 1995 level for the 
1995-2000 period. * denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.
1995-2000 2000-2004
 
The results from Table 4.1 show that relying only on aggregate data does not 
provide  robust  results.  The  aggregate  analysis  severely  limits  the  number  of 
observations, so convincing statistical evidence is difficult to obtain. Another reason 
for caution is that there are many more variables that potentially affect TFP growth 
differences between countries such as, for example, differences in market structure 
and flexibility of product, labour and capital markets between countries. Thirdly, with 
declining aggregate TFP growth in most European countries it is hard to interpret this 
evidence as a sign of increased spillovers compared to the period before 2000. Indeed 
the significant relationship since 2000 has mainly occurred because countries with 
lower ICT investment, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, have been showing slower 
TFP growth rather than from accelerations in countries with rapid ICT investment. 
This might at best imply that some countries have had more trouble in combining ICT 
with other growth-enhancing sources than others. Without TFP growth estimates for 
individual  industries  there  is  no  good  way  of  identifying  such  spillovers,  as  the 
aggregate TFP residual may include a whole range of unmeasured contributions (or 
detractions) to output  growth which are difficult to distinguish at aggregate level. 
Hence  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  focuses  on  industry  estimates  of  labour 
productivity and total factor productivity growth. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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4.3  Industry contributions to labour productivity growth 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, we would like to supplement the 
aggregate  figures  presented  above  with  estimates  of  TFP  growth  for  individual 
industries.  Only  then  it  becomes  possible  to  see  which  industries  are  heavy  ICT 
investors  and  whether  these  industries  have  higher  TFP  growth.  This  can  help 
determine  whether  ICT  spillovers  are  an  important  source  of  growth  differences 
between Europe and the United States. At this time such estimates are only available 
on  a  comparable  basis  for  4  major  European  countries  (France,  Germany,  the 
Netherlands, the UK) and the U.S., which will be discussed in Section 4.5. In the 
absence of industry-level growth accounts for all EU-15 countries, it is useful to first 
look at the labour productivity growth performance by industry for the EU-15.  
The 60-industry database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(GGDC, 2005b) contains data for the period 1979-2003 on output and employment in 
56  industries  for  all  EU-15  countries,  the  United  States  and  several  other  OECD 
countries. This database draws heavily on National Accounts, either as compiled in 
the  OECD  STAN  database  or  directly  from  national  sources,  supplemented  with 
information from industry censuses and surveys and labour force surveys.
101 For the 
analysis in the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the market economy, excluding 
non-market  services  from  the  industry  data.  The  measurement  of  output  for  non-
market services, such as health and education, is very problematic and might affect 
the aggregate results.
102 
Contribution and decomposition analysis 
To  determine  the  contribution  of  individual  industries  to  aggregate  growth,  a 
decomposition method suggested by Stiroh (2002b) is used. This method is akin to the 
shift-share  analysis  that  was  used  in  earlier  work  (e.g.  van  Ark,  Inklaar  and 
McGuckin, 2003a). Define labour productivity growth as the difference between the 
growth of value added at constant prices and the growth of total hours worked: 
                                                 
101  The  most  recent  dataset  as  well  as  more  extensive  documentation  can  be  downloaded  from 
www.ggdc.net.  Chapter  VII  of  O’Mahony  and  van  Ark  (2003)  provides  a  detailed  overview  of 
methodological choices, such as the aggregation procedure and the use of harmonized U.S. deflators 
for ICT manufacturing industries. 
102 In addition, the real estate industry is excluded as most of the output in this industry consists of 
imputed housing rents. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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(4.4)  H Y y ln ln ln ∆ − ∆ = ∆ . 
As Stiroh (2002b) shows, aggregate labour productivity growth can be written 
as: 
(4.5)  R y w H H w y w y
i
i i
i
i
i
i i
i
i i + ∆ = 





∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ln ln ln ln ln . 
In equation (4.5), wi is the share of industry i in total value added and a bar over 
a variable denotes the two-period average.
103 Aggregate labour productivity growth is 
the weighted sum of industry productivity growth plus a reallocation term R. This 
reallocation term gives the differences between the output-weighted growth of hours 
and  (roughly)  the  employment-weighted  growth  of  hours  (see  Appendix  4.C  for 
further discussion). If this term is positive it implies that, industries where the output 
share  is  larger  than  the  employment  share  show  faster  employment  growth  than 
industries where the reverse is true. In other words, the reallocation term is positive if 
employment shifts towards industries with high productivity levels. 
Figure  4.3  shows  the  contributions  to  market  economy  labour  productivity 
growth from the main industry groups for Europe and the U.S.
104 The figure makes 
clear that the resurgence of U.S. growth after 1995 is not principally due to stronger 
growth in ICT producing industries. Instead, the performance of market services is the 
key to understanding the acceleration of U.S. growth.
105 For the 1995-2000 period, it 
was already quite striking how market services made a much larger contribution to 
labour productivity growth in the U.S. than in Europe. However, after 2000 the gap 
widened even more: while in the EU-15 market services added only 0.10 percentage 
points to growth, in the U.S. this sector made up almost 2 percentage points of overall 
growth in the market economy. 
                                                 
103 This is based on a Törnqvist index of industry outputs. Since most statistical offices use different 
indexes, such as the Laspeyres or Fisher, the aggregate results will not be fully completely comparable 
to those published in the National Accounts. However, statistical offices are increasingly using so-
called ‘chained’ indexes, with annually changing weights, so the differences will be limited in practice. 
104 The set of ICT producing industries is very close to the OECD (2002b) definition. 
105 Stiroh (2002b) already made a similar argument. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Figure  4.4  Contributions  by  industry  groups  to  market  economy  labour 
productivity growth, EU-15 and U.S. 1987-2003 
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However,  the  market  services  sector  is  quite  heterogeneous,  including  both 
florists and accountants, so it is useful to see which industries have mostly contributed 
to the difference in contribution. A first step is to simply calculate the difference in 
contribution of each industry: 
EU
i
EU
i
US
i
US
i y w y w ln ln ∆ − ∆ . Summing across industries 
and  adding  the  difference  in  the  reallocation  term  then  gives  the  difference  in 
aggregate  productivity  growth.  It  can  be  interesting  though  to  move  beyond  this 
straightforward  expression  and  decompose  the  difference  in  industry  contributions 
into an effect due to different output shares between the two regions and an effect due 
to different productivity growth rates:
106 
(4.6)  ( )( ) ( )( )
EU
i
US
i
EU
i
US
i
EU
i
US
i
EU
i
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i y y w w w w y y ln ln
2
1
ln ln
2
1
∆ − ∆ + + − ∆ + ∆ . 
The first term in equation (4.6) weighs the difference in value added shares by 
the average productivity growth rates and is referred to as the share effect (share_eff). 
The second term weighs the difference in labour productivity growth rates by the 
average  value  added  share  and  is  the  productivity  growth  effect  (prodty_eff).  The 
difference in aggregate productivity growth rates can then be written as: 
                                                 
106 This decomposition is very similar in spirit to the one presented in van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin 
(2003a),  except  that  the  decomposition  there  was  based  on  a  shift-share  decomposition  of  labour 
productivity growth. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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(4.7) 
EU US
i
i
i
i
EU US R R eff share eff prodty y y − + + = ∆ − ∆ ∑ ∑ _ _ log log . 
By applying equation (4.7), the market services that have contributed most to 
the growth differential with the U.S. after 1995 can be identified and the cause of this 
difference can be traced to either faster productivity growth or a larger output share.
107 
To  examine  this  issue,  Figure  4.5  shows  the  difference  in  contribution  of 
individual  market  services  to  labour  productivity  growth  between  the  U.S.  and 
Europe. It is immediately apparent that most of the difference in contribution can be 
traced to only a limited number of services industries, mostly industries involved in 
trade and finance. The chart also separates the overall difference into the productivity 
growth effect (prodty_eff) and the share effect (share_eff) from equation (4.7). This 
makes  clear  that  most  of  the  differences  are  due  to  faster  productivity  growth, 
although in securities trade and wholesale trade, the larger size of the industry in the 
U.S. also had a sizeable effect. 
Figure 4.5 Difference in labour productivity contributions of market services, 
U.S. minus EU-15, 1995-2003 
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107 Not much attention is devoted here to the reallocation term since it is quantitatively less important. 
However, it does provide an interesting insight into the impact of structural change in Europe and the 
U.S. Appendix 4.C shows some of the results. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Measurement issues 
One  issue  that  has  not  been  dealt  with  in  much  detail  so  far  are  measurement 
problems. Adequately accounting for quality changes of manufactured products can 
be problematic, particularly for products undergoing rapid changes such as ICT (see 
e.g.  Gordon  (1990)  and  van  Ark  (2000)).  In  many  service  industries  the  main 
difficulty is to define a quantity concept that separates price changes from changes in 
output value. Triplett and Bosworth (2004) discuss the main measurement problems 
for many important services industries. Here the focus is on some of the questions that 
have been raised about the strong performance of the industries at the top of Figure 
4.5.  
In the securities trade industry, very rapid productivity growth rates in the U.S. 
have been questioned by, among others, Stiroh (2002b) because it is based on the 
volume  of  shares  traded  instead  of  the  margins  earned  on  these  trades  by  the 
stockbrokers. Recently, statistical practices in this area have improved in the U.S.
108 
McKinsey (2001) also shows that after refining and extending BEA output measures, 
labour productivity growth in this industry in the U.S. remains strong. 
There  has  also  been  a  debate  whether  rapid  U.S.  productivity  growth  in 
wholesale trade and retail trade reflects true productivity gains, or whether it is driven 
by  measurement  problems.  The  European  Commission  (2004)  and  Gordon  (2004) 
stress that U.S. growth in the trade sector may be overstated. The main problem is that 
the volume of trade services is proxied by the volume of sales. For many goods, this 
assumption seems plausible: if twice as many cars are sold, car dealers will have 
delivered about twice as many services to customers. The assumption becomes more 
problematic if the volume of sales increases because of quality improvement of the 
goods, such as in the case of ICT goods. Although a Pentium computer represents 
much  more  computing  power  than  a  286,  the  trade  services  needed  to  sell  these 
computers are probably not much different.
109 
However,  there  is  little  concrete  evidence  on  how  important  this  issue  is. 
Timmer  and  Inklaar  (2005)  show  that  real  output  growth  in  U.S.  wholesale  trade 
suffers  from  a  noticeable  upward  bias.  The  bias  in  European  wholesale  trade  is 
probably smaller, but not entirely absent either. The growth figures for retail trade are 
                                                 
108 See McCahill and Moyer (2002). 
109 Most of these arguments can be found in Triplett and Bosworth (2004). Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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much less affected by such measurement problems, and the productivity growth gap 
in retail trade between Europe and the U.S. is not much reduced by measurement 
refinements. Although any adjustment to growth in wholesale trade would lower the 
contribution of this industry to aggregate growth, it would do little to detract from the 
overall importance of market services in explaining the U.S. productivity advantage.  
4.4  Patterns of ICT use in the U.S. and Europe 
ICT intensity measures 
The next step of the analysis is to see whether there is a relationship between the 
strong performance of the industries in Figure 4.5 and the intensity of ICT use. To 
compare the intensity of ICT use across industries, it is necessary to have a good 
metric for ICT use such as the expenditure on ICT relative to the expenditure on other 
inputs. Other measures are, for example, the number of firms using the Internet for 
sales or purchases or the penetration of network technologies (OECD, 2002b, 2003). 
However, these measures are much harder to compare across industries or to the other 
input choices of a firm. However, since ICT is a general purpose technology, it seems 
more illuminating to focus on the ICT inputs than looking at specific uses.  
Given the use of a production framework, the focus here is on investment-based 
measures. Specifically, let 
i
t
i
t I P  stand for investment in current prices in asset i at 
time t. The simplest measure of ICT intensity is then  ∑ ∑
i
i
t
i
i
ICT
i
t
i
i I P I P , or the share 
of  ICT  investment  in  total  investment.
110  If  investment  series  are  available  for  a 
sufficiently long period of time, capital stocks can be calculated using the perpetual 
inventory method (PIM): 
(4.8)   t
i
t
i i
t I K K + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ , 
where 
i
t K  is the capital stock at constant prices of asset i at time t and 
i δ  is the 
geometric depreciation rate of capital good i. The second measure of ICT intensity 
can then be calculated as the share of ICT capital in the capital stock at current prices, 
or  ∑ ∑
i
i
t
i
i
ICT
i
t
i
i K P K P . In general, the ICT investment share will be larger than the 
ICT  capital  share  because  non-ICT  assets  such  as  structures  have  a  much  longer 
service life and hence, a lower depreciation rate (around 3-10%) than ICT assets (10-
                                                 
110 The group of ICT assets consists of computers, communication equipment and software. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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30%). However, the capital stock share neglects the fact that ICT assets deliver more 
capital services because of a higher user cost. To take this into account, the ICT share 
in capital compensation is required. The ICT capital compensation share is defined as: 
(4.9)  ∑ ∑
i
i
t
i
i
i
t
ICT
i
t
i
i
i
t K P r K P r . 
Similar to labour compensation, ∑
i
t
i
i
i
t K P r  gives the income that capital assets 
have to generate to cover their user cost. The gross real rate of return on a capital 
asset, r
i, is calculated as:  
(4.10) 
i
t
i
t t
i
t p R r & − + = δ . 
The gross return is determined by the internal rate of return Rt at time t, the 
depreciation rate of asset i and its rate of price change 
i
t p & .
111 ICT assets demand a 
higher return than other assets because of a higher depreciation rate and rapid price 
declines. As a result, the ICT share of capital compensation will be higher than the 
ICT share of the capital stock. 
We can also look at the share of ICT capital compensation in value added: 
(4.11)  t
Y
t
ICT
i
t
i
t
i
t Y P K P r ∑ . 
The main advantage of this last expression is that given cost minimization and 
constant  returns  to  scale  it  is  equal  to  the  output  elasticity  of  ICT  for  a  general 
production function:
112 
(4.12)  ( ) ICT Non ICT K K L f Y − = , , . 
Furthermore, equation (4.11) takes into account that some industries are more 
labour intensive than others as the productive impact of a given ICT share in capital 
compensation is likely to be smaller for a labour intensive than for a capital intensive 
industry.  One  problem  with  these  intensity  measures  is  that  they  are  all  input 
measures,  while  we  are  ultimately  interested  in  the  impact  of  ICT  on  output  and 
productivity. Of course, as mentioned before, in a neo-classical framework, the output 
impact of ICT will be equal to the ICT share in value added as given in equation 
(4.11).  However,  this  assumes  away  spillover  effects  from  ICT  reflected  in  TFP 
                                                 
111 Usually a term reflecting corporate taxes and investment credits is also included in equation (4.10). 
However, as Erumban (2004) shows, taxes have only a limited effect on capital input growth, so these 
terms are omitted here. The internal rate of return is in this case taken as the return which equates total 
economy capital compensation with the observed capital stock at current prices. 
112 In general, the industry production function is specified in terms of gross output instead of value 
added and intermediate inputs are included amongst the inputs. Given separability of  intermediate 
inputs, the equality of cost shares and output elasticities will hold. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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growth. In reality, however, there is a lot of case-specific evidence of spillovers from 
ICT.  One  example  is  the  retail-case  as  discussed  by  McGuckin  et  al.  (2005)  (see 
Section  4.5).  Another  example  is  from  Olewiler  (2002),  who  discusses  how  a 
relatively small ICT investment by the oil industry has fundamentally changed oil 
exploration methods. But although the impact of ICT may not be well captured by the 
intensity  measures  described  here,  the  intensities  should  be  useful  as  a  first 
approximation.  
To get some idea about the magnitude of the various ICT intensity measures, 
Table 4.2 shows the various measures discussed above for two broad sectors of the 
U.S.  economy,  production  industries  and  market  services,  as  well  as  the  market 
economy  as  a  whole  in  1995.  These  estimates  are  based  on  a  dataset  containing 
investment and output data for 47 U.S. industries.
113 ICT investment consists of all 
investment in computers (IT hardware), communication equipment and software. 
Table 4.2 ICT intensity measures for major U.S. sectors in 1995 
ICT 
investment 
share
ICT capital 
stock share
ICT capital 
compensation 
share
ICT capital 
compensation in 
value added
Production industries 15.3 3.2 11.8 4.7
Market services 33.3 13.0 32.1 8.5
Market economy 26.1 8.2 23.2 7.2
Rank correlation
Investment share 0.97 0.97 0.81
Capital stock share 0.96 0.83
Capital compensation share 0.80
Sources: BEA, 1997 Capital Flow Table, extrapolated using BEA, Estimates of nonresidential fixed assets, 
detailed industry by detailed type, 1987-2003 (NAICS-based) and 1901-2001 (SIC-based). GGDC (2005) 
60-Industry database (value added). Notes: Production industries includes agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and utilities. Market services covers the other market industries. The (Spearman) rank 
correlation is calculated using data for 47 U.S. industries covering the market economy.  
As the table shows, the services sector invests most strongly in ICT according 
to all intensity measures. Indeed, the services sector owns more than 85 percent of 
ICT assets in the U.S. economy.
114 The high ICT intensity of the services sector is not 
                                                 
113 The basic source is the 1997 Capital Flow Table from the U.S. BEA (see Meade et al., 2002) on the 
basis of which nearly all industries from the 60-industry database can be distinguished. The benchmark 
figures are extrapolated using detailed investment series by industry and asset from the BEA. 
114 As Inklaar, O’Mahony and Timmer (2005) show, this pattern is similar in Europe. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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just  due  to  the  fact  that  services  are  less  capital-intensive  overall,  since  the  ICT 
intensity is highest of the sectors even as a share of value added. The four intensity 
measures vary considerably in magnitude, but as the bottom panel of the table shows, 
the ranking of industries is very similar across measures. The average rank correlation 
between  the  four  measures  is  0.89.  The  rank  correlation  among  the  first  three 
measures (investment, capital and capital compensation share) is even higher at about 
0.97. Differences in capital intensity between industries explain why the ICT share in 
value added has a lower rank correlation with the other measures. Still, the various 
ICT intensity measures give a largely similar picture of which industries are intensive 
ICT users and which are less so. In the remainder, the ICT capital compensation share 
is used as the main measure of ICT intensity. 
Can a distinct group of ICT users be identified? 
In earlier work we have extensively focused on ways to distinguish between industries 
that are intensive users of ICT and industries that are less intensive users. Van Ark, 
Inklaar  and  McGuckin  (2003a)  looked  at  the  share  of  ICT  capital  in  total  capital 
compensation  to  distinguish  between  intensive  ICT-using  and  less-intensive  ICT-
using  industries.  An  arbitrary  cut-off  point,  namely  the  median,  was  used  to 
distinguish ICT using industries from non-intensive users. 
Of course, this typology can be criticized on grounds of the arbitrariness of the 
cut-off  point  between  more  intensive  and  less  intensive  ICT-use.
115  Indeed  the 
literature on general purpose technologies suggests that the spectrum of ICT intensity 
will be much more gradual as technological opportunities only differ gradually across 
industries.  Gradualism  is  confirmed  in  Figure  4.6,  which  ranks  industries  in  the 
United States on the basis of the share of ICT capital compensation in total capital 
compensation in 1995. As the figure shows, most of the ICT producers and market 
services are on the left side of the chart whereas most of the production industries are 
on the right side. 
An alternative approach to distinguish between intensive and less intensive ICT 
using industries is to look for a data-determined cut-off point using cluster analysis 
(see e.g. Peneder, 2003). One such approach to dividing observations into two (or 
more)  groups  is  the  k-means  approach.  Starting  from  an  arbitrary  grouping  of 
                                                 
115 See, for example, Daveri (2004). Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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industries, the absolute difference with the mean of each group is calculated. New 
groups are then formed by allocating industries to the group with the nearest mean. 
This process is repeated until no industries change between groups. This way, the 
intra-group variability is minimised. 
Another clustering method is hierarchical cluster analysis. In this method, the 
distance (for example, the squared difference) between all observations is calculated. 
The  two  observations  that  are  closest  together  are  grouped  into  a  cluster  and  the 
distance  from  this  cluster  to  all  other  observations  is  calculated.  This  process  is 
repeated until there is only one cluster left containing all observations. To get two 
groups  of  industries,  one  can  simply  go  to  the  point  in  the  hierarchy  where  all 
observations are part of either of two clusters. The distance from the cluster to all 
other observations can  be calculated in a number of ways. Three commonly used 
methods are the average link, single link, and complete link methods. Average link 
uses  the  average  ICT  intensity  of  a  cluster  to  calculate  distances  to  all  other 
observations. Single link uses the minimum distance from any cluster member to the 
other observations. Complete link uses the maximum distance. 
Table 4.3 Number of U.S. industries classified in high ICT intensity cluster and 
correlation between ICT intensity measures 
1987 1995 2003 1987 1995 2003
Number of industries in high intensity cluster
K-means 14 9 15 10 7 8
Hierarchical
Average link 8 9 8 2 4 3
Single link 2 9 1 1 4 1
Complete link 2 9 13 4 4 3
Rank correlation between ICT intensity measures
1987 1995 2003 1987 1995 2003
1987 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.64
1995 0.97 0.90
Notes: Average link uses the average ICT intensity of a cluster to calculate distances to all other observations. Single link 
uses the minimum distance from any cluster member to the other observations, complete link uses the maximum distance.
ICT share in capital compensation ICT share in value added
 
 Figure 4.6 Share of ICT capital in total capital compensation in the United States for 1995 
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Table 4.3 shows the number of U.S. industries that is classified in the high 
ICT intensity  cluster according to the different cluster analysis methods discussed 
above for various years.
116 For example, in 1995 the nine industries with the highest 
ICT share in capital compensation would be clustered into the ICT-using group of 
industries. Judging by these results, no clear group of ICT users can be identified. 
There are considerable differences between methods for a single year, between years 
and  between  ICT  intensity  measures.  Using  these  results,  one  can  either  defend 
choosing  only  the  most  ICT  intensive  industry  as  ICT  using  or  take  the  top  15 
industries.  The  cluster  analysis  methods  are  also  remarkably  sensitive  to  small 
changes in the data: even though the correlation between the 1995 and 2003 shares of 
ICT in capital compensation is 0.97, the single link method places nine industries in 
the high intensity cluster in 1995, but only one in 2003. Overall this suggests that no 
clearly defined group of ICT users exists but instead that the change from highly ICT 
intensive to less intensive is gradual. Any analysis of the productive impact of ICT by 
industry should therefore be cautious in making a sharp distinction between ICT using 
and non-ICT industries. 
4.5  Industry-level growth accounts and the contribution of ICT to growth 
Growth  accounts  can  provide  information  that  is  obscured  when  looking  only  at 
labour productivity growth by providing a framework in which the contribution to 
growth  of  different  types  of  physical  and  human  capital  can  be  assessed  and 
compared. However, data on investment by asset at the industry level is still scarce so 
the  analysis  is  limited  to  five  countries  (France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  United 
Kingdom and United States) and 25 market industries.
117 This section first gives an 
overview of the growth accounting methodology at the industry level and then moves 
on to a discussion of some of the data issues. The remainder of the section is devoted 
to a presentation of the results. 
                                                 
116  For  the  hierarchical  cluster  analysis,  the  squared  difference  between  observations  is  used  as  a 
distance measure. Using the absolute difference does not change the results. For the cluster analysis, all 
47  market  industries  have  been  used.  The  results  are  qualitatively  similar  if  the  ICT  producing 
industries, which are mostly near the top of the ranking, are left out. 
117 In addition, there are an increasing number of country-specific studies with industry-level growth 
accounts and data on ICT investment. Some of these studies are for countries that are covered here (e.g. 
Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) for the UK, and van der Wiel (2001) for the Netherlands) and others are 
for other countries (e.g. Mas and Quesada (2005) for Spain). Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Growth accounting at the industry level 
Calculating capital stocks and rental prices 
Capital  input  is  measured  by  capital  service  flows,  following  the  methodology 
pioneered  by  Jorgenson  and  Griliches  (1967)  and  more  recently  implemented  in 
Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005). Capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual 
inventory method (PIM) as in equation (4.8). The rental price for each asset is defined 
as the rate of return R at time t plus the depreciation rate minus the rate of inflation of 
the asset in question (see equation (4.10)). Growth in capital input is measured by 
capital service flows and is derived from the capital stocks by asset type as follows: 
(4.13)  ∑ ∆ = ∆
j
t j
K
t j t K v K , , ln ln , 
where
K
t j v ,   is  the  two-period  average  share  of  asset  type j  in  total  nominal  capital 
compensation (implementing equation (4.9)). In the results below, the contribution of 
ICT capital services and non-ICT capital services are separately distinguished. ICT 
capital services are calculated by weighting each of the ICT capital stocks by the 
share of the asset in total ICT capital compensation. Non-ICT capital services are 
calculated analogously. 
Aggregation and industry contributions 
Section  4.1  provided  an  overview  of  the  basic  growth  accounting  methodology. 
Industry-level data adds the complication that results have to be aggregated to get 
industry contributions to aggregate growth. Jorgenson, et al. (2005) distinguish three 
methods  to  aggregate  output  and  inputs  across  industries,  namely  the  aggregate 
production  function,  the  aggregate  production  possibility  frontier  and  aggregation 
over industries. The third method is employed here because it is the most flexible. 
Specifically, the assumption that the prices of value added and inputs are equal across 
industries  does  not  have  to  be  made.
118  This  means  that  industry  growth  rates  of 
output and inputs are weighted by their share in aggregate value added to calculate 
contributions to aggregate labour productivity growth. 
                                                 
118 An aggregate production function exists only if gross output prices, and hence value added prices, as 
well as input prices are equal across industries. For an aggregate production possibilities frontier, input 
prices need to be equal. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Combining the decomposition of aggregate labour productivity in (4.5) with 
equation  (4.2),  the  decomposition  of  aggregate  labour  productivity  growth  into 
industry contributions can be written as: 
(4.14)   ( ) R A k v k v q v w y
i
i
N
i
N
i
ICT
i
ICT
i
L
i
L
i i + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∑ ln ln ln ln ln . 
In  contrast  to  equation  (4.2),  equation  (4.14)  also  includes  a  term  reflecting 
labour quality, 
L
i q . This term is calculated as the difference between the change in an 
index of labour input and growth of total hours worked. The labour input index is 
calculated in a similar fashion as capital services growth, but with different types of 
labour,  distinguished  by  educational  attainment.
119  Using  this  decomposition,  the 
contribution  of  input  and  TFP  growth  from  each  industry  to  aggregate  labour 
productivity growth can be calculated.
120 For example, the contribution of ICT-capital 
deepening in industry i to aggregate labour productivity growth is given by: 
(4.15)  ( )
ICT
i
ICT
i i i k v w ICTContr ln ∆ = , 
which is defined as the growth of ICT capital per hour worked in industry i weighted 
by the share of ICT capital compensation of industry i in aggregate nominal value 
added. The weight is the product of the share of industry i in aggregate value added 
( i w )  and  the  share  of  ICT  capital  compensation  in  industry  value  added  (
ICT
i v ). 
Similar calculations can be carried out for the contributions of non-ICT capital, labour 
quality and TFP.
 121 
Growth accounting results 
Table 4.4 shows the growth accounts for the total market economy as well as for the 
contributions from two industry groups, namely the (broad) ICT production sector and 
total market services from 1995 to 2003.
122 In addition to the four European countries, 
a column shows the (weighted) average results for these countries (referred to as EU-
                                                 
119 See Inklaar, O’Mahony and Timmer (2005) for more details. 
120 Just as in Section 4.2, value added is used as the measure of output. As long as statistical offices use 
double deflation to estimate real value added from gross output and intermediate inputs, value added-
based TFP is equal to gross output-based TFP divided by the value added to gross output ratio. See 
OECD (2001) for further discussion. 
121 For a more extensive description of methodology as well as the data sources, see Inklaar, O’Mahony 
and Timmer (2005). Estimates for recent years follow similar procedures. At this stage, no educational 
attainment data could be collected for years after 2000, so labour quality growth is assumed to be zero 
for those years. 
122 The “broad” ICT production sector includes electrical and optical equipment (ISIC 30-33) and 
telecommunications (64). Investment data is not available to distinguish computer services (72) in all 
countries. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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4) which facilitates the comparisons with the macro-results presented in Section 4.2. 
The findings for the market economy are similar to those at the macro-level: labour 
productivity growth in the U.S. is higher than in Europe due to a combination of 
higher contributions from ICT capital deepening and TFP growth. The EU-U.S. gap 
in TFP growth from ICT production is somewhat smaller here than for the aggregate 
level (where the impact of ICT production was subtracted from aggregate growth on 
the basis of output shares) because the industry data also include telecommunications 
services, where Europe has a growth edge over the U.S. 
Table 4.4 Sources of industry labour productivity growth, 1995-2003 
France Germany Netherlands United EU-4 United 
Kingdom States
Market Economy Labour Productivity Growth 1.80 2.08 1.41 2.59 2.12 3.51
of which:
ICT capital deepening 0.46 0.54 0.81 0.77 0.63 1.27
Non-ICT capital deepening 0.32 0.37 0.71 0.71 0.54 0.60
Labour quality growth 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.11
Reallocation of hours 0.01 0.25 -0.35 -0.26 -0.08 -0.26
Total factor productivity growth 0.79 0.88 0.14 1.13 0.89 1.78
Contribution of ICT producing sector 0.71 0.84 0.41 0.87 0.83 1.15
of which:
ICT capital deepening 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.23
Non-ICT capital deepening 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.08
Labour quality growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
Total factor productivity growth 0.64 0.69 0.19 0.65 0.67 0.83
Contribution of market services 0.12 0.34 0.63 1.29 0.57 2.02
of which:
ICT capital deepening 0.33 0.38 0.60 0.53 0.44 0.84
Non-ICT capital deepening 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.40 0.20 0.27
Labour quality growth 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.07
Total factor productivity growth -0.36 -0.19 -0.29 0.21 -0.14 0.85  
The  industry  results  bring  out  some  of  the  earlier  findings  in  sharper 
perspective. First, market services in both Europe and the U.S. account for between 
75 and 80 percent of ICT capital deepening in the total market sector, with much 
smaller contributions from ICT producing industries. In terms of TFP contributions, 
however, the ICT producing sector is the most important source of TFP growth in 
Europe  (0.67  percentage-points  out  of  0.89  percent  growth).  In  the  U.S.,  ICT 
production    also  makes  a  sizeable  contribution,  but  market  services  are  equally 
important. Indeed in the U.S., this sector generates 0.85 percentage points of growth, 
or half of market economy TFP growth. For the EU-4, the TFP contribution from 
market services is negative, -0.14 percentage points. The UK stands out among the Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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four European countries for its relatively strong TFP performance in market services, 
although it still lags the U.S. 
What is the evidence on TFP spillovers? 
Table 4.4 suggests that the U.S. has managed to combine strong ICT investment in 
market services with high TFP growth. There is considerable firm-level evidence for 
the U.S. that ICT has a larger impact on productivity than suggested by its share in 
total cost, according to a survey of this literature by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). A 
recent  OECD  (2004)  collection  of  studies  also  shows  that  this  result  holds  more 
widely  than  just  for  the  U.S.  In  other  recent  work,  Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  (2003) 
demonstrate that at the firm level, the benefits from ICT investment increase by a 
factor 5, up to seven years after the initial investment.  
However, as the overview of literature in Stiroh (2002a) shows, the evidence at 
the industry-level or economy-wide is much less convincing. His finding for the total 
economy was confirmed in Section 4.2 and Stiroh’s (2002a) own estimates show little 
or no evidence of spillovers from ICT capital accumulation to TFP growth at the 
industry level. Others, such as Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2004) find more 
support,  especially  for  the  hypothesis  that  it  takes  time  for  firms  to  accumulate 
sufficient  organizational  capital  to  productively  use  ICT.  O’Mahony  and  Vecchi 
(2005) also report findings that point towards spillovers.
123 
To more fully explore this issue for the industry data for Europe and the U.S., 
the following regression is estimated: 
(4.16)  ( ) it
ICT
it
ICT
it it K v A ε β α + ∆ + = ∆ ln ln . 
Using equation (4.16), the productive impact of ICT capital can be evaluated. 
Specifically,  if  β   is  not  significantly  different  from  zero,  ICT  capital  makes  a 
“normal” contribution to growth, given by its cost share and the entire productive 
impact of ICT is accounted for in the calculation of TFP growth. This equation is 
similar to one of the equations estimated in the more extensive study of Stiroh (2002a) 
for U.S. manufacturing.
124 
Equation (4.16) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The standard 
errors of the parameters have been corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
                                                 
123 In general, see Stiroh (2003) for a survey of studies estimating the output elasticity of ICT capital. 
124 Stiroh also simultaneously estimates the impact of the other inputs on TFP, but these are omitted 
here to facilitate the focus on ICT capital. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). The estimates in Table 4.5 are shown 
with only a single constant term as well as with fixed effects, with a dummy included 
for  each  country/industry  pair.  The  regressions  with  only  a  single  constant  show 
whether higher ICT contributions are related to higher TFP growth. The fixed effects 
models establish whether a rise in the contribution from ICT capital, in a particular 
industry in a specific country, is related to higher TFP growth. These fixed effects 
models may be relevant if certain unmeasured industry- and country-specific factors 
are important. For example, it could be the case that the regulatory environment of an 
industry in a country influences TFP growth, but not ICT investment. Eliminating this 
unobserved heterogeneity through a fixed effects model may be important to identify 
the impact of ICT on TFP growth (see e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1998).
125 
Table 4.5 The impact of ICT on TFP growth, annual growth rates for 1979-2003 
in Europe and the U.S. 
TFP=a+b*ICT+e All countries France Germany Netherlands UK U.S.
Single constant -1.01* -0.99 -1.43 -1.25* -0.78 -0.96*
(0.27) (0.90) (0.81) (0.48) (0.66) (0.42)
Fixed effects -1.47* -1.98 -3.14* -1.49 -0.71 -1.11
(0.45) (1.39) (1.50) (0.89) (0.50) (0.69)
Notes: * denotes significantly different from zero at 5% level. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable is industry TFP growth between 1979 and 2001. 
Independent variable is the contribution of ICT capital to output growth. In the fixed effects estimates, a dummy is 
introduced for each country/industry pair. Estimates for all market industries and all countries include 2875 
observations (23 years, 25 industries, 5 countries), the other columns include 575 observations.  
Table 4.5 shows the estimates of equation (4.16) for all market industries. When 
pooling across countries, a higher (or rising) ICT contribution actually leads to lower 
TFP growth. Most of the country estimates are insignificantly different from zero or 
negative too.
126 Overall, these results are in line with those reported in Stiroh (2002a), 
who also reports a number of significantly negative estimates of ICT on TFP growth, 
although he manages to trace these to the ICT producing industries. 
 One reason why no positive relationship between ICT and TFP is found in the 
industry  data  may  be  that  the  effect  of  ICT  on  TFP  occurs  only  with  a  lag,  for 
example, because complementary investments in organizational change must be made 
                                                 
125 Experiments with demand-side instruments to take further endogeneity problems into account, show 
comparable results. 
126  Removing  the  ICT  producing  manufacturing  industry  from  the  sample  does  not  change  the 
qualitative results. Estimates for only services industries are also not noticeably different. The fixed 
effects estimates are mostly larger, in absolute sense, than the single constant estimates. The reason for 
this is not immediately clear since this result also shows up for individual countries. However, in a 
statistical sense the two sets of estimates do not differ, so the issue is of limited importance. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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first. Basu et al. (2004) build a theoretical model and present some results that suggest 
this may be important. In their empirical exercise, they explain TFP growth in each 
industry, averaged over 1995 to 2000, by the ICT contribution to growth for 1980-
1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. For the U.S. they find a negative effect of ICT for 
1995-2000 on TFP and positive effects for the first two periods. This suggests that 
lags may be important. The analysis of Basu et al. (2004) however, is strictly cross-
sectional and the choice of periods and lags is somewhat arbitrary. 
Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  (2003)  test  a  similar  hypothesis  of  possible  time  lags 
using firm-level data, arguing that the best way to pick up the effects of earlier ICT 
investment on current TFP is by taking longer differences of the data. so instead of 1-
year growth rates, they look at growth rates over 2, 3 and more years. Their main 
finding is that the ICT impact on TFP growth rises as longer differences are taken, 
with the 7-year difference showing an impact of ICT that is 5 times as large as the 1-
year difference.  
Other methods have also been used to distinguish short-run and long run effects 
of  ICT  use.  O’Mahony  and  Vecchi  (2005)  apply  the  pooled  mean  group  (PMG) 
estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) to estimate the output contribution of ICT capital.
127 
With this methodology, O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) find a long-run effect of ICT 
on output that is higher than is expected on the basis of cost shares. This implies 
evidence of spillovers from ICT use. While their result is useful and interesting, the 
link to firm-level studies such as Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) is somewhat lost. The 
first  goal  here  is  to  use  similar  methods  as  Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  (2003)  to  see 
whether  the  firm-level  results  hold  up  at  the  more  aggregate  industry  level.  A 
secondary goal is to gauge the robustness of the Basu et al. (2004) results to different 
lag lengths and periods. 
It is not immediately clear which method (using long differences or including 
lagged ICT investment) best captures the idea of a long-run effect of ICT on TFP. A 
priori,  the  lagged  specification  would  seem  to  capture  the  idea of  complementary 
investments better. If a firm starts an ICT investment project at time t, it might be that 
for example the largest TFP benefits accrue at time t+5. However, by that time a new 
ICT investment project (perhaps in a different part of the organization) may have 
                                                 
127  The  PMG  estimator  allows  short-run  dynamics  to  differ  across  industries  and  countries,  but 
constrains the long-run effect to be the same. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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commenced. Also, summing TFP contributions over the years would include the years 
in  which  the  peak  TFP  impact  was  not  yet  reached  as  well.  However,  it  is 
straightforward  to  test  both  methods.  Furthermore,  they  both  have  the  added 
advantage  that  measurement  errors  become  less  prominent,  since  these  errors  are 
unlikely to be highly correlated across years. 
As  a  first  step,  ever  longer  differences  are  calculated  following  the  same 
procedure as Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003). When increasing the difference length, 
their approach is to use overlapping periods. So for three-year differences, they first 
calculate the difference from year 1 to year 4, next from year 2 to year 5, etc. This 
procedure does build in a certain amount of autocorrelation, since any measurement 
error in for example year 3 is included in the first, second and third observation. The 
Newey-West  procedure  should  correct  for  this,  however,  and  the  results  are 
qualitatively  similar  if  no  overlapping  periods  are  used.  Figure  4.7  shows  the 
parameter as well as confidence bands for fixed effects estimates, ranging from 1-year 
to 23-year differences.
128 
Figure 4.7 Effect of ICT on TFP growth in the EU-4 and U.S. at the industry 
level, 1-year to 23-year difference 
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The estimate for 1-year differences is the same as shown for OLS with fixed 
effects from Table 4.5. This estimate is significantly negative at the 5% level. From 5-
                                                 
128 To estimate fixed effects, at least two observations per industry are needed, so a 23-year difference 
is the maximum possible. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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year differences to 12-year differences, the coefficient is insignificantly different from 
zero and after the 12
th year, the upper bound fluctuates around zero.
129 Hence, Figure 
4.6 suggests that a rising ICT contribution in an industry does not have a significant 
impact on TFP growth over differences longer than four years and a negative effect 
for the first four  years. In any case, a strong positive relationship is certainly not 
supported by these data.
130 
The other possibility that needs to be explored is whether the ICT contribution 
in one year has an impact on TFP growth in the next year or years after that. For this 
exercise, only one-year differences are used, although experiments with combinations 
of  lags  and  longer  differences  suggest  a  similar  story  as  increasing  lags  in 
combination with one-year differences. Figure 4.8 shows the estimated impact of ICT 
on TFP growth, from the contemporaneous effect up to a 22 year lag. As before, fixed 
effects estimates are presented. 
Figure 4.8 Effect of ICT on TFP growth in the EU-4 and U.S. at the industry 
level, contemporaneous effect to 22-year lag 
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The contemporaneous effect and at the effect of a one-year lag are significantly 
negative but from two years onwards, the estimated effect is not significantly different 
                                                 
129 If only a single constant is used, the coefficient remains significantly negative, even for very long 
differences. This is mainly the result of tighter confidence intervals and not so much lower point 
estimates. As the fixed effects model removes certain unobserved heterogeneity, it seems preferable. 
130  The  individual  country  results  are  not  shown,  since  no  country  shows  consistently  positive  or 
negative effects. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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from zero. Estimates with a single constant are significantly below zero up to a lag of 
five years, and insignificant afterwards, which can again mostly be traced to tighter 
confidence intervals. As before, the country-specific results do not diverge noticeably 
from the overall pattern of Figure 4.8. 
So far, only the full sample of observations for all years has been analyzed. One 
might argue, however, that the relationship between ICT and TFP growth has changed 
over time. To investigate this possibility, equation (4.16) is also estimated for each 5-
year period in the sample.
131 Figure 4.9 shows the regression coefficient for 1979-
1984, then the 1980-1985 coefficient up to the 1998-2003 coefficient. Throughout the 
1980s, the ICT effect remains significantly negative, but starting with the 1991-1996 
period, the coefficient becomes indistinguishable from zero. So during the 1990s, ICT 
capital generated productivity effects in line with the cost of ICT capital, suggesting 
normal returns. 
Figure  4.9  The  relation  between  ICT  contributions  and  TFP  growth  for 
subsequent sets of 5-year differences, 1979-1984 to 1998-2003 
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131 Five-year differences were chosen since Figure 4.6 shows that on average over the full period, the 
ICT effect is not significantly different from zero. Using differences of other lengths does not alter the 
qualitative results. Including a single constant instead of fixed effects also does not affect the pattern. If 
similar rolling estimates are made using lags instead of long differences, the coefficients fluctuate more 
from  period  to  period,  but  the  pattern  of  significantly  negative  in  the  1980s  to  indistinguishably 
different from zero in the 1990s is unchanged. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
  140 
The analysis so far suggests that the significantly negative results, shown in 
Table 4.5, paint a picture that is too pessimistic about ICT’s impact on TFP growth. 
Taking longer differences or allowing for lags between the ICT investment and the 
impact on TFP, mostly eliminates the significant negative results, although the point 
estimates remain predominantly negative. These results seem to cast some doubt on 
the estimates shown by Basu et al. (2004), who find a significant positive impact of 
the 1990-1995 U.S. ICT contribution on 1995-2000 TFP growth. In the setting of this 
study,  they  find  a  positive  impact  of  the  5-year  lagged  ICT  contribution  with 
(roughly) 5-year differences. Although their specification is not separately reported, 
the more comprehensive set of specifications that were tested here shed some doubt 
on the robustness of their findings. Figure 4.9 shows that some of the point estimates 
for the 1990s are positive, but never significantly so.  
It  might  also  be  argued  that  the  U.S.  and  UK  are  ahead  of  the  Continental 
European countries, as suggested by Table 4.4. Figure 4.10 therefore takes the use of 
sub samples one step further by carrying out the 5-year regressions separately for the 
three continental European countries (France, Germany and Netherlands) and the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries (UK and U.S.) in the dataset. 
Figure  4.10  The  relation  between  ICT  contributions  and  TFP  growth  for 
subsequent  sets  of  5-year  differences,  Continental  Europe  vs.  Anglo-Saxon 
countries 
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Figure 4.10 shows that the effect of ICT on TFP growth is U-shaped for the 
Continental European countries: ICT capital has no significant impact on TFP growth 
up to the mid-1980s, a significantly negative effect up to the 1991-1996 period and 
from the 1991-1996 period onwards there is again no significant effect. There is some 
suggestion that a similar U-curve might exist for the Anglo-Saxon countries, but as it 
is located a couple of years earlier, the left tail of the U-shape cannot be directly 
observed because of lack of data. It should be stressed once again, however, that ICT 
has at best no effect on TFP growth in both the Continental European and Anglo-
Saxon countries. The main change from the 1980s is that ICT is no longer a drag on 
TFP growth in the 1990s. 
Some  complementary  evidence  for  the  U-curve  hypothesis  can  be  found  in 
Morrison (1997), who shows that high tech capital in U.S. manufacturing earned its 
marginal cost from the early 1970s until about 1980 and again from around 1990 
onwards. During the 1980s though, the marginal returns from ICT fell short of the 
marginal cost. In other words, it seems likely that the U-curve exists in all countries in 
our sample. This pattern may be indicative of relatively straightforward, direct, ‘hard’ 
savings from ICT investment that can be realized quickly. However, before further 
savings  can  be  realized,  new  organizational  forms  need  to  be  developed  and 
experimented with. In addition a strong competitive process is needed to weed out 
failing experiments with investment in organizational innovations. 
Compared  to  the  many  firm-level  studies  on  the  impact  of  ICT  capital  on 
productivity, the results presented here are still puzzling. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) 
estimate a number of long differences models and find a normal return to computer 
investment  already  at  one-year  differences,  while  at  longer  differences  the  return 
becomes  five  times  as  high.  The  results  here  show  that  even  with  very  long 
differences, only a normal return can be observed at the industry level. Furthermore 
Brynjolfsson  and  Hitt  (1996)  find  that  after  accounting  for  fixed  firm  effects,  the 
impact of ICT on growth decreases. They take this as evidence of important firm-
specific effects, possibly related to the strength and flexibility of the organization. The 
industry estimates here show little difference in point estimates, which can be taken as 
evidence that these firm effects are mostly a within-industry phenomenon. In other 
words, industries may have strong performers, but at the industry-level this averages 
out. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) also point out that within-industry variation in ICT Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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investment and productivity can lead to a lower correlation between these measures at 
the industry level due to the averaging out process described above. 
4.6  Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided some new perspectives on the relationship between ICT 
and productivity growth from an international comparative perspective. First of all, 
estimates up to 2004 show that the EU-U.S. growth gap, which opened up around 
1995, grew even larger after 2000. The gap can mostly be attributed to the sharp 
acceleration  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  in  the  U.S.,  which  appears  to  be 
located mainly in market service industries. European growth has declined further, 
and in particular, market services have performed quite poorly in recent years. This 
evidence gives support to the hypothesis that the European Union is presently not on a 
track to realize the same productivity gains from ICT as the U.S. 
Further analysis focused on the possibility that there is a difference in timing of 
the productivity effects of ICT between Europe and the U.S. The argument would 
then go that many European countries are still in a transition process towards a new 
phase of productivity gains from ICT usage, which the United States have already 
realized. To this end the direct relationship between ICT use and TFP growth at the 
industry level has been estimated, to identify any productivity spillover effects of ICT 
use. The results suggest that, at the industry level, ICT does not earn super-normal 
returns, even when taking longer differences or lags into account. The analysis did 
establish a pattern suggesting that ICT earned its normal returns in the early phase of 
ICT investment (1970s, early 1980s), followed by a period of negative effects from 
ICT on productivity (late 1980s) with a return to normal returns after several years. 
This U-shaped pattern of returns on ICT shows up clearly for the three continental 
European  countries  (France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands),  and  there  is  also 
evidence for a similar pattern in the UK and the U.S. several years earlier. 
These results might be better understood when relating them to the literature on 
general purpose technologies and, more specifically, to the idea that the pervasiveness 
of  technologies,  such  as  ICT,  involves  a  significant  amount  of  time  before  its 
productivity  effects  are  exploited  (see,  for  example,  Bresnahan  and  Trajtenberg, 
1995). One might speculate that the early normal returns on ICT are the result of the 
direct  productivity  effects  of  ICT  production  and  ICT  investment  (called  “hard 
savings”  here).  The  “negative  spillover”-period  may  be  related  to  a  phase  of Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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investments  in  human  capital  and  knowledge  capital  as  well  as  organizational 
innovations  which  do  not  immediately  result  into  an  acceleration  of  productivity 
growth.  It  takes  time  before  the  combination  of  ICT  investment  and  intangible 
investments  and  innovations  (here  called  the  “soft  savings”),  have  an  effect  on 
productivity.  This  interpretation  of  the  results  is  also  in  line  with  the  firm-level 
evidence  which  emphasizes  the  importance  of  human  capital  and  organizational 
innovations (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000, 2003; OECD, 2004). 
The idea that ICT can generate ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ savings with an impact that is 
phased  over  time  is  consistent  with  detailed  studies  of  individual  industries.  For 
example, McGuckin, Spiegelman and van Ark (2005) show that in retail trade, ICT 
investment had an immediate impact on productivity growth through hard savings. 
For example, the introduction of barcode scanning allowed for more efficient check-
out systems without much further investment. However, the same barcode technology 
has enabled a reorganization of the supply chain and the introduction of new shopping 
concepts.  These  soft  savings  not  only  require  heavy  investment  in  ICT,  but  also 
investments in new complementary technologies (RFID, transportation technology) 
and organizational changes (new shopping concepts, supplying shops more often). 
These  findings  also  have  methodological  implications.  The  econometric 
analysis of the ICT impact provided new insights compared to the growth accounts, 
especially  by  showing  a  U-curve  of  the  productive  impact  of  ICT  investment. 
However, the growth accounting framework did provide a consistent framework that 
defines the normal returns from ICT investment. Furthermore, the output elasticity of 
the other capital inputs and labour did not need to be estimated, but could be assumed 
equal to their cost share. 
This leaves open the question why firm-level studies find positive spillovers 
whereas the industry estimates show neutral effects. A plausible explanation is that 
within  an  industry,  some  leading  firms  invest  heavily  in  ICT  and  organizational 
change and reap the accompanying productivity gains. But there are also laggards 
with lower productivity growth. These laggards may have also invested heavily in 
ICT,  but  were  less  successful  in  realizing  soft  savings.  Although  in  time  these 
laggards  are  likely  to  either  exit  or  catch-up  due  to  competitive  pressures,  this 
inevitably takes time. In the meantime, industry performance will reflect both leading Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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and lagging firm performance. To find out whether this explanation holds in practice, 
further firm-level research into these aggregation effects is needed. 
The most relevant issue for policy is why Continental European countries are 
slower  in  realizing  the  effects  from  soft  savings  than  the  UK  and  the  U.S.  One 
possible line of argumentation is that the process of realizing soft savings involves 
much  trial-and-error.  It  therefore  requires  an  entrepreneurial  environment  and 
competitive labour and product markets that allow efficient firms to grow and weed 
out inefficient ICT users. There is substantial evidence from industry level studies on 
regulation (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) as well from firm-level studies on the 
dynamics of firm performance (e.g, Bartelsman, et al., 2005) that confirm the need for 
a conducive regulatory  environment to  generate productivity  growth. Many of the 
continental  European  institutions,  in  particular  in  the  area  of  labour  and  product 
markets, inhibit the reallocation of resources to the most productive companies. The 
European economic environment creates too little room for good firms to excel and 
for failing firms to exit the market so as to free up resources for the much-needed 
transition. This may particularly affect investments in firm-specific resources, such as 
human  and  organizational  capital,  which  unlike  ICT  are  not  easily  transferred  on 
markets and may stay for too long in firms that are not productive. This direct link 
between regulation and soft savings is an important area for further research. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Appendix 4.A  ICT-production TFP 
Section 4.2 presented estimates of ICT-production TFP. Similar estimates were also 
presented  in  Timmer  et  al.  (2003),  but  a  number  of  changes  were  made  to  the 
methodology. The main idea is to ‘back-out’ TFP growth that can be traced to ICT 
producing industries and is different from the ‘bottom-up’ industry approach from 
Section  4.5.  The  starting  point  is  TFP  growth  of  ICT  producing  industries  in  the 
United States. These growth rates are assumed to be equal across countries because 
there are few countries that account for quality changes as thoroughly as the U.S. 
Although a growing number of countries now use constant-quality (hedonic) prices 
for computers, few do so for telecommunications and semiconductor manufacturing. 
The  definition  of  ICT-production  is  limited  here  to  the  manufacturing  of 
computers (ISIC 30), semiconductors (321) and telecommunications equipment (322). 
This definition is narrower than those used in Sections 4.3 and 4.5. Section 4.3 closely 
follows the OECD (2002) classification and also includes insulated wire and cable 
(ISIC 313), part of the instruments industry (331), telecommunication services (64) 
and computer services (72). The definition in Section 4.5 is coarser due to the limits 
of  the  capital  data  and  covers  the  entire  electrical  and  optical  equipment  industry 
(ISIC30-33) and telecommunications (64). The reason for choosing a more narrow 
definition is that U.S. TFP growth rates in those three industries are most likely to be 
applicable  to  other  countries.  For  example,  Inklaar  et  al.  (2005)  report  large 
differences in TFP growth rates in telecommunications between the four European 
countries  and  the  U.S.  and  similarly,  there  are  considerable  differences  in  labour 
productivity growth between countries in insulated wire and cable and instruments. 
U.S.  labour  productivity  growth  in  computers,  semiconductors  and  telecom 
equipment  is  available  from  the  GGDC  (2005)  60-industry  database.  Capital 
deepening  estimates  are  based  on  the  1997  Capital  Flow  Table,  which  provides 
investment by asset data for each of the three industries. Investment trends are only 
available at a more aggregate level. Next, TFP growth is changed from a value added-
basis to gross output basis by multiplying by the value added to gross output ratio. 
This way, cross-country differences in the value added to gross output ratio can be 
taken into account. 
Domar weights are used to estimate the contribution of ICT production to TFP 
growth in both the U.S. and the European countries. These weights are defined as Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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industry gross output divided by aggregate value added and were originally suggested 
by  Domar (1961).  When summed across  all industries, the weights will  generally 
exceed one to account for the fact that TFP growth in any industry will also have 
effects  on  downstream  industries  through  cheaper  intermediate  inputs.  For  the 
European countries, value added for each of the ICT industries is taken from the 60-
industry database. Input-output tables, mostly from Eurostat, give data on value added 
to gross output ratios for a number of years in the late 1990s. For earlier and later 
years, these ratios are assumed to have remained constant. Multiplying value added 
and the value added to gross output ratios gives estimates of gross output for the ICT 
producing industries and this is used to calculate Domar weights. 
Appendix 4.B  Estimating TFP levels 
In  the  literature  on  growth  convergence,  controlling  for  initial  levels  of  GDP  per 
capita or per hour worked is common practice (see e.g. Baumol, 1986). In these cases, 
only the relative price (PPP) of GDP is needed to make income or labour productivity 
comparable across countries. However, to estimate TFP levels, a correction also has 
to be made for differences in capital levels. Once those are available, TFP levels can 
be calculated in analogous fashion to TFP growth rates: 
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In equation (4.B1), superscripts X and U denote the countries. Analogous to 
growth accounting, the relative TFP level can be calculated as the relative GDP level 
minus the weighted relative labour input level and relative capital input level (Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert, 1982). 
GDP levels in U.S. dollars are available from the GGDC/TCB Total Economy 
Database (2005). Relative labour input is from the same source and calculated as the 
ratio of total hours worked. For comparisons of capital input across countries, we 
need an estimate of the rental price in one country relative to another, the so-called 
capital service PPP (PPP
K): 
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Equation (4.B2) gives an expression for the rental price of asset j in countries k 
and m, using the same variables as in equation (4.10) (since the same depreciation rate Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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are used across countries, no country subscript is attached). Most elements of equation 
(4.B2) are readily available, since these are inputs for the calculation of the gross rate 
of return. The only missing element is the investment PPP (PPP
I).  Expenditure PPPs 
for 35 assets for 1999 from the OECD (2002a) are used here. The investment PPPs for 
the 35 assets are aggregated to investment PPPs for each of the six assets in this study 
using a multilateral (EKS) aggregation procedure. The resulting capital service PPPs 
are used to convert capital compensation to U.S. dollars. Summing over the assets 
gives total capital input in U.S. dollars for each country. 
Appendix 4.C  The reallocation effect 
Although  the  reallocation  effect  is  quantitatively  less  important  for  labour 
productivity growth than growth within industries, it provides useful insight into the 
impact of structural change. Recall from equation (4.5) that the reallocation effect is 
defined as follows: 
(4.C1)  ∑ ∑ ∆ − ∆ =
i
i i
i
i H H w R ln ln . 
There is no exact decomposition of this expression into industry contributions, 
but the following approximation comes very close:
132  
(4.C2)  ( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ ∆ − = ∆ − ∆ ≈
i
i i i
i
i i
i
i i H s w H s H w R ln ln ln . 
In  equation  (4.C2),  i s   denotes  the  two-period  average  employment  share, 
∑ i i H H .  In  other  words,  the  contribution  of  an  industry  to  the  aggregate 
reallocation  of  hours  is  determined  by  its  growth  in  total  hours  worked  and  the 
difference between the industry output share and employment share. This difference is 
large  when  the  industry  labour  productivity  level  is  higher  than  the  aggregate 
productivity level. 
                                                 
132 The approximation is due to the substitution effect, whereby the employment shares of each industry 
change over time. The squared difference between the exact measure and the approximation is roughly 
1000 times smaller than the standard deviation of the exact measure over time.  Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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Figure 4.C1 Contributions by industry groups to market economy reallocation of 
hours, EU-15 and U.S., 1987-2003 
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 Figure  4.C1  shows  the  (approximate)  industry  contributions  to  the  market 
economy reallocation effects by industry group. A first observation is that the size of 
the reallocation effects is larger in the U.S. than in the EU-15. The industry pattern is 
also different. In Europe, the production sector contributed positively to aggregate 
reallocation, and hence to labour productivity growth, while in the U.S., the main 
effects  from  this  industry  group  are  negative.  Also  interesting  is  that  after  2000, 
market  services  contributed  positively  in  the  U.S.,  while  in  earlier  periods  the 
contribution  was  negative.  In  Europe,  the  contribution  from  market  services  was 
negative throughout the period. 
First of all, these results suggest that the degree of structural change is much 
higher in the U.S. than in Europe. Indeed, when averaging the absolute reallocation 
contributions over the full period, U.S. reallocation is more than 40 percent higher 
than EU-15 reallocation. This does not seem implausible, judging by for example the 
lower degree of employment protection in the U.S. (Nicoletti, et al., 2000). But to 
establish  this,  we  would  need  to  know  whether  this  difference  is  due  to  larger 
employment changes at the industry level or possibly due to a greater dispersion in Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
 
  149 
labour productivity levels. Although a similar decomposition as in the main text is 
possible, the resulting effects are hard to interpret.
133  
It makes more sense to find direct measures of productivity level dispersion and 
gross employment change. A measure for productivity level dispersion is the standard 
deviation of productivity levels relative to the aggregate. To avoid overstating the 
importance of small sectors, industries are weighted by their employment share. Gross 
employment change is measured here as the absolute growth of total hours worked, 
again weighted using industry employment shares.
134 Table 4.C1 shows these two 
summary  measures  for  the  EU-15  and  U.S.  There  is  no  large  difference  in  the 
dispersion of productivity levels, but the difference in gross employment change is 
substantial. This suggests that the difference in the size of the reallocation effects can 
be traced to larger employment flows. 
Table  4.C1  Summary  measures  of  productivity  level  dispersion  and  gross 
employment change, EU-15 and U.S., 1987-2003 
1987-1995 1995-2000 2000-2003
Labour productivity dispersion
EU-15 0.32 0.36 0.38
U.S. 0.32 0.37 0.41
Gross employment change
EU-15 2.46 2.20 1.51
U.S. 3.04 3.08 2.56
Note: Labour productivity dispersion is defined as the standard 
deviation of labour productivity levels relative to the aggregate, 
weighted by employment share. Gross employment change is 
defined as the absolute growth in total hours worked, weighted by 
employment share.  
This leaves the different industry pattern of the reallocations to be explained. As 
discussed above, the most notable differences can be seen between 2000 and 2003. 
However, given that the post-2000 period includes a recession in the U.S. and slow 
growth in Europe too, this finding should not be overstated. The negative contribution 
from market services for most of the period can, to an important extent, be traced to 
non-professional business services in both Europe and the U.S. In the U.S., this can be 
                                                 
133 See also van Ark, et al. (2003a). 
134 At the industry level, only the net change in employment is available, so this measure understates 
true gross job flows. Chapter 4, Productivity growth and ICT use 
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further traced to strong employment growth of employment agencies.
135 After 2000, 
U.S. employment in this industry declined by about 5 percent per year. However, as 
persons employed by employment agencies work in other parts of the economy, it is 
hard to give an economic interpretation to developments after 2000. The most that can 
be said is that a notable part of the reallocation term is probably due to an increased 
importance of employment agencies to increase labour input flexibility. 
                                                 
135  In  Europe,  this  information  is  usually  not  available,  although  for  the  Netherlands,  similar 
observations can be made. Chapter 5  Cyclical productivity
136 
5.1  Introduction 
In the short run, output and productivity tend to move together in many countries and 
across  a  wide  range  of  industries.
137  In  recent  years  this  observation  has  gained 
increased prominence, as each proposed explanation for the observed procyclicality 
of  productivity  has  important  implications  for  modelling  the  business  cycle  and 
measuring  technical  change.  The  goal  of  this  chapter  is  to  evaluate  the  role  of 
increasing returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization in explaining procyclical 
productivity  growth. This is motivated  by the success of the  model  by Basu and 
Fernald  (2001),  who  find  that  these  two  factors  can  fully  account  for  cyclical 
productivity of the aggregate U.S. economy. The analysis also serves as a test for the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and well-measured inputs inherent in the 
growth accounting results presented in the previous chapter. 
Although there is a large and growing empirical literature looking at returns to 
scale and input utilization, the exercise in this  chapter is the  first to directly test 
whether the Basu-Fernald (2001) model is similarly successful in reducing output-
productivity correlations outside the U.S. and to what extent the model applies not 
only at the aggregate but also at the industry level. I confirm the main finding of Basu 
and Fernald (2001) for the aggregate U.S. economy, but also show that the Basu-
Fernald  model  does  not  eliminate  procyclicality  in  many  industries.  Even  after 
correcting for possible non-constant returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization, 
around one quarter of U.S. industries still show significant procyclical productivity 
growth.  
For  European  countries,  the  evidence  on  the  Basu-Fernald  model  is  more 
mixed,  with  some  success  at  the  aggregate  level  while  it  again  falls  short  at  the 
industry level. One possible reason for these findings is that the analysis relies on a 
proxy for unmeasured input utilization, hours worked per person. If the change in 
                                                 
136 This chapter is largely based on Inklaar (2005). See the acknowledgements for further details. 
137 This effect is distinct from the Verdoorn effect, where larger cumulative output leads to higher 
productivity through learning-by-doing. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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average hours worked is not a good indicator of changes in unmeasured inputs, the 
explanatory power of the model will fall short. The original arguments for this proxy 
were largely based on work practices in U.S. manufacturing and this may not be very 
relevant in Europe and in services industries. 
Even though the Basu-Fernald model is far from perfect, it does provide a good 
opportunity to evaluate the impact of adjustments for variable returns to scale and 
unmeasured input utilization on measured productivity growth. The main result is that 
although the estimated growth rates change, the adjustments are not large enough to 
affect the main stylized facts as presented in the previous chapter. For example, the 
lead of the U.S. in market services TFP growth after 1995 remains unchanged. This 
suggests that the standard growth accounting assumptions do not give a misleading 
picture of productivity growth. 
The final finding of this chapter is of a more technical nature, but nevertheless 
important for the analysis. Identification of the production functions estimated in this 
literature tends to rely on relatively weak demand-side instruments. Following Shea 
(1993) and Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwanger (2001), I construct a set of industry-
specific  instruments  capturing  downstream  intermediate  demand.  A  recently 
developed  statistical  test  confirms  that  these  instruments  are  less  prone  to  weak-
instrument bias than the more commonly used instruments such as the real oil price. 
Therefore,  using  these  downstream  indicators  allows  for  a  greater  degree  of 
confidence in the estimates presented here than in some of the earlier studies in this 
literature. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the main stylised 
facts of cyclical productivity are introduced alongside the most important proposed 
explanations for this phenomenon from the literature. The next section presents the 
theoretical  framework  for  the  analysis.  Section  5.4  discusses  the  estimation 
framework and the data used. The results are shown in Section 5.5, first with regards 
to the production function estimates. The next part focuses on the cyclicality of the 
technical change residual while the final part of the section discusses the sensitivity of 
the standard TFP growth measure. Section 5.6 summarizes and discusses some of the 
implications of the results. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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5.2  Background 
One of the more robust stylised facts in the macroeconomic literature is that output 
and productivity move together in the short run. Table 5.1 illustrates this phenomenon 
by showing the correlation between output growth and total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth  in  European  countries  and  the  United  States.  With  few  exceptions,  the 
correlations  are  positive  and  highly  significant.  Although  other  filtering  methods 
exist, we focus on these correlations mainly because Basu and Fernald (2001) do so. 
Table 5.1 Correlation between annual total factor productivity and GDP growth, 
Europe and the U.S., 1979-2003 
Austria 0.62* Italy 0.54*
Belgium 0.64* Luxembourg 0.78*
Denmark 0.47* Netherlands 0.48*
Finland 0.78* Portugal 0.61*
France 0.7* Spain -0.42*
Germany 0.92* Sweden 0.61*
Greece 0.82* UK 0.55*
Ireland 0.78* US 0.75*  
Notes: * denotes a correlation significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
Source: GGDC Total Economy Growth Accounting Database (2005a) 
Three  explanations  for  cyclical  productivity  are  popular  in  the  literature:  1) 
procyclical technology shocks, 2) increasing returns to scale and 3) unmeasured input 
utilization.
138  The  first  explanation  is  the  most  obvious:  if  technology  shows 
transitory, high-frequency fluctuations, it should not come as a surprise that output 
will show similar fluctuations and hence, productivity will be procyclical. This argues 
in favour of models where technology drives the business cycle as in Real Business 
Cycle Theory (e.g. Cooley and Prescott, 1995). Under increasing returns to scale, a 
decline in inputs in a recession will lead to a more than proportionate decline in 
output and hence lower output per unit of input. If these increasing returns are related 
to imperfect competition, changes in  government expenditure can directly lead to 
procyclical  productivity.
139  Increasing  returns  can  also  be  due  to  external  effects, 
                                                 
138  See  Basu  and  Fernald  (2001)  for  a  more  extensive  overview  of these  explanations.  They also 
include reallocation of resources across sectors as an explanation at the aggregate level. As the focus of 
this chapter is mostly on the limits of their model at the industry level, it is not discussed any further 
here. 
139 Increases in government expenditure increases (future) taxes and thereby reduce labour income and 
hence, labour supply. However, increases in government expenditure also increase output and thereby 
labour supply. Under imperfect competition the former effect dominates the latter, leading to a larger Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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implying that output in an industry can affect output in other industries and these 
effects need to be modelled.
140 If the third explanation holds, firms adjust not only 
measured  inputs  such  as  capital  and  labour,  but  also  unmeasured  inputs  like  the 
utilization rate of capital or the labour effort per hour worked. Therefore, during a 
growth slowdown or a recession the decline in productive inputs will be understated 
and observed productivity will be procyclical. Differences in the importance of these 
explanations can also shed important light on the effect of the institutional structure 
across countries. For example, as Vecchi (2000) shows, Japanese firms hoard more 
labour than American firms due to lower transaction costs in Japan, which affects the 
dynamics of the economies in question. 
Different explanations for cyclical productivity also have implications for the 
interpretation  of  productivity  growth  as  technical  change.  Researchers  such  as 
Gordon  (1993,  2000)  try  to  separate  the  ‘cyclical’  from  the  ‘structural’  part  of 
productivity growth. This approach might be useful to isolate a measure of technical 
change  if  unmeasured  input  utilization  were  the  leading  cause  for  procyclical 
productivity  growth.  However,  as  Basu  and  Fernald  (2001)  argue,  if  increasing 
returns to scale and reallocations are important, cyclical productivity is a ‘structural’ 
phenomenon since it reflects the ability of firms to produce output given a certain 
level of inputs. As a result, a more formal analysis is needed to identify technical 
change. 
There is an extensive literature that tries to distinguish between the various 
explanations of procyclical productivity.
141 Most of these papers focus on the U.S., 
but there is international evidence as well, most notably from Caballero and Lyons 
(1990), Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) and Vecchi (2000) which so far 
                                                                                                                                           
effect  of  government  expenditure  increases  on  output  than  on  employment;  see  the  survey  by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). 
140 The literature on short-run externalities is rather unclear about the exact nature of these spillovers. 
Long-run  externalities  are  generally  related  to  knowledge  spillovers,  but  to  explain  short-run 
externalities, the authors at most refer to the idea that ‘thick markets’ are responsible. In other words, 
more activity in one market ‘spills over’ to other markets. See Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994) 
for a discussion. 
141 See amongst others: Hall (1988, 1990), Roeger (1995), Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996), 
Basu and Fernald (1997) and Diewert and Fox (2004) on returns to scale and markups. Markups and 
returns to scale are comparable as economic profits are generally modest. See Caballero and Lyons 
(1990,  1992),  Bartelsman,  Caballero  and  Lyons  (1994),  Sbordone  (1997)  and  Vecchi  (2000)  on 
externalities. See e.g. Berndt and Fuss (1986), Basu and Kimball (1997), Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo (1995), Burnside (1996), Hart and Malley (1996), Vecchi (2000), Basu and Fernald (2001) and 
Basu, Fernald and Shapiro (2001) on labour hoarding and correcting for unmeasured input utilization. 
Finally,  Basu  and  Fernald  (2001)  and  Basu,  Fernald  and  Shapiro  (2001) stress the importance  of 
reallocations between sectors. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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is confined to production function and related estimates. In a recent study for the 
U.S., Basu and Fernald (2001) use production function estimates to evaluate whether 
these reduce the correlation between output and the technology residual they estimate. 
On the basis of this exercise Basu and Fernald (2001) conclude that there is only a 
limited role for increasing returns to scale outside durable manufacturing and that 
unmeasured input utilization and reallocations explain the cyclicality of aggregate 
U.S. productivity. In this chapter the same approach is used to analyze whether their 
conclusions also apply to individual industries and other countries. First, I discuss the 
production model that underlies the empirical analysis. 
5.3  A model of cyclical productivity 
This section discusses a model that is commonly used to study the cyclicality of 
productivity  growth.
142  A  firm  produces  according  to  the  following  production 
function: 
(5.1)  ( ) A M eHN zK F Y , , , = . 
Output, denoted by Y, is produced using capital K, workers N, average hours 
worked H and intermediate inputs M, given the state of production technology A.
143 
Additional choice variables for the firm are the intensity of capital use z and the 
effective labour effort e. In a model with costless input adjustment, the latter two 
variables are irrelevant. However, when we assume that labour and capital are quasi-
fixed inputs, firms can adjust to shocks in the short run only by varying average hours 
worked, labour effort and the intensity of capital use. Following Basu and Fernald 
(2001), we think of z as being determined by the number of work shifts. Higher 
intensity of capital use is costly due to a shift premium.
144 
The firm can pay its workers more in order to ensure higher effort levels, given 
the  number  of  hours  worked  per  worker.  If  pay  is  raised  immediately,  labour 
compensation could be used as an indicator of labour utilization. However, if the 
extra compensation is by way of better promotion chances or when it is spread out 
                                                 
142 Similar types of models are presented in many of the referenced papers. A model that leads to the 
same estimating equation is given in Basu and Fernald (2001). 
143 In this concept, gross output is the output concept instead of value added as in Chapter 4. The 
reason is that while this choice is not crucial for analyzing TFP growth, it does affect the econometric 
analysis that follows. 
144 Another theoretical mechanism commonly used is to assume that if capital is used more intensively, 
machinery wears out more quickly and depreciation is higher (see e.g. Imbs, 2003). However, the shift 
premium fits more closely with the utilization proxy used here. See Basu and Kimball (1997) for a 
model that explicitly combines both mechanisms. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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over several years, it will not fully show up in the labour compensation figures of a 
single year. The level of effort can be interpreted directly as the intensity of work, but 
an employee might also divide his time between productive work and training or 
other  learning  activities.  In  the  latter  case,  the  firm  might  respond  to  a  positive 
demand shock by shifting workers from non-productive to productive work without 
having to pay a higher wage immediately. This will be costly because future labour 
productivity  improvements  will  be  lower  as  less  human  capital  will  have  been 
accumulated.
145 
If the firm minimizes costs and is a price taker on the market for factor inputs, 
inputs will be purchased up to the point where the marginal product equals factor 
prices.  This  means  we  can  construct  an  input  growth  index  (see  e.g.  Basu  and 
Fernald, 1997): 
(5.2)  ( ) ( ) dM s dK dz s dN dH de s dX M K L + + + + + = , 
where d(.) is an operator giving the percentage growth of the variable and  x s  is the 
two-year average share input x in total cost.
146 Note that equation (5.2) gives the 
Törnquist approximation to the continuous-time Divisia index of input growth. This 
way, very few restrictions are placed on the underlying production function. 
The  standard  calculation  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  as  the  Solow 
residual subtracts the growth of inputs from the growth of output. This will only give 
a valid measure of technical change under constant returns to scale. In general, if we 
assume neutral technical change, the relationship is as follows: 
(5.3)  dA dX dY + = γ , 
where γ  denotes the returns to scale. The problem with estimating equation (5.3) is 
that neither effort levels nor the intensity of capital use is easily observable so that 
one only measures a biased version of equation (5.2): 
(5.4)  ( ) dz s de s dX dM s dK s dN dH s dX K L M K L − − = + + + =
* . 
The usual solution to this problem is to find a proxy for input utilization. For 
the  manufacturing  sector,  a  number  of  researchers  have  used  capacity  utilization 
measures (i.e. Shapiro, 1996). Other studies have proposed energy use or materials 
use  as  a  proxy  for  capital  utilization  (e.g.  Burnside  et  al.,  1996).  However,  such 
measures  do  not  reflect  changes  in  labour  utilization  and  are  often  not  available 
                                                 
145 See Hart and Malley (1996) for arguments along these lines. 
146 An alternative would be to use constant shares over the full period, but this has only a small impact 
on the results discussed in Section 5.4.  Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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outside  manufacturing.  Abbott,  Griliches  and  Hausman  (1998)  propose  to  use 
changes in average hours worked as a proxy for both labour and capital utilization. 
This was formalised in the model of Basu and Kimball (1997). Their rationale for this 
proxy is that if optimising firms adjust inputs along one margin, namely  average 
hours worked, they will also adjust along unobserved margins. As long as labour 
effort increases with the rise in average hours worked, growth of the latter variable 
will be a valid proxy for labour utilization. Similarly, if the only way to increase 
capital  utilization  in  the  short  run  is  to  increase  the  number  of  shifts  and  hence, 
average hours worked, the growth in average hours worked will also be a good proxy 
for  capital  utilization.  Equation  (5.3)  can  then  be  written  entirely  in  terms  of 
observable variables:
147 
(5.5)  dA dH dX dY + + = ξ γ γ
* . 
In this equation,  ξ  is the effect of changes in the utilization proxy on output 
growth. Although data on average hours worked are available for all sectors of the 
economy,  the  interpretation  of  this  variable  as  a  proxy  for  unmeasured  input 
utilization  seems  to  be  most  relevant  for  manufacturing  industries.  Most  non-
manufacturing industries do not work in shifts and many workers are not paid by the 
hour, leading to less reliable measures of hours worked.  
Another proxy, which is also available economy-wide, is intermediate inputs 
use. The rationale for using this proxy, as originally advanced by Basu (1996), is that 
if  capital  and  labour  utilization  goes  up,  this  is  partly  reflected  in  higher  use  of 
intermediates  such  as  energy  or  raw  materials.  Intermediate  inputs  make  up  on 
average nearly half of all input cost, so one would expect parameter γ  to adequately 
pick up any utilization effects as well. Adding changes in intermediate inputs per hour 
worked as done by Vecchi (2000) may be problematic since intermediate inputs are 
then included as part of input growth and as a separate explanatory variable.
148 
No explicit role is given to external effects in equation (5.5), although some 
researchers such as Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992) and Vecchi (2000) argue their 
importance. There are two reasons for this. First, adding aggregate output growth to 
                                                 
147 Basu, et al.  (2001) use the cyclical part of average hours worked instead of the growth in average 
hours worked. In practice, they estimate this cyclical part using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a very 
high smoothing parameter, removing an almost linear trend (see Chapter 3), so only the mean growth 
of average hours worked is removed, with no impact on parameter estimates. 
148 The next section also discusses an adjustment to equation (5.5) to take this problem into account for 
growth in average hours worked. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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equation (5.5) may indeed pick up the effect of growth in other industries. However, 
as  Sbordone  (1997)  argues,  is  may  just  as  well  be  a  proxy  for  demand-induced 
utilization changes. Second, while it is interesting to know whether increasing returns 
to scale are internal or external to the firm or industry, in the present analysis the 
main focus is on whether returns to scale can explain procyclical productivity growth. 
Equation (5.5) gives the general estimation framework to analyse the cyclicality of 
productivity growth.
149 A number of econometric issues need to be dealt with first, 
however. 
5.4  Methods and data 
Econometric methodology 
We estimate two specifications, one including only the returns to scale parameter γ , 
and another specification which includes both returns to scale and the correction for 
unmeasured input utilization in the form of parameter ξ : 
(5.6a) 
1
, ,
*
, ,
1
, , , t j i t j i j j i t j i dX dY ε γ µ + + = , 
(5.6b) 
2
, , , ,
*
, ,
2
, , , t j i t j i j t j i j j i t j i dH dX dY ε ξ γ µ + + + = . 
Output growth of industry i in country j at time t is the dependent variable in 
both regressions. In (5.6a), measured input growth is the only explanatory variable 
while  in  (5.6b)  the  growth  in  average  hours  worked  is  included  to  proxy  for 
unmeasured  input  utilization  changes.  Input  growth  is  a  weighted  average  of  the 
growth  in  labour,  capital  and  intermediate  inputs  (equation  (5.4)).  In  both 
specifications a country/industry fixed effect,  j i, µ , is included as well. One of the 
goals of this work is to see to what extent European countries show different results 
from the U.S., so the parameters are allowed to vary by country. Productivity growth 
is partly accounted for through the fixed effect and it partly ends up in the residuals 
j i, ε . The results from Basu and Fernald (2001) suggest that (5.6a) should give returns 
to scale estimates significantly greater than 1, while (5.6b) should give significantly 
positive estimates of ξ . Note that in equation (5.5), parameter ξ  was interacted with 
                                                 
149 Basu, et al. (2001) also give considerable attention to including adjustment costs in their output and 
input  measures,  which  are  calibrated  using  the  estimates  of  Shapiro (1986).  While in theory,  this 
approach has merit, Hall (2004) finds relatively strong evidence against adjustment costs for capital or 
labour using U.S. industry data. Outside the U.S., the evidence is even scarcer so such adjustments are 
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γ . In practice taking this nonlinearity into account has little effect on the results as γ  
is close to one. 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to provide comparable estimates to Basu 
and  Fernald  (2001).  However,  in  specification  (5.6b),  growth  in  average  hours 
worked  is  included  both  as  part  of  input  growth  and  as  a  separate  explanatory 
variable. This is likely to bias the elasticity estimates, so a modified version of (5.6b) 
is also estimated where input growth, 
∗ dX , is calculated excluding the growth in 
average hours worked. 
An  important  problem  with  estimating  equations  (5.6a)  and  (5.6b)  is  that 
optimising firms set their levels of inputs and outputs simultaneously in response to 
productivity shocks. Therefore we need variables unrelated to industry productivity 
shocks but relevant for input growth to identify γ  and ξ . Most of the literature has 
relied on relatively weak instruments, such as the world price of oil (Hall, 1988), to 
estimate  variants  of  equations  (5.6a)  and  (5.6b).  Some  have  even  relied  on  OLS 
estimates to avoid small-sample bias in IV estimates (e.g. Diewert and Fox, 2004). To 
lessen the weak instrument problem, downstream indicators of industry demand are 
used here. 
Shea (1993) proposed to use input-output tables to identify industries with close 
demand links but relatively modest reverse links. If one takes, for example, the metal 
industry and the car industry, higher output in the latter industry will likely induce 
higher demand in the former industry. As a result, growth in the car industry is a 
relevant  indicator  for  output  in  the  metal  industry,  which  satisfies  the  first 
requirement  for  a  good  instrument.  In  this  case,  however,  it  is  not  clear  whether 
output changes in the car industry are sufficiently exogenous to productivity shocks in 
the metal industry because a notable part of intermediate inputs of the car industry 
come from the metal industry. Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwanger (2001) constructed 
a weighted average of growth in downstream industries using all industries that buy 
output from a certain industry and for which these purchases represent less than five 
percent of intermediate inputs. In constructing the downstream instruments here, the 
same procedure was followed. 
Data 
A quite extensive dataset is needed to estimate the model described in Section 5.3. 
For the most part, the same industry growth accounting database is used as in the Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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previous chapter, but there are some differences. First, to estimate full production 
functions, data on gross output and intermediate inputs are collected, in addition to 
the value added, capital and labour data from Chapter 4. Since the UK does not apply 
double deflation procedures in most of their value added estimates, no gross output 
series  can  be  constructed  that  is  consistent  with  value  added,  at  least  at  constant 
prices.  The  UK  is  therefore  omitted  from  the  analysis  in  this  chapter.  A  further 
change is in the calculation of the gross return on capital assets: 
(5.7)   
i
t
i
t
E
t
i
t P R r & − + = δ . 
Instead of an internal rate of return (R), an external rate is used here, which is 
assumed equal to the government bond yield (from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics). This adaptation was made in order to avoid assuming constant returns to 
scale in one part of the analysis and estimating those same returns later on. 
Finally, information is collected on gross output at current and constant prices 
from the National Accounts of the various countries. Especially for the 1980s, prices 
for gross output are frequently not given in the National Accounts. In those cases 
either  producer  price  indexes  are  used  or  price  indexes  are  estimated  based  on 
implicit value added deflators. Intermediate inputs at constant prices are implicitly 
estimated based on gross output and value added at constant prices.  
To construct the downstream indicator for each country, information is needed 
on deliveries by industry x to industry y. Benchmark input-output tables are used for 
each of the countries.
150 Although the sales shares of industries are likely to change 
over time, experiments using annual input-output tables for the Netherlands show that 
the impact on the indicators is limited. Therefore, only a single input-output table is 
used  for  1995  (France  and  the  Netherlands),  1997  (United  States)  and  2000 
(Germany). The downstream indicators are calculated at the industry detail of the 
GGDC  60-industry  database  and  then  aggregated  to  the  level  of  the  25  market 
industries covered here. 
5.5  Results 
First of all, it is useful at this point to compare how the various instrument sets 
perform when confronted with the data. As shown by Stock and Yogo (2004), the F-
statistic from the first-stage regression where the endogenous variable is explained by 
                                                 
150To be precise, both industry-by-industry and product-by-industry (use) tables are used. Industry-by-
industry tables are conceptually to be preferred, but in practice differences will be modest. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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the  instruments,  is  a  useful  statistic  to  test  for  instrument  weakness.
151  The  first 
column of Table 5.2 shows the average F-statistic across industries based on the first-
stage regressions that aim to explain (measured) input growth by the current value 
and  one  lag  of  the  downstream  indicator  for  each  industry  in  each  country.  The 
second column shows the same results from regressions with the so-called ‘Hall-
Ramey’ instruments as explanatory variables.
152 As the table shows, in each country 
the downstream indicators generate a considerably better fit than the more widely 
used Hall-Ramey instruments.
153 As the last two columns show, in many of the 25 
industries used here, the simultaneity bias inherent in OLS estimation can be reduced 
by 90 percent or more by using the downstream indicators, while the Hall-Ramey 
instruments  lead  to  estimates  that  are  much  more  biased  towards  the  OLS 
estimates.
154  Based  on  these  results,  we  may  confidently  rely  on  the  downstream 
indicators to estimate equations (5.6a) and (5.6b). 
Table 5.2 Comparing the fit of first-stage regressions explaining input growth, 
downstream indicator vs. Hall-Ramey instruments 
Downstream Hall-Ramey Downstream Hall-Ramey
indicator indicator
France 15.8 6.7 13 3
Germany 11.9 3.5 12 1
Netherlands 14.6 4.7 12 1
U.S. 13.2 5.7 8 2
First and third column: Regression with the growth of inputs as dependent variable and the 
current value and one lag of the downstream indicator as independent variables. Second and 
fourth column: Regression ith the growth of inputs as dependent variable and the current value 
and one lag of oil price change and growth of real government spending as independent 
variables. Third and fourth column: Number of industries where the first-stage F-statistic 
exceeds the critical value of 9.08 (third column) and 10.83 (fourth column), using Table 1 of 
Stock  and Yogo (2004).
bias less than 10% of OLS bias
Number of industries with IV Average first-stage F-statistic
 
                                                 
151 To be precise, this is the F-test of joint significance of the explanatory variables, or the explained 
sum of squares over the residual sum of squares, corrected for degrees of freedom. 
152 These instruments are the current value and one lag of the change in the oil price relative to the 
GDP deflator and the growth of real government spending. The political party of the president is 
excluded,  as  it  has  no  straightforward  counterpart  in  other  countries  and  is  usually  the  weakest 
instrument  of  the  three  (e.g.  Hall,  1988).  Similarly,  military  expenditure  is  broadened  to  all 
government spending for easier cross-country comparability. 
153 F-statistics for individual industries in each country are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
154 As Basu and Fernald (1997, p. 258) note, the first stage F-statistic of equation (6a) using the Hall-
Ramey instruments is around three using their data, which is comparable to the results in Table 5.2. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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Production function estimates 
In this section, the estimation results from equations (5.6a) and (5.6b) are presented. 
In all cases, two-stage least squares is used to estimate the parameters with the current 
value and one lag of the industry-specific downstream indicators as instruments. To 
improve efficiency, first-stage coefficients are allowed to vary by industry.
155 The 
standard  errors  of  the  parameters  have  been  corrected  for  autocorrelation  and 
heteroscedasticity using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  three  specifications  are  considered, 
namely  equation  (5.6a),  equation  (5.6b)  with  growth  of  average  hours  worked 
included in the aggregate input measure and equation (5.6b) with growth in average 
hours worked excluded from the aggregate inputs. Table 5.3 shows the estimates of 
returns  to  scale  based  on  the  first  specification.  Estimates  that  are  significantly 
different from one (constant returns to scale) are marked by an asterisk.
156 The results 
are shown for groups of industries, as the time series dimension (23 observations) is 
too  short  for  reliable  inference  at  the  industry  level.
157  Indeed,  for  individual 
industries some very large, very small and even negative returns to scale are found 
(see Appendix Table 5.A3).  As Table 5.3 shows, there is evidence of increasing 
returns to scale in each of the countries, with significant returns in particular for the 
market economy as a whole and in durable manufacturing. Excluding agriculture and 
mining tends to increase the parameter estimates. The largest effect of this can be 
seen in French non-manufacturing, where decreasing returns to scale are found. When 
looking only at the services sector (by excluding agriculture and mining), returns to 
scale are insignificantly different from one. 
                                                 
155  In  principle,  it  is  also  efficiency-enhancing  to  explicitly  take  into  account  any  cross-sectional 
dependence of the residuals in a three-stage least squares procedure. However, since the number of 
industries is larger than the number of  years, the estimated covariance matrix is not of full rank. 
Pesaran (2004) suggests an alternative procedure if the errors have a factor structure, which involves 
adding  the  cross-industry  (weighted)  averages  of  the  dependent  and  independent  variables  to  the 
regression. However, in an economic sense, this would be a specification that attempts to test for 
external effects as in Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992). To avoid such complications, simple two-
stage least squares is used. 
156  Appendix  Table  5.A4  shows  the  same  results,  but  using  Hall-Ramey  instruments  instead  of 
downstream indicators. There only durable manufacturing shows significant increasing returns. 
157 The period between 1979 and 2003 is 24 years, but one year is omitted because a lagged value of 
the downstream indicator is used as an instrument.  Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
  163 
Table 5.3 Estimates of returns to scale to inputs, unadjusted for unmeasured 
input utilization, for France, Germany, Netherlands and U.S., 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands U.S.
Market economy 0.98 1.12* 1.01 1.13*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 1.06 1.15* 1.08* 1.12*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Durable manufacturing 1.10* 1.08 1.04 1.16*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.81 1.10 1.04 0.93
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-manufacturing 0.76* 1.04 0.97 0.98
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Services 0.88 1.04 1.06 1.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and 
growth of inputs as independent variable. Estimation is done for a panel of industries, with industry fixed 
effects included (not shown) using two-stage least squares with the current value and one lag of the 
downstream indicator for each industry as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are allowed to 
vary across industries. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly different from one at the 5% level. See Table 5.A3 for 
definitions of industry groupings.  
In earlier work, Basu et al. (2001) have shown that adding changes in average 
hours worked as a proxy for unmeasured input utilization reduces the estimates of 
returns to scale. Table 5.4 shows the results for the same specification. In most cases, 
the estimates of returns to scale have decreased compared to Table 5.3, although 
especially in France and Germany, the differences are relatively small. Indeed, for 
these two countries, the same industry groups show returns to scale estimates that are 
significantly different from one. However, in the Netherlands and the U.S., estimates 
have gone down to such an extent that the constant returns to scale hypothesis is not 
rejected for any industry group. Still, the U.S. is the only country where the utilization 
parameter is positive and significant, while the other countries show many negative 
and sometimes even significantly negative parameter estimates. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
  164 
Table  5.4  Returns  to  scale  of  inputs  with  a  correction for  unmeasured  input 
utilization, 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands U.S.
Market economy 0.98 1.12* 0.97 1.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 1.06 1.15* 1.05 1.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Durable manufacturing 1.12* 1.07 1.02 1.12
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.80 1.10 1.01 0.87
(0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Non-manufacturing 0.76* 1.03 0.96 0.95
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Services 0.87 1.10 1.08 1.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Market economy -0.40 0.03 -0.34* 0.64*
(0.34) (0.23) (0.14) (0.23)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining -0.81 -0.10 -0.29* 0.63*
(0.45) (0.23) (0.11) (0.23)
Durable manufacturing -0.37* 0.17 -0.26* 0.29
(0.11) (0.18) (0.08) (0.26)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.45*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.07) (0.22)
Non-manufacturing -0.01 -0.40* 0.08 0.30
(0.25) (0.20) (0.14) (0.27)
Services -0.51* -0.93* -0.29* -0.07
(0.19) (0.29) (0.09) (0.18)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of 
inputs and growth of average hours worked as independent variable. Parameters are estimated for a panel of industries, with 
industry fixed effects included (not shown). Parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares with the current value 
and one lag of the downstream indicator for each industry as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are 
allowed to vary across industries. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and auto correlation, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly different from one (returns to scale) or zero (utilization correction) at the 5% 
level. See Table 5.A3 for definitions of industry groupings.
Returns to scale
Utilization correction
 
The U.S. results are different from those of Basu et al. (2001) who find strongly 
significantly positive parameters for each of the industry groupings from Table 5.4. 
For comparison, Appendix Table 5.A5 shows the same estimation results as Table 
5.4, using Hall-Ramey instruments as Basu et al. (2001) instead of using downstream 
indicators. As the utilization effect is not uniformly significant in this specification 
either, it suggests that  differences between the Basu et al. (2001) results and the 
results presented in Table 5.4 are due to the use of a different dataset.
158 Specifically, 
their dataset, which is based on the work of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), contains 
more industries (33 vs. 25) and more years (31 vs. 23). As a result their estimates are 
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likely to be more precise.
159 Furthermore, even though the utilization proxy performs 
badly in all industry groups, the negative estimates for services suggest that growth in 
average hours worked is even less suitable in services than in manufacturing. The 
Jorgenson-Stiroh dataset only includes eight non-manufacturing industries and three 
of these cover utilities and construction, where work practices are probably more 
comparable  with  manufacturing  industries  than  with,  say,  finance  or  business 
services.  This  difference  in  composition  of  the  dataset  might  therefore  also  be 
important. 
Table  5.5  Returns  to  scale  of  inputs  with  a  correction for  unmeasured  input 
utilization, excluding average hours worked from aggregate inputs, 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands U.S.
Market economy 0.97 1.13* 0.99 1.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 1.06 1.16* 1.07 1.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Durable manufacturing 1.12* 1.07 1.04 1.12
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.80 1.10 1.04 0.88
(0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Non-manufacturing 0.76* 1.03 1.01 0.97
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Services 0.87 1.09 1.09 1.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
Market economy -0.09 0.41 -0.12 0.92*
(0.35) (0.23) (0.14) (0.22)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining -0.48 0.27 -0.02 0.90*
(0.46) (0.23) (0.10) (0.22)
Durable manufacturing -0.06 0.50* -0.00 0.64*
(0.11) (0.18) (0.08) (0.25)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.25 0.19 0.02 0.62*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.22)
Non-manufacturing 0.25 -0.03 0.36* 0.61*
(0.25) (0.18) (0.12) (0.25)
Services -0.19 -0.49 0.14 0.31
(0.21) (0.29) (0.09) (0.17)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of 
inputs and growth of average hours worked as independent variable. The growth of inputs is modified to exclude growth in 
average hours worked. Parameters are estimated for a panel of industries, with industry fixed effects included (not shown). 
Parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares with the current value and one lag of the downstream indicator for 
each industry as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are allowed to vary across industries. Standard errors, 
consistent for heteroscedasticity and auto correlation, are shown in parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly different 
from one (returns to scale) or zero (utilization correction) at the 5% level. See Table 5.A3 for definitions of industry 
groupings.
Returns to scale
Utilization correction
 
                                                 
159 Another reason is probably that Basu et al. (2001) could use system estimation methods to increase 
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As discussed in Section 5.3, including growth in average hours worked both in 
aggregate inputs and as a separate explanatory variable may bias the estimate of ξ . 
Table 5.5 therefore shows estimation results based on equation (5.6b), but without the 
growth of average hours worked being included in aggregate inputs.
160 Compared to 
Table 5.4, the utilization proxy in the U.S. is now also significantly positive in non-
manufacturing. Furthermore the estimates of scale returns are almost unchanged, but 
the significantly negative utilization effects from Table 5.4 have now disappeared. 
However,  except  in  the  case  of  durable  manufacturing  in  Germany  and  non-
manufacturing in the Netherlands, the estimates on the utilization correction are not 
significantly positive either. These results suggest that European firms do not vary the 
average number of hours worked in response to short-run fluctuations in demand in a 
systematic way. A potential explanation could be that adjustments in Europe take 
place by changing the number of temporary workers instead of average hours per 
worker. A more complete answer, however, would need further research. Given these 
estimates  though,  we  turn  to  the  question  of  whether  the  estimated  models  help 
reduce the cyclicality of the productivity residuals. 
Cyclicality of productivity growth 
Basu and Fernald (2001) estimate a similar model to Basu et al. (2001) and use the 
results to look at the cyclicality of productivity growth. As is the case with traditional 
growth accounting, productivity  growth is a residual.  When the regression results 
presented above are used to account for non-constant returns to scale and corrected 
for unmeasured input utilization, the residuals from this regression give an adjusted 
productivity growth measure. This adjusted measure will be a more accurate measure 
of technical change than TFP growth, but as it is a residual, there may still be other 
factors included as well. Basu and Fernald (2001) show that the traditional Solow 
residual (assuming constant returns to scale and well-measured inputs) is positively 
correlated with output growth while the residuals from their regression are not.
161 
Although  most  of  the  estimates  show  returns  to  scale  that  are  statistically 
indistinguishable  from  constant  and  few  significant  utilization  effects,  the  point 
                                                 
160 Appendix Table 5.A6 shows the same estimation results using Hall-Ramey instruments. These 
specifications show a few more significant utilization effects, but also more significantly decreasing 
returns to scale. 
161  In  general,  technical  change  from  these  regressions  is  equal  to  the  constant  plus  the  residual. 
However, average technical change is not relevant for the cyclicality of technical change. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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estimates can be used to see whether these can decrease the observed procyclicality. 
To compare the results from this analysis to those in Basu and Fernald (2001), it is 
useful to start at the aggregate level of the market economies. Basu et al. (2001) 
calculate  aggregate  adjusted  productivity  growth  by  aggregating  industry-level 
residuals.  However,  since  these  residuals  are  based  on  a  gross  output  production 
function, an adjustment needs to be made to deal with the double counting of output. 
Following  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1995),  a  value  added-based  productivity 
growth measure can be calculated as: 
(5.8) 
i M
i V
i s
dA
dA
γ −
=
1
. 
In this equation,  i dA  is the residual from either (5.6a) or (5.6b). This residual is 
adjusted using the returns to scale estimate  γ  and the share of materials in gross 
output  i M s  of the industry in question. The value added-based productivity residuals 
can then be aggregated across industries using the industry’s share in value added. 
These residuals are then correlated with value added growth for broad sectors or the 
market economy.  
Table 5.6 presents the evidence on the cyclicality of the productivity residuals 
in three panels. Panel A shows the correlations for the market economy, excluding 
agriculture and mining for different specifications. Panel B shows correlations for 
each industry group, based on the residuals of the models presented in Table 5.5. 
Panel C shows the number of industries within each industry group with significantly 
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Table 5.6 Correlation between output growth and adjusted productivity growth 
for  industry  groups  under  variable  returns  to  scale  and  corrected  for 
unmeasured utilization  
France Germany Netherlands U.S.
A: Output/productivity correlations: different specifications
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining
Constant returns to scale 0.64* 0.71* 0.44* 0.51*
Variable returns to scale 0.59* 0.14 0.18 0.33
Variable returns to scale & utilization correction 0.37 0.15 -0.09 0.21
B: Output/productivity correlations, industry groups
Market economy 0.73* 0.16 0.67* 0.20
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.37 0.15 -0.09 0.21
Durable manufacturing 0.38 0.43* 0.65* 0.38
Non-durable manufacturing 0.73* 0.40 0.69* 0.86*
Non-manufacturing 0.89* 0.87* 0.76* 0.54*
Services 0.79* 0.62* 0.32 0.50*
C: Number of industries with significantly positive correlations (5% level)
Market economy (25 industries) 16 7 17 5
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining (23) 12 6 12 4
Durable manufacturing (6) 3 2 3 1
Non-durable manufacturing (7) 5 1 2 5
Non-manufacturing (12) 12 9 9 4
Services (10) 8 6 7 4
Note: Top panel: correlations between output growth and technical change residuals from the regressions in Tables 
5.3 to 5.5. * denotes a correlation significantly greater than zero at the 5% level. Bottom panel: number of 
industries with significantly non-zero correlations/number of industries in group. See Table 5.A3 for definitions of 
industry groupings.  
As  Panel  A  shows,  at  the  aggregate  level  the  Basu-Fernald  (2001)  model 
reduces  the  procyclicality  of  the  technical  change  residuals,  with  correlations 
becoming mostly insignificant when allowing for variable returns to scale (Table 5.3) 
and correlations dropping even further when the utilization proxy is included (Table 
5.5). The evidence is more mixed when looking at the main industry groups in Panel 
B.  Although  the  aggregate  correlations  have  become  insignificant,  in  each  of  the 
countries  three  out  of  four  industry  groups  still  show  a  significantly  positive 
correlation between output growth and technical change. This result casts some doubt 
on the scope of the Basu and Fernald (2001) results.
162 These doubts become even 
stronger when looking at the cyclicality of individual industries. Hart and Malley 
(1999) have shown that in general, there is important heterogeneity in the cyclicality 
of productivity across industries, making it an important issue to examine. 
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Panel C of Table 5.6 shows the number of industries where the correlation is 
significantly  different  from  zero.
163  In  most  groupings  a  considerable  fraction  of 
industries shows a significant positive correlation, even in cases where the industry 
group as a whole shows no sign of procyclicality anymore. Appendix Table 5.A7 
shows that this finding remains, even when allowing all coefficients to vary across 
industries. 
Table 5.7 Share of U.S. industries with significantly positive correlation between 
output growth and adjusted productivity growth for various specifications 
Specification Market economy Market economy excl.
agriculture & mining
Baseline (downstream indicators, industry dummies) 40% 43%
Hall-Ramey instruments (industry dummies) 68% 65%
Basu et al. (2001, Table 1) parameters 26%
Single constant (downstream indicators) 32% 35%
Time dummies (downstream indicators) 64% 52%
Industry and time dummies  (downstream indicators) 76% 65%
Notes: shows percentage of U.S. industries where the technical change residual is significantly positively correlated 
with output growth. Different coefficients are estimated for durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing or services. The numer of industries with significant correlations is added across sectors and 
divided by the total number of industries in the sector (25 for the market economy, 23 if agriculture and mining are 
excluded).  
To further evaluate the robustness of this finding, Table 5.7 shows the share of 
industries  with  significantly  positive  correlations  in  the  U.S.  for  a  number  of 
alternative specifications.
164 The set-up is the same as for Table 5.6: coefficients are 
allowed  to  vary  across  broad  industry  groups,  but  for  brevity,  the  number  of 
significant correlations is added across groups. For example, the 40 percent in the 
first cell of the table is calculated by adding the one durable manufacturing industry, 
five  non-durables  and  four  non-manufacturing  industries  with  significant  positive 
correlations, divided by the maximum of 25 industries in the market economy. Five 
different specifications are considered, first the Hall-Ramey instruments, as discussed 
in Table 5.2, are used instead of the downstream indicators. Second, the parameters 
from the Basu et al. (2001) study are used to calculate the residuals. The last three 
specifications first drop the industry dummies and include only a single constant, next 
include year dummies and finally include both year and industry dummies. The main 
result is that irrespective of the specification, a noticeable fraction of industries still 
shows  significantly  positive  correlations  between  output  growth  and  the  technical 
                                                 
163 After the name of the industry grouping, the total number of industries in that group is shown in 
brackets. 
164 The results for other countries are very similar. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
  170 
change residuals. Although not shown here, the significant correlations can be found 
across all industry groups. When using the Basu et al. (2001) parameters, the fraction 
of significant correlations drops to 26 percent but this is still more than could be 
expected  based  on  random  chance.  In  all,  this  raises  serious  questions  about  the 
ability of the Basu and Fernald (2001) model to explain the observed cyclicality of 
productivity growth, especially when looking at individual industries and European 
countries. 
Adjusted productivity growth 
Up to here, the focus of the analysis has been on the cyclicality of technical change 
residuals. A related question is to what extent the estimated models affect the stylized 
productivity growth facts that were presented in the previous chapter. The results in 
the previous chapter all relied on standard growth accounting assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and well-measured inputs. The estimates in Table 5.5 show that these 
assumptions are not uniformly supported by the data, so it is useful to see the effect of 
relaxing these assumptions on productivity growth estimates. Table 5.8 shows two 
different productivity growth estimates for the period 1995-2003 for both the market 
economy and the market economy, excluding agriculture and mining. In addition, the 
contribution of market services to aggregate growth is shown. To make it easier to 
compare the results to those presented in the previous chapter, the parameters from 
Table 5.5 are applied on a value added basis, instead of in a gross output framework. 
Hence the parameters from Table 5.5 are converted to a value added basis: 
(5.9) 
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Mi V
s
s
γ
γ γ
−
−
=
1
1
. 
Equation  (5.9)  shows  how  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  is  converted  from 
gross  output  to  value  added  and  the  same  equation  is  used  for  the  utilization 
parameter. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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Table 5.8 Productivity growth relaxing growth accounting assumptions 
Solow Adjusted Solow Adjusted
Average TFP growth, 1995-2003
France 0.79 1.25 0.76 1.04
Germany 0.88 0.91 0.84 0.77
Netherlands 0.14 0.10 0.14 -0.36
U.S. 1.78 1.86 1.76 1.64
Contribution of market services, 1995-2003
France -0.18 0.33 -0.19 0.13
Germany 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.01
Netherlands -0.19 -0.22 -0.20 -0.70
U.S. 0.93 1.03 0.96 0.87
Market economy Market economy excluding 
agriculture & mining
Notes: The columns labelled 'Solow' show productivity growth under constant returns to scale 
and without utilization adjustments. 'Adjusted' applies the estimated returns to scale and 
utilization correction from Table 5.5, adjusted to a value added basis.
 
The columns labelled ‘Solow’ show (total factor) productivity growth under the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and well-measured inputs. The ‘Adjusted’ 
columns apply the returns to scale parameters and utilization correction from Table 
5.5 for the main industry groups.
165 As Table 5.8 show, the adjustment are sometimes 
sizeable with adjusted productivity growth coming out half a percentage point lower 
in  the  case  of  the  market  economy  excluding  agriculture  and  mining  in  the 
Netherlands. In contrast, growth is almost half a percentage point higher in the case of 
the market economy in France. 
However, the adjustments have no large impact on the main stylized facts from 
the previous chapter. The U.S. shows the highest aggregate growth for this group of 
countries after 1995. Similarly, market services make much larger contributions to 
aggregate growth in the U.S. than in the European countries. It is also important to 
note the effect of excluding agriculture and mining. Germany and the U.S. provide 
the clearest cases with growth compared to the Solow residual coming out higher if 
agriculture and mining are included and lower when they are excluded. Also, in some 
sense the adjustments represent an upper-bound since for most industry groups and 
countries,  the  returns  to  scale  were  not  significantly  different  from  one,  and  the 
utilization adjustment statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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5.6  Concluding remarks 
It  is  important  to  understand  why  productivity  growth  is  procyclical,  both  for 
understanding the determinants of the business cycle and productivity growth. This 
chapter extends the current literature by not only analyzing this phenomenon for the 
U.S.  but  also  for  France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  using  an  up-to-date  and 
internationally consistent dataset covering the entire market economy. The analysis 
follows the approach of Basu and Fernald (2001). Production functions are estimated 
to allow for non-constant returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization. While this 
study is not the first to analyze this issue for countries outside the U.S., none of the 
earlier  studies  have  followed  Basu  and  Fernald  (2001)  and  tested  whether  the 
estimated models lead to lower correlation between growth of output and the adjusted 
productivity residual using the production model estimates. Furthermore, industry-
specific demand-side instruments are introduced to correct for simultaneity bias in the 
estimation of production functions. 
The  results  cast  some  doubt  on  the  ability  of  the  Basu  and  Fernald  (2001) 
model to account for procyclical productivity growth beyond their specific case. At 
the level of the market economy (excluding agriculture and mining), the correlation 
between adjusted productivity growth and output growth is no longer significant. But 
in some individual industry groups, technical change is still significantly procyclical. 
Furthermore, the results show that in all countries, a sizeable fraction of individual 
industries show procyclical productivity. Since the underlying theoretical model tries 
to explain firm behaviour, the failure of the empirical model in many industries is 
particularly worrisome. 
There have been other studies that cast doubt on the popular explanations for 
procyclical productivity growth. Basu and Fernald (1997) themselves raised questions 
about the prevalence of increasing returns to scale in the U.S., while Sbordone (1997) 
showed that the dynamic behaviour of output and productivity is not consistent with 
externalities. The main justification for looking at input utilization is the presence of 
adjustment costs for labour and capital. However, in recent work, Hall (2004) finds 
strong evidence against important adjustment costs to labour and capital over a time 
horizon  of  a  year  or  more.  As  a  result,  it  is  not  clear  whether  firms  will  vary 
utilization very much in response to shocks at the frequency for which we observe the 
data.  The  finding  of  Baily,  Bartelsman  and  Haltiwanger  (2001)  that  long-run Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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downsizing plants show more procyclicality during downturns than upsizing plants 
also  argues  against  the  input  utilization  hypothesis.  In  their  view,  downsizing 
establishments would have fewer incentives to hoard labour or conserve capital. This 
chapter provides some direct evidence that unmeasured input utilization is unable to 
account for procyclical productivity growth in many settings. One possible reason for 
this  may  be  that  average  hours  worked  per  person  is  not  a  very  good  proxy  for 
unmeasured input utilization in most industries, especially outside the U.S. and in the 
services sector. 
This raises the question where to go from here. One avenue might be to try and 
find  better  measures  for  unmeasured  input  utilization,  especially  outside 
manufacturing. For example, the type of customers of an industry (business versus 
consumers)  may  be  important,  as  Hart  and  Malley  (1999)  find  less  evidence  of 
procyclicality  in  investment-goods  industries  than  in  other  industries.  More 
theoretical research may also provide useful new directions for empirical research. 
Ultimately, firm-level studies, especially extending the work of Baily, Bartelsman 
and Haltiwanger (2001) beyond U.S. manufacturing, may be needed to understand 
how firms adjust to changing demand. 
More encouraging are the results on the robustness of the stylized productivity 
growth  facts.  Relaxing  the  assumptions  of  constant  returns  to  scale  and  well-
measured inputs has a noticeable impact on productivity growth estimates. However, 
the stylized facts from Chapter 4 are not affected. U.S. TFP growth remains higher 
than  in  the  European  countries,  especially  in  market  services.  Furthermore  the 
regression parameters, and therefore the adjusted productivity estimates, are strongly 
affected by relatively minor changes to the data, such as excluding agriculture and 
mining from the set of industries. This suggests that relaxing some of the growth 
accounting assumptions may be warranted by the data, but it can give a false sense of 
precision. A more robust approach is to acknowledge that total factor productivity 
growth  is  a  concept  that  captures  many  different  phenomena,  such  as  technical 
change and returns to scale. 
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Appendix 5.A   Appendix tables 
Appendix Table 5.1 Correlation between annual output growth and total factor 
productivity growth at the industry level, France, Germany, Netherlands and 
U.S., 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands US
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.82* 0.74* 0.65* 0.84*
Mining and quarrying 0.74* 0.48* 0.46* 0.19
Food products -0.22 0.08 0.38 0.28
Textiles, clothing and leather 0.29 0.62* 0.32 0.40
Wood products 0.52* 0.71* 0.34 0.39
Paper, printing and publishing 0.05 0.63* 0.68* 0.34
Petroleum and coal products 0.57* 0.52* 0.42* -0.19
Chemical products 0.84* 0.44* 0.63* 0.45*
Rubber and plastics -0.04 0.33 0.40 0.45*
Non-metalic mineral products 0.38 0.88* 0.48* 0.57*
Metal products 0.16 0.54* 0.83* 0.7*
Machinery 0.68* 0.63* 0.77* 0.69*
Electrical and electronic equipment & instruments 0.58* 0.29 0.13 0.69*
Transport equipment 0.63* 0.53* 0.67* 0.19
Furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing 0.66* 0.64* 0.19 0.56*
Electricity, gas and water 0.65* 0.82* 0.40 0.27
Construction 0.60* -0.14 0.22 0.56*
Wholesale trade 0.33 0.49* 0.76* -0.17
Retail trade 0.73* 0.73* 0.70* 0.56*
Hotels and restaurants 0.39 0.67* 0.72* 0.06
Transport & storage 0.53* 0.55* 0.80* 0.24
Communications 0.35 0.60* 0.71* 0.55*
Financial intermediation 0.23 0.53* 0.55* 0.02
Business services 0.06 0.76* 0.17 0.07
Other services 0.57* 0.37 0.64* 0.47*
Market economy 0.66* 0.69* 0.62* 0.57*  
Note: Total factor productivity growth is calculated as growth of gross output minus growth of a 
Törnquist aggregate of intermediate inputs, capital and labour. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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Appendix Table 5.2 F-statistics for the first-stage regression of instruments on 
input growth 
France Germany Netherlands US
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3.31 9.59* 0.75 2.31
Mining and quarrying 2.81 8.73 0.29 0.55
Food products 15.9** 1.19 8.28 3.92
Textiles, clothing and leather 12.4* 17.9** 9.99* 7.54
Wood products 1.87 1.07 2.29 8.92
Paper, printing and publishing 15.7** 24.9** 8.36 7.59
Petroleum and coal products 4.27 2.97 1.07 2.40
Chemical products 16.9** 4.94 7.03 5.84
Rubber and plastics 2.54 17.9** 16.3** 23.6**
Non-metalic mineral products 10.6* 0.88 1.71 8.58
Metal products 7.19 20.5** 4.12 6.93
Machinery 8.49 15.1** 24.8** 7.47
Electrical and electronic equipment & instruments 14.8** 23.9** 29.1** 15.8**
Transport equipment 25** 9.58* 6.13 9.90*
Furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing 0.66 2.08 8.22 8.74
Electricity, gas and water 7.58 10.8* 9.83* 0.23
Construction 7.78 5.73 13.4* 4.48
Wholesale trade 30.3** 7.93 30.6** 5.12
Retail trade 16.8** 15.8** 22.6** 15.6**
Hotels and restaurants 22.8** 42.0** 8.40 27.1**
Transport & storage 18.0** 4.34 14.1** 28.1**
Communications 10.6* 2.68 18.5** 20.4**
Financial intermediation 8.02 5.58 47.3** 4.48
Business services 63.3** 32.9** 54.8** 66.3**
Other services 67.3** 8.91 15.9** 38.6**
Market economy 15.8** 11.9* 14.5** 13.2*
Note: *: bias is less than 10% of OLS bias, **: bias is less than 5% of OLS bias  
Instruments are the current value and one lag of industry-specific downstream indicators. Significance 
is determined using critical values from Table 1 of Stock and Yogo (2004). Critical 5% value is 13.91, 
the 10% value is 9.08. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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Appendix  Table  5.3  Estimates  of  returns  to  scale  of  inputs  for  individual 
industries, 1979-2003 
Ind. Group France Germany Netherlands US
Agriculture, forestry and fishing NMFG 1.55 0.88 0.74 1.15
Mining and quarrying NMFG -2.48 0.61 -0.21 -1.64*
Food products NDUR 0.46* 0.59 0.3 1.35
Textiles, clothing and leather NDUR 1.85 1.19* 1.01 1.24
Wood products NDUR 1.04 1.15 0.87 0.92
Paper, printing and publishing NDUR 1.04 1.15 1.29* 1.23
Petroleum and coal products NDUR 0.62 1.23 0.97 0.45*
Chemical products NDUR 1.68* 1.15 0.76 1.21
Rubber and plastics NDUR 1.06 1.04 1.18 1.22*
Non-metalic mineral products DUR 0.96 1.54* 1.62 1.21*
Metal products DUR 1.05 1.08 1.31* 1.27*
Machinery DUR 1.32 1.15* 1.28* 1.23*
Electrical and electronic equipment & instruments DUR 1.20* 0.94 1.03 1.42
Transport equipment DUR 1.25* 1.09 1.15* 1.00
Furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing DUR 1.57 1.30* 0.88 1.40
Electricity, gas and water SER/NMFG 0.12* 0.84 1.08 0.43
Construction SER/NMFG 1.25* 0.93 1.01 1.07
Wholesale trade SER/NMFG 0.93 1.46* 1.34* 1.10
Retail trade SER/NMFG 0.25 1.67* 1.35 1.33
Hotels and restaurants SER/NMFG 1.28 1.49 1.47 0.74
Transport & storage SER/NMFG 1.21 1.30* 1.36* 0.81*
Communications SER/NMFG 0.99 1.12 0.93 0.61
Financial intermediation SER/NMFG 0.83 0.88 0.42* 1.21
Business services SER/NMFG 0.96 1.37* 1.07 0.96
Other services SER/NMFG 0.83 1.25 2.47 1.20
Market economy 1.15* 1.09 1.01 1.11*
Ind. Group denotes the group in which the industry is included. DUR = Durable manufacturing, NDUR = Non-durable
manufacturing, SER = Services, NMFG = Non-manufacturing.  
Notes:  Table  shows  parameter  estimates  from  a  regression  with  output  growth  as  the  dependent 
variable and growth of inputs as independent variable; a constant was also included. Estimation is done 
industry-by-industry  using  two-stage  least  squares  with  the  current  value  and  one  lag  of  the 
downstream  indicator  for  each  industry  as  instruments.  Standard  errors,  consistent  for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly 
different from one at the 5% level. Chapter 5, Cyclical productivity 
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Appendix Table 5.4 Estimates of returns to scale of inputs without a utilization 
correction, using Hall-Ramey instruments, 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands US
Market economy 0.99 0.85* 1.11 0.90*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.97 0.98 1.12* 0.94
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Durable manufacturing 1.08* 0.94 1.07 1.13*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.87 1.05 1.06 0.88
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-manufacturing 0.72* 0.82* 1.08 0.69*
(0.1) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Services 0.52* 0.99 1.11 0.72*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and 
growth of inputs as independent variable. Estimation is done for a panel of industries, with industry fixed 
effects included (not shown) using two-stage least squares with the current value and one lag of the real oil 
price and real government spending as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are allowed to vary 
across industries. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly different from one at the 5% level. See Table 5.A3 for 
definitions of industry groupings.
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Appendix Table 5.5 Returns to scale of inputs with a correction for unmeasured 
input utilization using Hall-Ramey instruments, 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands US
Market economy 1.00 0.87 1.11 0.86*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.96 1.07 1.11* 0.93
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Durable manufacturing 1.12* 0.98 1.06 1.11
(0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.88 1.05 1.06 0.88
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-manufacturing 0.73* 0.82 1.08 0.68*
(0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Services 0.54* 1.02 1.11 0.74*
(0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Market economy 0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.39*
(0.23) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.11 -0.51* -0.13 0.11
(0.24) (0.22) (0.07) (0.20)
Durable manufacturing -0.40* -0.28 -0.21* 0.18
(0.11) (0.36) (0.05) (0.25)
Non-durable manufacturing -0.08 -0.26 -0.05 0.12
(0.15) (0.24) (0.07) (0.16)
Non-manufacturing -0.24 -0.28 0.01 0.19
(0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19)
Services -0.27 -0.63* -0.17 -0.21
(0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.19)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of inputs 
and growth of average hours worked as independent variable. Parameters are estimated for a panel of industries, with 
industry fixed effects included (not shown). Parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares with the current value and 
one lag of the real oil price and real government spending as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are allowed 
to vary across industries. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and auto correlation, are shown in parentheses. * 
denotes parameters significantly different from one (returns to scale) or zero (utilization correction) at the 5% level. See 
Table 5.A3 for definitions of industry groupings.
Hall-Ramey instruments
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Appendix Table 5.6 Returns to scale of inputs with a correction for unmeasured 
input utilization, excluding average hours worked from aggregate input growth 
using Hall-Ramey instruments, 1979-2003 
France Germany Netherlands US
Market economy 0.99 0.88 1.12 0.87*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.95 1.07 1.13* 0.94
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Durable manufacturing 1.12* 0.98 1.07 1.11
(0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.88 1.05 1.07 0.89
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-manufacturing 0.73* 0.82 1.08 0.69*
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
Services 0.54* 1.02 1.14* 0.76*
(0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Market economy 0.33 0.12 0.26* 0.61*
(0.22) (0.19) (0.1) (0.18)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.4 -0.17 0.15* 0.39*
(0.23) (0.22) (0.06) (0.19)
Durable manufacturing -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.53*
(0.1) (0.38) (0.05) (0.24)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.1 -0.02 0.1 0.31*
(0.14) (0.27) (0.05) (0.14)
Non-manufacturing 0.01 0.00 0.32* 0.38*
(0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18)
Services -0.08 -0.24 0.25* 0.05
(0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.17)
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of inputs 
and growth of average hours worked as independent variable. The growth of inputs is modified to exclude growth in average 
hours worked. Parameters are estimated for a panel of industries, with industry fixed effects included (not shown). 
Parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares with the current value and one lag of the real oil price and real 
government spending as instruments. Parameters in the first stage regression are allowed to vary across industries. Standard 
errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and auto correlation, are shown in parentheses. * denotes parameters significantly 
different from one (returns to scale) or zero (utilization correction) at the 5% level. See Table 5.A3 for definitions of industry 
groupings.
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Appendix  Table  5.7  Correlation  between  output  and  adjusted  productivity 
growth,  based  on  industry-by-industry  estimates  of  returns  to  scale  and 
unmeasured input utilization 
France Germany Netherlands US
Market economy
Constant returns to scale 0.66* 0.69* 0.62* 0.57*
Variable returns to scale -0.01 0.21 0.53* 0.21
Variable returns to scale & utilization correction -0.34 -0.09 0.35 0.19
Number of market industries with correlation significantly different from zero (5% level)
Constant returns to scale 13 20 15 11
Variable returns to scale 10 8 8 8
Variable returns to scale & utilization correction 5 7 8 7
Note: correlations between output growth and technical change residuals. * denotes a correlation significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. The definitions of technical change residuals is similar to Table 5.6, only in this 
table the parameters are allowed to vary for each industry.Chapter 6  Summary and Conclusions 
6.1  Introduction 
In the coming decades, European countries face a number of major economic challenges, 
such as dealing with ageing populations and increased competition from both the United 
States and low-wage countries such as India and China. Facing these long-run challenges 
motivates  the  need  to  strengthen  European  competitiveness.  Indeed  two  of  the  main 
economic projects of the European Union are geared towards this goal. In 1999, twelve 
countries joined the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with the aim of stimulating 
economic integration and growth. In 2000, EU governments subscribed to the Lisbon 
agenda of reforms to improve competitiveness. This study has analyzed the prospects of 
both projects from different perspectives. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the challenges for the new common monetary policy 
in the euro area in relation to the business cycles in European countries. Chapters 4 and 5 
looked  at  the  driving  forces  of  productivity  growth  in  Europe  relative  to  the  United 
States.  This  chapter  first  summarizes  the  main  results  from  each  chapter,  before 
discussing  the  implications  for  economy  policy  in  more  detail.  To  face  Europe’s 
competitiveness  challenges,  the  research  in  this  study  suggests  that  a  broad  reform 
agenda is needed, aimed at making European economies more flexible. 
6.2  Prospects for a common currency 
The scale and scope of the euro experiment have been emphasized frequently. Twelve 
countries with over 300 million inhabitants have given up their national currency and 
adopted a common monetary policy. This has created an economic area that is second 
only to the United States (in terms of GDP), in which a new central bank, the ECB, is 
responsible for monetary policy. Naturally, such an endeavour faces challenges, both in 
the short run and in the long run. Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
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In the short run, the ECB has to establish a common monetary policy that fits a 
heterogeneous  group  of  countries.  Although  the  ECB  has  some  tools,  like  structural 
models, to guide its policy, a euro area business cycle index can be a useful complement. 
Such an index aims to combine the information from a number of economic variables 
into a single figure reflecting current economic activity. The component variables should 
normally be available at least once a month and are used complement the GDP figures 
which  are  only  available  on  a  quarterly  basis  and  which  are  mostly  subject  to  large 
revisions. An important question is how to select the variables that go into the index and 
how to construct the business cycle index. One approach is to collect a dataset that is as 
large and diverse as possible and use a statistical model to determine the importance of 
each of the variables. Alternatively, analysts select a limited set of variables by judging 
how well their development corresponds to GDP.  
Chapter 2 compares a set of business cycle indexes which are based on these two 
different approaches. As it turns out, there is little difference in the ability of the indexes 
to capture the main cyclical facts of the euro area. However, as it is easier to interpret 
changes in an index based on less than forty variables than in one based on 250 variables, 
the approach where analysts select a set of variables has certain merits. The second part 
of the analysis in Chapter 2 showed how variables from only three euro area countries 
(France,  Germany  and  Spain) can provide a  good insight into the euro area business 
cycle.  Whenever  the  euro  area  was  in  a  recession,  variables  from  each  of  the  three 
countries also pointed towards contraction. This suggests that at least in the short run, 
heterogeneity in the euro area is not as large that it will hamper monetary policy making. 
However,  another  finding  is  that  comparable  variables  in  different  countries  have 
different effects. For example, German industrial production is much more important in 
explaining movements in euro area GDP than comparable series for France and Spain. 
This hints at the main long run challenge to the sustainability of the currency area. 
If business cycles differ across countries, monetary policy will be too strict for countries 
with below-average  growth and too accommodating for countries with above-average 
performance.  This  is  potentially  worrisome  since  cyclical differences have  led  to the 
break-up of currency unions in the past. Chapter 3 argues that the prospects for the euro 
area depend on the future similarity of business cycles and the degree of flexibility of Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
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labour markets. In recent decades economic and monetary integration within Europe has 
increased  and  business  cycle  synchronization  among  EMU  members  has  increased 
modestly. However, this mild upward trend hides substantial variation over time. The 
experience of states within the U.S. suggests that such variation is unlikely to disappear 
as a result of further economic integration. Indeed, fluctuations in synchronization over 
time are stronger within the U.S. than within Europe and these fluctuations appear closely 
related to major national cyclical episodes. For example, during the Great Depression and 
the wartime boom, synchronization between U.S. states was high, but after World War II, 
average synchronization decreased. 
To better understand how the EMU is likely to affect synchronization within the 
euro area, a set of determinants is identified. The analysis confirms earlier results that 
countries with closer trade links have more similar business cycles. The other findings are 
less well established in other research. Countries with more similar monetary and fiscal 
policies, highly correlated stock market returns, stable exchange rates, and a larger share 
of  intra-industry  trade  also  show  higher  output  correlations.  Furthermore,  these  other 
factors are at least as important as trade in terms of their impact on synchronization. 
Based on this analysis, it seems likely that synchronization will increase as a result 
of the EMU. The most obvious reason for this is the common monetary policy and fixed 
exchange rates under monetary union. However, since the 1970s, stock market returns 
have become more similar and the share of intra-industry trade has risen too. The main 
uncertainties are the future course of fiscal policy and the degree of specialization. If a 
country  embarks on a unilateral spending spree, its business cycle will less resemble 
those in other EMU countries. However, if all countries simultaneously break the deficit 
rule of the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy will remain highly correlated. The 
more qualitative prescription that the budget should be in balance over the cycle can help 
to achieve a greater degree of synchronization  
Specialization  is  the  other  uncertain  factor  in  the  future  development  of 
synchronization. The analysis showed that countries with a more similar industrial and 
trade  structure  have  more  similar  business  cycles.  Krugman  (1991)  expects  regions 
(countries)  to  specialize  as  a  result  of  economic  integration  due  to  agglomeration 
benefits. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. The dataset used in Chapter 3 shows Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
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that  since  the  early  1970s,  export  bundles  have  become  more  similar  and  the  intra-
industry share has risen between euro area countries, while the measures of industrial 
similarity show increasing specialization over time. Evidence for U.S. regions by Kim 
(1995)  suggests  that  agglomeration  effects  have  not  been  a  major  factor  in  driving 
specialization in the U.S. Instead, since the 1930s, the industrial structure of U.S. regions 
has  become  more  similar  due  to  more  mobile  production  factors.  This  suggests  that 
industrial  similarity  across  Europe  might  increase  due  to  greater  cross-border  labour 
market flexibility. 
Although the costs of the euro are likely to remain low due to sufficiently high 
synchronization of business cycles, the uncertainties regarding fiscal policy coordination 
and  changes  in  specialisation  patterns  make  the  future  degree  of  synchronization 
uncertain too. One way to mitigate this uncertainty is to increase flexibility and especially 
make cross-border movements of labour much more straightforward. First of all, a greater 
degree  of  flexibility  is  likely  to  lead  to  more  similar  cycles  due  to  a  decrease  in 
specialization. Second, when a country is hit by an asymmetric shock, workers can move 
to countries with higher labour demand if labour markets are sufficiently flexible. This in 
turn will mitigate the effects of the asymmetric shock, reducing the need for other policy 
measures.  Furthermore, apart from dampening the effect of asymmetric shocks, more 
flexible labour markets can also stimulate productivity growth. 
6.3  What drives productivity growth? 
The  analysis  in  Chapters  2  and  3  provides  insight  into  the  role  of  certain  structural 
features of the European economies for European business cycles. Chapters 4 and 5 focus 
on the question of whether structural or cyclical factors drive the productivity growth gap 
between Europe and the U.S. As U.S. labour productivity growth has been considerably 
higher than in Europe since the mid 1990s, the question arises whether the European 
economies  are  sufficiently  competitive  and  innovative  to  safeguard  future  living 
standards. 
It  is  argued  here  that  the  main  structural  explanation  for  Europe’s  lagging 
productivity  growth  since  the  1990s  is  the  smaller  impact  of  new  information  and 
communication technologies (ICT) compared to the U.S. This is not so much due to a Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
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larger ICT producing sector, but mainly due to less extensive and less productive use of 
ICT across the economy in European countries. Even though the larger ICT producing 
sector  is  one  factor  in  the  EU-U.S.  growth  differential,  it  makes  a  relatively  small 
contribution  to  this  growth  differential.  In  fact  while  the  ICT  manufacturing  sector 
contributes more to labour productivity growth in the U.S. than in Europe, the opposite is 
the case in the ICT producing services sector, which includes telecommunications. The 
big difference between Europe and the U.S. is in the pace of ICT investment and its 
productive use. It is relatively straightforward to determine that European ICT investment 
is lower than in the U.S., but harder and more controversial to establish its productive 
impact. 
In theory, the marginal returns to ICT investment should equal its marginal cost. 
ICT  goods  can  readily  be  purchased  on  international  markets,  so  in  a  competitive 
economy, the returns from investing in ICT will be driven down to marginal cost. On 
average, the equality of marginal returns and marginal cost on ICT cannot be rejected 
with the industry data used here. But this average return hides important variation over 
time. While the productivity of ICT investment up to the beginning of the 1980s and 
again since the early 1990s was in line with marginal cost, returns on ICT were lower 
than marginal cost during the 1980s. The evidence suggests that this U-shaped pattern of 
returns to ICT was apparent in both the Anglo-Saxon countries (UK and U.S.) and the 
Continental European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) in the analysis. 
However,  the  U-shaped  pattern  for  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  preceded  that  of  the 
Continental European countries by a number of years 
One  explanation  for  these  patterns  is  that  ICT  investment  can  at  first  quickly 
generate important productivity gains (the so-called ‘hard savings’). However, additional 
gains (the ‘soft savings’) from ICT use can only be exploited once sufficient time and 
money have been invested in complementary innovations. Many of these organizational 
investments  are  often  not  measured  as  investment  but  as  expenses,  leading  to  an 
understatement in TFP growth.
166 As these intangible investments start to bear fruit, TFP 
growth rises again.  
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In Chapter 4, we find that ICT mostly generates productive returns in line with 
marginal cost. However, strong TFP growth in a number of specific U.S. market services 
(in particular in trade and finance) suggests that the ICT gains may be larger. A reason 
for this could be that traditionally, services have not been very standardized, either in the 
set of inputs purchased or in ‘bundles’ of services that are sold, lowering its potential for 
productivity growth.
167 However, ICT has become a helpful tool for codifying knowledge 
about, for example, consumer buying patterns. Such information can then be analyzed to 
allow for greater standardization and hence drive productivity improvement. 
Elucidating the link between knowledge, codification and ICT is one avenue for 
future research. Another approach is to establish the link between firm-level studies of 
the impact of ICT (e.g. OECD, 2004) and the type of industry-level analysis presented in 
this study. A number of firm-level studies find that the returns from ICT are larger than 
their  marginal  cost.  In  other  words,  they  find  evidence  of  positive  ICT  spillovers. 
However, the industry-level results presented here suggest that returns are equal to cost 
(at  best).  The  explanation  for  this  difference  may  also  be  related  to  intangible 
investments. The return to intangible investments is likely to be much more uncertain 
than the return to tangible investment and the type of investment will differ by industry. 
As a result, some firms in an industry will be successful in generating positive spillovers, 
while  other  firms  will  fail  and  may  even  generate  negative  spillovers.  Although  the 
competitive  process  will  favour  the  successful  firm,  the  unsuccessful  firm  will  not 
disappear quickly in particular not when labour and bankruptcy laws are rigid.  More 
research is needed to establish how this type of averaging-out of performance at firm 
level takes place in practice and how it affects the industry aggregate. 
In  addition  to  structural  factors,  cyclical  factors  may  also  be  important  in 
explaining  the  productivity  growth  gap  between  Europe  and  the  U.S.  The  fact  that 
productivity growth is faster during periods of strong economic growth and slower in 
recessions is interesting, but causality  may  run either way. Productivity shocks could 
cause  business  cycles  but  demand-side  factors  may  also  influence  (measured) 
productivity. If the second explanation holds, a growth comparison between countries 
                                                 
167 See Boden and Miles (2000) for more on the distinction between manufacturing and services. Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
  187 
will depend on the state of the business cycle in each country. Specifically, economic 
activity boomed in the late 1990s in the U.S., but much less so in Europe. Although the 
U.S. experienced a (relatively mild) recession in 2000-2001, U.S. productivity growth 
continued to outpace European growth, which suggests that cyclical factor cannot explain 
the entire EU-U.S. growth gap.
168 
Understanding  the  reasons  behind  the  cyclicality  of  productivity  can  help  in 
interpreting productivity growth in the short run, as well as in understanding the business 
cycle. Two popular demand-side explanations for cyclical productivity are the possibility 
of  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  unmeasured  input  utilization.  Chapter  5  tests  the 
importance of both for three European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
and the U.S. Earlier research proposed two criteria for testing these explanations (Basu 
and Fernald, 2001). First, the hypotheses of constant returns and well-measured input 
utilization  should  be  rejected  based  on  production  function  estimates.  Second, 
productivity growth at the aggregate level should no longer be correlated with output 
growth after adjusting for non-constant returns to scale and unmeasured inputs.  
However, the Basu and Fernald (2001) model aims to explain firm-level behaviour. 
This  suggests  that  the  model should  be tested  at  the  most  detailed  level  possible.  In 
Chapter 5, industry data are used, so a more appropriate test of the Basu-Fernald model is 
whether the correlation between output and productivity growth decreases at the industry 
level. The analysis based on this model suggests that increasing returns and unmeasured 
input  utilization  are  indeed  able  to  explain  aggregate  cyclicality.  However,  in  many 
industries, adjusted productivity growth remains positively correlated with output. 
This raises questions about the usefulness of the Basu-Fernald (2001) model. The 
importance  of  increasing  returns  was  reduced  by  using  the  change  in  average  hours 
worked as a proxy for unmeasured input utilization. The reasoning behind this proxy is 
that in times of high demand, firms will increase average hours worked as well as worker 
effort and capital utilization. In the long run, new workers can be hired and new capital 
equipment installed. However, if work effort is less related to the use of machinery such 
as in services, the proxy may be less useful. Also, working hour regulations may make 
                                                 
168 Inklaar and McGuckin (2003) also showed that averaged over 1995-2000, cyclical factors were not very 
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this measure less informative outside the U.S. In the more regulated European labour 
markets, it may be easier to hire temporary workers instead of adjusting average working 
hours. This suggests more research into measuring input utilization may be helpful. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 also serves as a test for some of the well-known and 
frequently criticized  growth accounting assumptions, namely  constant returns to scale 
and  well-measured  inputs.  Even  when  taking  the  estimation results  from  the cyclical 
analysis  at  face  value,  the  main  stylized  productivity  growth  facts  (in  particular  the 
slowdown of European productivity growth relative to the U.S. since the mid-1990s) are 
not affected by relaxing these assumptions. Furthermore, the size and even the sign of the 
adjustments to productivity growth are highly uncertain. In addition, Chapter 4 tested the 
equality of marginal returns and marginal costs of ICT capital. The results suggested that 
deviations from this equality may be informative about intangible investments. Hence 
both chapters illustrate that growth accounting assumptions are a useful starting point of 
the  analysis.  Furthermore,  the  deviations  from  the  standard  assumptions  are  neither 
certain nor stable enough to take them as the basis for further analysis. This leads to the 
conclusion  that  growth  accounting  provides  a  consistent  framework  for  analysis,  and 
serves as a useful point of departure for analyzing the sources of growth and differences 
in performance across economies. 
6.4  An agenda for European reform 
The main economic benefits from the introduction of the euro are likely to be a greater 
degree of competition and higher growth rates in the European Union. This is in line with 
the goal of the Lisbon agenda which aims to strengthen European competitiveness. The 
main policy question is what European countries should do to achieve these goals. The 
analysis in the first part of this study (Chapters 2 and 3) showed that the costs of the 
monetary union are probably not going to be excessive. However, the uncertainties about 
the future degree of coordination in fiscal policy and specialization across countries make 
the future degree of synchronization and hence the costs of the monetary union uncertain. 
One way of mitigating these costs is to make European labour markets more flexible. 
Specifically, it should be easier for workers to move across borders. However, the ease 
with which Americans move across the U.S. to chase better jobs and opportunities is Chapter 6, Summary and Conclusions 
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likely to remain a distant goal for the foreseeable future. Europeans face not just language 
and cultural barriers, but pensions and insurance systems continue to differ substantially 
across countries. Improving the degree of flexibility should still be an important goal for 
the European Union though, as it is also likely to improve productivity growth. 
Stimulating competitiveness is not straightforward, but the analysis in this study 
suggests a number of policy measures. Chapter 4 showed that the U.S. has been reaping 
more of the productive benefits of ICT than Europe. The U.S. has invested more in ICT 
and  has  been  realizing  many  of  the  soft  savings  earlier  than  Continental  European 
countries. One reason for this U.S. advantage is that it is easier not just to start new firms, 
but also for those new firms to grow quickly. There are many regulations in the areas of 
product markets that restrict restructuring and inhibit the start of new economic activities. 
Investments in intangibles (such as R&D, training, organizational innovations) are often 
costly and risky and will not be undertaken in an environment that is too restrictive. 
Hence the gains from intangible investments will be limited, which in turn reduces the 
potential gains from ICT investment. European countries should enact reforms to enable 
good  firms,  which  are  those  which  successfully  invest in  restructuring  and  start  new 
activities, to excel and failing firms to exit. Lowering hiring and firing costs should help 
to do both. In addition, reducing differences in regulation across countries will further 
assist in reaping economies of scale through ICT investment projects that rely on a large 
scale. Given the strong advantage of market services in the U.S., the European Union 
should give priority to liberalizing services markets across countries. 
During the 1990s, most European countries struggled to bring inflation and deficits 
under control. In the end, inflation and deficits converged to the lower levels, such as 
those historically experienced in Germany, and not to the high levels of Italy. To unlock 
the  benefits  of  ICT  and  stimulate  competitiveness,  a  similar  convergence  may  be 
necessary in the area of regulation. This should stimulate productivity growth by enabling 
more experimentation with new business models, as well as allow for more cross-border 
activity. Greater flexibility of product and labour markets will not just make it easier to 
respond to cyclical shocks but also to technological opportunities.  
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169 The key references for these databases are van Ark et al. (2002) for the total economy growth accounts, van 
Ark et al. (2003b) for the first version of the 60-industry database and Inklaar et al.  (2005) for the industry 
growth accounts. Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
De  Europese  Unie  kent  momenteel  twee  belangrijke  economische  projecten  die  erop 
gericht zijn de concurrentiekracht van de Europese economieën te stimuleren. In de eerste 
plaats heeft een groot deel van de lidstaten sinds 1999 een gemeenschappelijke munt, de 
euro.  In  de  tweede  plaats  hebben  de  regeringsleiders  in  2000  de  Lissabon  agenda 
onderschreven die erop gericht is om Europa tot de meest concurrerende economie ter 
wereld te maken.
170 De doelstellingen van beide projecten zijn echter nog niet gehaald en 
de  voortgang  gaat  niet  zonder  slag  of  stoot.  Zo  blijft  de  Europese 
arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei  al  10  jaar  achter  bij  de  groei  in  de  Verenigde  Staten.  De 
Europese  Commissie  (2004)  spreekt  dan  ook  over  Europa’s  ‘structurele 
productiviteitsprobleem.’ 
Grotere  concurrentiekracht,  en  vooral  hogere  arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei,  is  van 
groot belang voor de versterking van Europa’s economische prestaties. Op korte termijn 
kan de levenstandaard stijgen doordat een groter deel van de bevolking betaalde arbeid 
verricht of langer werkt, maar op lange termijn is een hogere productie per gewerkt uur 
essentieel. De vergrijzing in de rijke landen en de sterke opkomst van de economieën van 
China  en  India  versterken  de  noodzaak  van  hogere  productiviteitsgroei  en  innovatie. 
Vergrijzing zorgt ervoor dat in de komende jaren de beroepsbevolking afneemt en het 
aantal  gepensioneerden  toeneemt.  Een  hogere  productiviteit  kan  eraan  bijdragen  dat 
pensioenen in de toekomst betaalbaar blijven. 
Productie van een aantal goederen, zoals kleding en speelgoed, vindt steeds vaker 
plaats in lagelonenlanden (zoals in China) en ook bepaalde diensten, zoals het schrijven 
van  computerprogramma’s,  blijken  voor  uitbesteding  (bijvoorbeeld  naar  India)  in 
aanmerking  te  komen.  Een  ander  schrikbeeld  in  West-Europa  is  de  komst  van  de 
goedkope loodgieter uit Polen. De reactie op deze globalisering is veelal een roep om 
                                                 
170 Met Europa doel ik op de 15 landen die lid waren van de Europese Unie voor de toetreding van 10 
nieuwe lidstaten op 1 mei 2004. Samenvatting 
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bescherming  van  de  binnenlandse  markt  door  middel  van  importquota’s  tot  het  aan 
banden  leggen  van  het  vrije  verkeer  van  arbeid  in  de  Europese  Unie.  Hoewel 
globalisering vooral aan de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt voor problemen kan zorgen, is 
het  vooral  de  snelle  Amerikaanse  productiviteitsgroei  die  een  grotere  uitdaging  voor 
Europa vormt. De groeiachterstand ten opzichte van de VS suggereert dat Europa niet 
alleen een concurrentieprobleem heeft ten opzichte van lage-lonenlanden, maar dat het 
ook niet kan meekomen in termen van innovatie en gebruik van nieuwe technologieën. 
De introductie van de euro brengt ook belangrijke uitdagingen met zich mee. Een 
belangrijk voordeel van de invoering van de euro is dat het economische integratie en 
groei kan bevorderen. Zowel op korte als op lange termijn zijn er echter ook uitdagingen. 
De  Europese  Centrale  Bank  (ECB)  moet  vorm  geven  aan  een  gezamenlijk  monetair 
beleid voor een, in economisch opzicht, heterogeen gebied. Op korte termijn is dit een 
beperkt probleem omdat de ECB om zich op het eurogebied als geheel richt. 
Op langere termijn kan de heterogeniteit echter een bedreiging vormen voor het 
voortbestaan van de euro. Met de invoering van de euro hebben de deelnemende landen 
hun monetair beleid uit handen gegeven en zijn daarmee een instrument kwijtgeraakt 
waarmee  ze  op  economische  ontwikkelingen  kunnen  reageren.  Als  de  stand  van  de 
conjunctuur sterk verschilt tussen de verschillende landen, zal het gezamenlijke monetair 
beleid niet passend zijn voor elk van de lidstaten. 
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op één van de praktische problemen waar de ECB mee te 
maken heeft. Bij het bepalen van het gezamenlijk monetair beleid is de stand van de euro-
economie een van de bepalende factoren. Een probleem hierbij is echter dat cijfers met 
betrekking  tot  het  BBP  alleen  op  kwartaalbasis  beschikbaar  zijn  en  dat  de  BBP 
schattingen vaak met een flinke vertraging worden gepubliceerd. De ECB moet echter 
elke maand beslissen of het monetair beleid aanpassing behoeft. Een belangrijke vraag 
hierbij  is  hoe  informatie  uit  de  verschillende  lidstaten  gecombineerd  kan  worden  om 
inzicht  in  de  economie  van  het  eurogebied  als  geheel  te  krijgen.  Een  instrument  om 
hierbij  te  helpen  is  een  conjunctuurindex.  Deze  index  is  doorgaans  samengesteld  uit 
reeksen  die  in  ieder  geval  maandelijks  beschikbaar  zijn,  zoals  industriële  productie, 
aandelenkoersen en detailhandelomzet. De vraag is hoe deze variabelen het beste in één 
index gecombineerd kunnen worden.  Samenvatting 
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Er  zijn  ruwweg  twee  benaderingen  om  een  conjunctuurindex  samen  te  stellen. 
Volgens de eerste benadering selecteren analisten de reeksen, waarbij voor elke variabele 
wordt  gekeken  hoe  goed  ze  de  algehele  conjunctuur  volgen.  De  andere  benadering 
gebruikt een statistisch model om het belang van elk van de variabelen in de index te 
bepalen. Vooral recentelijk zijn met behulp van statistische methoden conjunctuurindices 
geconstrueerd  waarin  informatie  uit  honderden  variabelen  wordt  gecombineerd. 
Hoofdstuk 2 vergelijkt hoe goed beide benaderingen erin slagen om de  conjuncturele 
ontwikkeling van het eurogebied te vangen. Het blijkt dat een index op basis van een 
beperkt  aantal  variabelen  (minder  dan  40)  voor  drie  grote  euro  landen  (Frankrijk, 
Duitsland en Spanje) al een goed beeld van conjunctuur in het eurogebied geeft. Een 
voordeel van dit beperkte aantal variabelen is dat gemakkelijker is te achterhalen welke 
factoren een belangrijke rol spelen in veranderingen van de index. Over de gehele periode 
bezien blijkt elk van de landen redelijk goed in de pas te lopen met de conjunctuur van 
het volledige eurogebied. Er zijn echter ook verschillen. Zo blijkt de industriële productie 
in  Duitsland  een  veel  grotere  rol  te  spelen  in  de  Europese  conjunctuur  dan  dezelfde 
variabele in Frankrijk of Spanje. Dit suggereert dat het van belang is om nauwkeuriger te 
kijken naar de samenhang van de conjunctuur in het eurogebied. 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert in hoeverre de conjunctuurbewegingen in de verschillende 
euro landen op elkaar lijken en probeert een inschatting te maken hoe de synchronisatie 
van de conjunctuurbewegingen zich in de monetaire unie zal ontwikkelen. Hoewel sinds 
de  jaren  ’70  de  monetaire  integratie  in  de  Europese  Unie  steeds  meer  vorm  heeft 
gekregen, heeft dit slechts geleid tot een geringe toename van de synchronisatie van de 
conjunctuur  binnen  het  eurogebied.  Bovendien  fluctueert  de  mate  van  synchronisatie 
redelijk sterk door de tijd. Een analyse voor de Verenigde Staten laat zien dat dergelijke 
fluctuaties  vermoedelijk  ook  in  de  toekomst  belangrijk  zullen  blijven.  Hoewel  de 
Verenigde Staten al lang een monetaire unie vormen, zijn er perioden geweest waarin 
veel staten een conjunctuurbeweging hebben laten zien die sterk afwijkt van het landelijk 
beeld. Daarnaast zijn er ook perioden geweest, zoals bijvoorbeeld de Grote Depressie in 
de  jaren  ’30,  waarin  nationale  ontwikkelingen  domineerden  en  de  mate  van 
synchronisatie derhalve erg hoog was. Samenvatting 
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Om  een  nauwkeuriger  beeld  te  krijgen  van  de  toekomstige  ontwikkeling  van 
synchronisatie worden in Hoofdstuk 3 de determinanten van synchronisatie bestudeerd. 
Hieruit volgt dat een aantal variabelen robuust gerelateerd is aan synchronisatie. Zoals 
eerder onderzoek al heeft aangetoond, blijken landen met een grotere handelsintensiteit 
een meer synchroon lopende conjunctuurbeweging te vertonen dan landen die minder 
intensief  met  elkaar  handelen.  Het  blijkt  echter  ook  dat  een  grotere  mate  van 
overeenstemming  in  monetair  beleid,  financieel  overheidsbeleid,  correlatie  van 
aandelenrendementen  en  minder  wisselkoersvariabiliteit  en  minder  specialisatie  tot 
hogere synchronisatie leiden. Bovendien heeft elk van deze factoren een ongeveer even 
groot effect op synchronisatie als de handelsintensiteit.  
De implicaties voor de  toekomstige ontwikkeling van  conjunctuursynchronisatie 
liggen voor de hand. Ten eerste, onder invloed van de gemeenschappelijke monetaire 
politiek  zullen  de  economische  ontwikkelingen  in  de  landen  in  het  eurogebied  meer 
synchroon gaan lopen. De kans dat deze politiek mogelijk niet voor alle landen optimaal 
is, wordt minder groot. Ten tweede, indien alle landen een vergelijkbaar begrotingsbeleid 
voeren zal dat eveneens leiden tot meer synchronisatie. Vanuit het perspectief van de 
analyse in Hoofdstuk 3, zijn de tekortnormen in het Stabiliteits- en Groeipact als zodanig 
niet doorslaggevend voor de convergentie in conjuctuurcycli. Van belang is wel dat het 
begrotingsbeleid  van  de  eurolanden  niet  te  sterk  verschilt.  Een  homogeen 
begrotingsbeleid  zal  een  positieve  bijdrage  leveren  aan  het  succes  van  het 
gemeenschappelijke monetaire beleid. 
De  ontwikkeling  van  specialisatiepatronen  binnen  de  EU  en  het  gevolg  voor 
synchronisatie is lastiger te voorspellen. Onderzoek voor de VS laat zien dat door een 
grotere  mobiliteit  van  productiefactoren,  de  productiestructuur  van  regio’s  in  de  VS 
homogener is geworden. Bovendien is sinds de jaren ’70 de specialisatiegraad binnen 
Europa  afgenomen.
171  Deze  resultaten  suggereren  dat  de  conjunctuur  binnen  het 
eurogebied  uniformer  zal  worden.  Dit  neemt  niet  weg  dat  er  vermoedelijk  altijd 
verschillen  zullen  blijven  en  dat  een  hogere  mate  van  flexibiliteit,  met  name  op  de 
arbeidsmarkt, wenselijk is. 
                                                 
171 Hierbij wordt vooral gekeken naar de goederensamenstelling van handelsstromen. Samenvatting 
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Wanneer is vastgesteld dat de kosten van de euro vermoedelijk beheersbaar zullen 
blijven, resteert de vraag hoe de Europese economieën hun concurrentiekracht kunnen 
versterken. Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 analyseren de productiviteitsgroei in Europa, waarbij 
Hoofdstuk 4 zich richt op de  structurele factoren en Hoofdstuk 5 zich concentreert op het 
het belang van cyclische factoren in de productiviteitsgroei. Eén van de voornaamste 
redenen waarom de Europese arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei achterblijft bij de groei in de VS 
is de geringere bijdrage van informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT) aan groei. 
Allereerst is de ICT producerende sector in de VS groter dan in Europa, maar het belang 
van dit verschil is kwantitatief beperkt. Belangrijker is dat Amerika meer investeert in 
ICT en deze nieuwe technologie productiever gebruikt dan Europa. 
Het effect van de hogere investeringen in ICT kan worden vastgesteld door middel 
van zogenaamde groeirekeningen. In groeirekeningen wordt veronderstelt dat het aandeel 
in de totale kosten van kapitaalgoederen een goede indicator is voor de bijdrage aan de 
productie. Hiermee is een gedeelte van arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei toe te schrijven aan 
een bijdrage van een grotere hoeveelheid kapitaal per gewerkt uur. Het restant wordt 
totale factor productiviteitsgroei genoemd. Binnen dit raamwerk is het echter lastiger om 
het effect van ICT gebruik op de productiviteit vast te stellen. Een eerste aanwijzing voor 
een productiviteitsvoordeel in de VS is dat de dienstverlenende sector aldaar de grootste 
ICT investeerder is en dat juist deze sector een sterke groeispurt heeft laten zien sinds de 
tweede  helft  van  de  jaren  ’90.
172  Directer  bewijs  kan  worden  ontleend  aan  een 
econometrische  analyse  op  bedrijfstakniveau.  Volgens  de  traditionele  neoklassieke 
groeitheorie, waarop de groeirekeningen zijn gebaseerd, moet de marginale productiviteit 
van ICT kapitaal gelijk zijn aan de marginale kosten. In de praktijk blijkt dit in de jaren 
’70 en jaren ’90 inderdaad het geval te zijn. Gedurende de jaren ’80 was de marginale 
productiviteit echter lager dan op basis van de kosten verwacht zou mogen worden. Dit 
U-patroon  is  in  zowel  Europa  als  de  VS  te  zien,  maar  in  de  Angelsaksische  landen 
(Verenigd Koninkrijk en Verenigde Staten) vond elke fase een aantal jaren eerder plaats 
dan in continentaal Europa (Frankrijk, Duitsland en Nederland).  
                                                 
172 Bovendien is deze groeispurt niet alleen aan hogere ICT investeringen te danken maar vooral aan een 
toename van de totale factorproductiviteit, wat kan betekenen dat innovaties in de sectoren zelf vruchten 
afwerpen. Samenvatting 
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Een verklaring voor het U-patroon is dat in de beginfase van ICT investeringen de 
productiviteitsverhogingen  relatief  makkelijk  te  realiseren  waren,  maar  dat 
complementaire innovaties nodig zijn om aanvullende productiviteitswinsten te boeken. 
Dit kan worden geïllustreerd aan de hand van een voorbeeld voor de detailhandel. Zo 
zorgde  de  introductie  van  barcode  scanners  in  supermarkten  voor  een  aanzienlijke 
versnelling  van  het  betalingsproces  dat  relatief  eenvoudig  zorgde  voor 
productiviteitswinsten. Barcode scanners leveren echter ook veel informatie op over het 
koopgedrag  van  consumenten  en  deze  informatie  kan  worden  gebruikt  om  het 
bevoorraadingsproces  te  stroomlijnen.  Hiervoor  moet  het  organisatieproces  van 
supermarkten  echter  aanzienlijk  worden  aangepast  en  moeten  innovaties  bijvoorbeeld 
ook worden gerealiseerd in aanpalende bedrijfstakken, zoals de transportsector. 
Hoewel er weinig barrières zijn voor investeringen in ICT hardware en software, 
zijn  complementaire  innovaties  veel  moeilijker  te  realiseren.  Dit  suggereert  dat  de 
dynamiek  binnen  het  bedrijfsleven  moet  worden  gestimuleerd  om  meer  van  de 
productiviteitsvruchten van ICT te plukken. Rigide markten, met name in de sfeer van 
arbeids-  en  produktmarkten  spelen  hierbij  een  belangrijke  rol.  Strikte 
bestemmingsplannen maken het bijvoorbeeld lastig om snel winkels volgens een nieuw 
concept op te zetten en te openen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 concludeert dat structurele factoren van belang zijn voor het verklaren 
van  de  achterblijvende  arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei  in  Europa  ten  opzichte  van  de  VS. 
Zeker op korte termijn kunnen cyclische factoren echter ook een rol spelen. Het blijkt 
namelijk dat productiviteitsgroei hoger is in perioden van snelle economische groei en 
relatief  laag  tijdens  recessies.  Dit  kan  betekenen  dat  productiviteitsschokken  de 
conjunctuur bepalen of dat de (gemeten) productiviteit niet alleen beïnvloed wordt door 
aanbodfactoren  maar  ook  door  vraagfactoren.  Hoofdstuk  5  onderzoekt  een  tweetal 
vraagfactoren  waarmee  eerder  is  geprobeerd  cyclische  productiviteit  op  geaggregeerd 
niveau te verklaren voor de VS.  
Ten eerste wordt er gekeken of toenemende schaalopbrengsten van belang kunnen 
zijn  voor  procyclische  productiviteit.  In  het  geval  van  toenemende  schaalopbrengsten 
neemt de productie meer dan proportioneel toe bij een toename in productiefactoren. In 
perioden van groei stijgt daardoor de productiviteit, terwijl productiviteit daalt ten tijden Samenvatting 
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van recessies. Een tweede mogelijkheid is dat ongemeten inzet van productiefactoren van 
belang is. Aanpassingkosten voor kapitaal en arbeid zorgen ervoor dat bedrijven in de 
opgaande fase van de cyclus niet meer personeel aannemen of meer investeringen doen. 
In plaats daarvan wordt bijvoorbeeld de bestaande kapitaalgoederenvoorraad gedurende 
meer uren per week ingezet. Het niet adequaat meten van deze extra inzet leidt tot een 
onderschatting van het niveau van de productiefactoren in perioden van  groei en een 
onderschatting  in  perioden  van  krimp.  Hierdoor  is  (gemeten)  productiviteit  ook 
procyclisch. 
Het blijkt dat deze verklaringen voor andere landen dan de VS minder (statistische) 
verklaringskracht  hebben,  maar  dat  ook  in  Europa  de  mate  van  cyclicaliteit  van 
productiviteitsgroei  afneemt.  De  analyse  toont  echter  ook  dat  in  veel  individuele 
bedrijfstakken  deze  correlatie  nog  steeds  significant  positief  is.  Aangezien  het 
economisch  model  met  ongemeten  inzet  van  productiefactoren  is  gebaseerd  op  een 
beschrijving  van  het  gedrag  van  individuele  bedrijven,  is  de  verwachting  dat  de 
verklaringskracht op het meest gedetailleerde niveau minstens zo groot moet zijn als voor 
de gehele marktsector. Dit roept twijfels op over de validiteit van het economisch model. 
Een betere verklaring van cyclische productiviteit laat echter nog op zich wachten. 
Tenslotte blijkt dat wanneer productiviteitsgroei wordt  aangepast voor  variabele 
schaalopbrengsten en ongemeten inzet van productiefactoren, het diverse groeipatroon 
tussen de VS en Europa niet wezenlijk verandert. Zo is de aangepaste productiviteitsgroei 
in  de  VS  nog  steeds  hoger  dan  in  Europa,  mede  dankzij  snelle  groei  in  de 
dienstverlenende sector. Bovendien is de omvang en zelfs het teken van de aanpassing 
erg onzeker. 
Samenvattend, structurele factoren lijken een dominante te spelen in het verklaren 
van  de  achterlopende  arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei  in  Europa.  Zoals  Hoofdstuk  4 
beargumenteert, remt regulering de productieve toepassing van ICT en moet het voor 
goede bedrijven makkelijker worden gemaakt om snel te kunnen groeien terwijl slechte 
bedrijven sneller failliet moeten kunnen gaan. Ook deregulering van de arbeidsmarkt, en 
vooral  lagere  ontslagkosten,  kunnen  de  dynamiek  van  de  Europese  bedrijvigheid 
vergroten. Daarnaast helpen deze maatregelen ook om Europese economieën weerbaarder 
te maken tegen een conjunctuur die uit de pas loopt bij de rest van Europa. 